Norman Naimark's Review of Guenter Lewy's Book

Norman M. Naimark
Stanford University

The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians, Donald Bloxham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xiv + 329 pp., cloth $39.95, pbk $26.95.

The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, Guenter Lewy (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005), xiii + 370 pp., cloth $24.95.


There are few historical episodes more painful than the Armenian genocide. [1] Many thousands of reliable eyewitnesses of various nationalities, Turks included, have written detailed descriptions of the horrors that the Armenians endured—including maiming, torture, starvation, disease, abduction, rape, mental and physical abuse, and mass execution. [2] There continue to be serious debates about how many Armenians died, with estimates ranging from 600,000 to 1.5 million. [3] There can be no controversy, however, about the victims' suffering. [4]

But the pain is not limited to our empathy for the victims and their families. [5] The Turkish government systematically denies the Armenian genocide [6] and silences Turkish writers and intellectuals on the subject; Turkish citizens who have discussed the genocide publicly have been arrested and indicted for "insulting Turkish dignity." [7] The government's attempts to keep allied governments from formally recognizing the genocide have negatively affected Turkish foreign policy. In turn, Turkish policies have prompted equally misguided attempts in other countries to legislate against denial—such as the October 12, 2006, bill passed by the French National Assembly making it a crime to deny that Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of the Turks. [8]

Such ill-advised efforts aside, there can be no question that denial is traumatic for Armenians. As Donald Bloxham writes in his latest work, The Great Game of Genocide, "The massive trauma inflicted on the collective consciousness of the Armenian people is an open wound, continually aggravated by the refusal to acknowledge its infliction" (p. 234). It is almost impossible for the Armenians to come to terms with their past as long as the perpetrators' heirs and their helpmates among Western Ottomanists continue to deny that the genocide took place. [9] Turkish denial has at least three other serious consequences: it precludes dialogue between Turks and Armenians about their common past [10]; it limits access to the Ottoman Turkish archives, making it impossible for researchers to address the many unanswered empirical questions about 1915 [11]; and it deprives the Turkish people of the opportunity to confront their own past. [12] The Armenian genocide is an "open wound" not just for the Armenians, but for the Turks as well.

The historiography of the Armenian genocide has been of little help in resolving the claims and counter-claims by Armenians and Turks. First, the available source base is much weaker than that for Hitler's war against the Jews. We simply do not have the kinds of unambiguous documentation of the intentions, plans, and actions of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government in 1915 that we have of the Nazi regime's "Final Solution." Second, the historiography of the subject remains polarized [12a], with some contributors insisting that genocide was the logical culmination of the Ottoman Muslim regime's policies towards the Christian Armenians, and others asserting that the deportation of Armenians to their death [13] in 1915 was the unfortunate but natural consequence of Armenian disloyalty to the Turkish state under difficult wartime conditions. Both extremes [14] have their obvious faults, as Guenter Lewy emphasizes in his new book, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey. But it is also true that both positions have been modified and made more nuanced in recent scholarship—a fact that Lewy for the most part ignores. [15] In March 2000, scholars Ronald G. Suny, Fatma Muge Gocek, and Kevork Bardakjian initiated a series of annual workshops in Armenian-Turkish studies with the intent of opening a dialogue between Armenian and Turkish scholars. The papers and publications resulting from the workshops have substantially narrowed the gap between the Armenian and Turkish exclusivist narratives. [16] Although the use of the term "genocide" for the massacres in 1915 is still controversial, a great deal of progress has been made in scholarship on the subject. If the Turkish government were to fully open its archives and stop interfering in scholarly inquiry [17] into these events, a sophisticated historical literature would begin to appear within a short time.

Bloxham's and Lewy's studies must be understood in this historiographical context. Given the restrictions on access to sources, neither can provide the detailed narrative and analytical history of the events of 1915 that the field so desperately needs. Within these limitations, however, the two works are deeply researched and well written; Bloxham is an especially engaging stylist. [18] Each work is revisionist in its own way, challenging the traditional "Armenian" story of the 1915 genocide that is represented above all by Vahakn Dadrian's pioneering scholarship. Lewy seems to have a particular animus for Dadrian's work, though he cites Dadrian's research to support his own arguments as frequently as he criticizes it. [19] In an effort to contextualize the events of 1915 in the international system without depriving them of their meaning for the victims, Bloxham situates the genocide squarely within the history of the "Eastern Question." [20] Both authors take the story of the Armenian genocide up to the present, making serious arguments about the contemporary relevance of Turkish denial to world affairs. But the similarities end here.

Some might characterize Lewy's book as an exercise in denial. I would not. Rather, I would argue that the author engages in a kind of exaggerated empiricism, claiming to be interested only in the facts and having "no special axe to grind" unlike "most of those who have written on the subject of the Armenian massacres" (p. x). In this statement, Lewy appears to overlook the work of historians of Armenian background, such as Ronald G. Suny [21], who write critically about the Armenian historiography of the genocide, as well as the growing number of Turkish historians—Taner Akçam, for example—who are ready to recognize the genocide and are critical of Turkish denial. While Lewy cites Akçam and especially Suny approvingly, he takes no notice of their unapologetic use of the term "Armenian genocide." [22] Likewise, he appears to disregard the recent explosion of comparative historical literature on mass killing that treats the Armenian events of 1915 as an example of genocide (by Isabel Hull, Benjamin Lieberman, Michael Mann, Manus Midlarsky, Norman Naimark, [23] Samantha Power, Jacques Semelin, Benjamin Valentino, Eric Weitz, and others). This literature adds little in the way of new facts or figures to the story of 1915, but it is important to our understanding of the CUP government's responsibility for genocidal actions against the Armenians. [24]

Lewy claims repeatedly that he is not interested in the larger question of the judicial definition of genocide. But the book is nothing if not a systematic attempt to poke holes in the argument that the mass killing of the Armenians in 1915 constituted genocide. [25] Lewy first criticizes the "Armenian" argument that a genocide occurred. He then reviews the "Turkish" argument that the deportations of 1915 were a consequence of Armenian disloyalty and rebellion and justifiable Turkish fears of partition. The Armenian losses that resulted were part and parcel of the wartime situation, according to this argument; many Turks died as well. Here, Lewy criticizes the absurd official Turkish view that the Armenian deaths were a consequence of civil war. [26] Finally, he retells the story of the deportations themselves from his own—supposedly objective[27]—standpoint and demonstrates to his own satisfaction that there was no premeditation or planning of mass killing on the part of the Young Turk government. [28] Therefore, he concludes, the events do not meet the definition of a genocide.

Let me be clear: one can learn a lot from reading this monograph. Lewy has used an impressively wide range of sources and has an excellent grasp of the available documentary record. [29] He relates with sympathy the horrors that Armenians suffered on the forced marches and when the survivors arrived in Syria and Mesopotamia. However, he puts forward the specious argument that if one cannot "prove" definitively the involvement of the CUP triumvirate in the events in the way that one can prove the Nazis' involvement in the Holocaust, then the events cannot correctly be labeled genocide. [30] He claims, for example, that because the Young Turks exempted some Armenians in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo from deportation, they could not have engaged in genocide. "These exemptions," he writes, "are analogous to Adolf Hitler failing to include the Jews of Berlin, Cologne, and Munich in the Final Solution" (p. 251). That the Young Turks did not engage in extensive deportations in these cities could not have been, he insists, the result of an effort to avoid adverse publicity, as so many historians [31] have argued, since knowledge of the deportations was widespread. But in fact, there is every indication that concerted foreign pressure kept certain local Turkish administrations from deporting Armenians. [32] Moreover, at least some Jews in Berlin (and elsewhere in Germany) did survive the Holocaust. This in no way diminishes the argument for use of the term "genocide" in the German case; neither does the survival of a few Armenian communities undermine its application in the Armenian case. [33] No historical or judicial definition of genocide assumes that all members of the targeted group are killed. [34] The historical cases of genocide have very different characters and dimensions. For example, the massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica—a relatively small number in the context of mass murder—has been labeled genocide by scholars, as well as by the International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. [35] Finally, if Lewy wishes to maintain his claims to historical objectivity by using accepted judicial definitions of genocide, then the difficulty of finding direct evidence for the Young Turks' premeditated planning of mass murder should not prevent him from concluding that genocide took place. At its core, then, Lewy's argument is illogical. [36]

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The rest of Dr. Naimark's review gets into Bloxham's book, not a part of this page's theme, and has therefore been excluded. Readers who are interested in learning more about this work are invited to consult Prof. Norman Stone's equally dual review of both Bloxham's and Lewy's books. Here, we learn Bloxham guided the Edinburgh City Council to recognize the "genocide," which tells us a great deal as to where Bloxham stands. Bloxham also goes with the usual propagandistic conclusions, such as a figure of 1.2 million for the Armenian dead. Prof. Stone comments that "We take a tour round some by now very familiar arguments and sources.," which reveals that Bloxham relied very much on the usual propaganda (including Dadrian, much as Bloxham has sometimes criticized Dadrian, to Bloxham's credit. Of note is that Naimark did not hurl even a variation of the same criticism he leveled against Lewy, that is, "though he cites Dadrian's research to support his own arguments as frequently as he criticizes it"; perhaps Bloxham got a free pass here because his criticism of Dadrian was not as frequent), without caring about conducting original research as to whether there was a genocide or not. (After criticizing Bloxham for sometimes offering "inadequate evidence to buttress his arguments concerning the central planning of the massacres," fellow genocide-believer Dr. Donald Quataert wrote [in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Autumn, 2006] of this book: "Bloxham does not consult Ottoman archival sources.In fact, he uses few Turkish secondary ones.Thus, his is not an Ottomanist tract ...[using] Ottoman-language sources in significant measure. His is always the externalist view,events as seen from the outside by Europeans and Americans.")

If Bloxham conducted new research, Naimark fills us in on where Bloxham preferred to concentrate (emphasis Holdwater's):

The argument that the European powers and, eventually, the United States played an important role in the Armenian tragedy is not a new one. In his Armenian Atrocities (1915) and especially in his Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922), Arnold Toynbee was highly critical of what he saw as Western contributions to the explosion of national conflict in the Ottoman realm. But Bloxham has mustered a great deal of fresh evidence from a variety of European and American archives to capture the dynamic relationship between Great Power interests in the Ottoman Empire and the growing Armenian nationalist movement.

(What scholar wishing to preserve his integrity would cite an invalid booklet such as Armenian Atrocities, which was published by England's war propaganda division, Wellington House, without a disclaimer?)

Naimark goes very easy on his fellow genocide scholar, of course. The one time he is slightly critical:

Bloxham writes: "It is highly likely, given the repeated intensification of anti-Armenian policy over the previous decades when outside attention had been forced onto the Armenian question ... that the Allied threat was itself responsible for precipitating the general deportation decision" (pp. 85–6). While judging Great Power policies harshly, Bloxham tries to avoid leaving the inevitable impression that it was the Entente and not the Turks who were responsible for the genocide. In my view, he is not always successful.

What a dilemma for a genocide scholar such as Bloxham; he travels down the path of events leading to the "genocide," and time after time recognizes that if it were not for imperialist interference and the Europeans' use of the Armenians as pawns, the Armenians would have never been foolhardy enough to take the traitorous course they embarked upon (relying on Allied promises, or by living in the fantasy world that the Allies would give the Armenians the hand-outs they were hoping for), leading to their tragic fate, and yet Bloxham stops short of the "inevitable conclusion," because that conclusion would go completely against the dishonest genocide world's wishing to lay blame on one and only one culprit, in this case, their favorite Turkish whipping boy. And it sounds like fellow genocide scholar Naimark bristled at the very suggestion.

After wrongly informing us that a "new, independent Armenia" was formed after the war had ended (when in fact Armenia came into being in 1918, and the Ottoman Empire got the credit for conceiving and recognizing it), Naimark gets offensive with: "...An admission (of genocide by Turkey, in Bloxham's view) would have undermined the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic because, as Turkish scholars have pointed out, there was considerable continuity of personnel between those involved in the Armenian genocide and those who joined the institutions of Kemalist Turkey." (Emphasis Holdwater's.) It is so dishonest to refer to Armenian propagandists as Taner Akcam and Fatma Muge Gocek as "Turkish scholars," as though they would represent the average, objective Turkish scholar. (But that is exactly part of the value of opportunists such as Akcam and Gocek, so that genocide scholars can pass them off as typical Turks.) Much more dishonest is the notion that those who went on to serve in the Turkish Republic were genocidal criminals. Where is the proof?

Naimark then wonders "why the murderous legacy of the Ottoman government in 1915 cannot be decoupled from the legitimacy of the new Turkish Republic," which is naive at best and disingenuous at worst. The whole idea of the Armenian genocide propaganda apparatus is to form a link between Turkey and the empire it overthrew, for a host of reasons everyone already knows about. (Dr. Dennis Papazian can tell us about one.)

Finally, Naimark reminds us that "Some Armenians continue to call for the return of their homeland and urge the United States and Europe to intercede with the Turks on their behalf." Since the Turks did not go to war with the Armenians over this land centuries ago, but instead with those who had already conquered the Armenians (that list is long; the Byzantines serve as the relevant example), it would be helpful for the responsible scholar who values truth to remind unwary readers that what "some Armenians" call for would be as ludicrous as expecting any nation that conquers California to return the state, part and parcel, to Mexico. (And if Mexico should be a lucky recipient in this insanely unrealistic scenario, then Mexico would need to give this land, in turn, to American Indians. None of this takes into account, of course, as to whether Eastern Anatolia ever comprised the Armenians' "ancient homeland" in the first place.)

A Quick Look at Dr. Naimark

Of course, we had to take at least a surface look into the background of Dr. Naimark, and a web bio describes him as "an expert in modern East European and Russian History. His current research focuses on Soviet policies and ... on genocide and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century." He is a professor of history at Stanford University, where he earned his degrees. So he is one of those few genocide scholars who has a background of history, and as so happens with the corrupting influence of genocide studies, has forgotten the rules of honest history. What a pity!

Professor Norman Naimark

He wrote a 2001 book entitled, "Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe," which was reviewed at the American Historical Review (AHR). Naimark earns points for paying heed to the fate of Chechens and Crimean Turks in the Soviet Union, not the usual terrain for biased genocide scholars. (Remember the beginning of Naimark's review, where he declared few genocides were more painful than the Armenians' experience? Wouldn't either of these have qualified as at least as painful? Why then is Prof. Naimark giving so much attention to the overexposed Armenians, when he could venture on a muted crusade for powerless peoples whose death cries have been seldom heard?) We are not surprised to learn the Armenian story gets coverage in his book ("the state-coordinated mass slaughter of Armenians in World War I-era Turkey"), hitting the Turks again with "the subsequent Greco-Turkish 'population exchange'." ("The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne set a dangerous historical precedent, he [Naimark] contends, by lending an aura of legality and respectability to the expulsion of nearly 1.5 million Greek Orthodox people from Turkey and over 350,000 Muslims from Greece—a violent and brutal demographic upheaval that had largely run its course by the time the treaty was negotiated.") Was Naimark aware the Turks were against this idea, according to Greek historians? (Armenian and genocide propaganda often presents this episode as yet another example of Turkish brutality, fulfilling the Turks' wishes of ridding the nation of its Christian inhabitants.)

An August 02, 2004 article written by Norman M. Naimark, "Sudan: Bosnia Repeated? How genocides begin," and appearing in the National Review, impressed me, as it demonstrated the professor is capable of breaking ranks with the genocide world. For example, he resists, in this article, of classifying Bosnia as a genocide, inasmuch as he began the particular passage dangerously ("Bosnia offers another warning, however, and that is how quickly ethnic cleansing can turn into genocide..."); he only refers to the "Srebrenica" part of Bosnia as genocide, blaming only the Bosnian Serbs, two-and-a-half years before the U.N. court at the Hague would arrive at the very same conclusion! That I found remarkable, because everyone (including myself, at times) used the easy shorthand of "genocide" for Bosnia, simply because everyone else was calling it a genocide. Here is the part that was especially impressive:

Some journalists and human-rights organizations want to label the violence in Sudan as genocide, as a way to jump-start sanctions against and intervention in Sudan. But Secretary Powell is correct to reject that interpretation of events. This is not Rwanda, he stated, where genocide did take place. The aggression in Sudan, like that in Bosnia, does not constitute intentional mass-murder, but rather the violent expulsion of peoples from their lands. Ethnic cleansing is bad enough, and this "crime against humanity" requires the immediate and forceful action of the international community.

The U.S. government subsequently did characterize Darfur as a "genocide," but I don't know how much of that had to do with pressure from those using genocide as a political weapon, and how much had to do with aggression by the Sudanese government, which subsequently intensified. But the point is, Prof. Naimark is aware of how dishonest some parties can be, anxious to pin the genocide label regardless of truthful application to the 1948 U.N. Genocide Convention. (For ostensibly moral purposes, in order to rescue victims so in need of relief, but so wrong on the other hand, because these matters are rarely black and white; to prematurely charge an entity with the worst crime against humanity using only selective facts is an entirely immoral enterprise.)

Naimark is also to be commended for having written a book on Soviet misbehavior in Germany ("The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945—1949") which a reviewer indicated made the Nazis near-saints in comparison with Nazi misbehavior in the Soviet Union. Of course, German suffering is off the agenda in the genocide world, which usually does not allow departures from its holy designations of villains and victims. According to the reviewer, Naimark does not care for such double standards, or as Naimark has put it, the "pseudoscience of comparative victimology."

So why hasn't Naimark applied this professional caution and open-mindedness with the Armenian story? And why is he content with embracing such obvious propaganda (given the conflict-of-interest nature of practically all sources of Armenian genocide proponents), even when purer information and logic is made available to him, as with Prof. Lewy's book? And then he actually, as a "historian" sworn, in effect, to be objective and to restrain his emotions/prejudices, goes so far as to try and put down an entirely honest and courageous book, a book that should have served to open his eyes, finally classifying it as "illogical."

The Review

Journal of Genocide Research (2007), 9(1), March, 135–163

Book reviews

The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide
Guenter Lewy
Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2005
384 pp, $24.95 (hbk)

I should like to confess that upon reading Guenter Lewy’s article, “Revisiting the Armenian genocide,” 1 the purpose of which was to prepare audiences for his forthcoming book, I was left with the impression that The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey was not a work to bother with. I feel constrained to confess further that this impression did not change much after I finished reading the complete text. [37] Even if we put aside Lewy’s attempt to “excuse” the mass murder in question, and to insist that it is necessary to assign blame to the Armenians themselves for the mishap that befell them 2 —an attitude rarely encountered in academia [38]—a more fundamental problem exists. To be precise, Lewy’s book seems to be the work of someone who has not mastered the subject. [39]

One of Lewy’s core theses is: yes, the Armenians were killed, but it is difficult to argue that this occurred without any cause. Well, unless one ascribes mass murder to a condition of insanity, perpetrators always have reasons for their actions that may be considered “sensible.” [40] It is therefore natural that the Ottoman authorities felt there were “logical reasons” for the annihilation of their Armenian citizens. [41] It appears that, for this reason in particular, diplomats belonging to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are distributing this book freely, as representing “the official Turkish position.” [42] And for this reason, I need to write a lengthy critique in response. 3 [43]

One of Lewy’s claims is that he is situated outside the parameters of what he describes as “the Turkish view” and “the Armenian view.” [44] He alleges that his book “subjects the rich historical evidence available to the test of consistency and (as much as the state of knowledge allows) attempts to sort out the validity of the rival arguments” (p x). Actually, one could grant the legitimacy of such an endeavour. A book that does not shy away from interpreting the opposite views on the events of 1915, exploring the facts and documents on which these views are grounded, could prove useful, especially to those new to the subject. Lewy, though, not only fails in his self-assigned task; he instead pursues a highly pretentious one. [45] As with his study of the Sinti and the Roma (“Gypsies”) in World War II, 4 his intent is to show that although events were indeed tragic, they did not constitute a “real” genocide, as central organization and state-sponsored premeditation were absent. [46]

Thus, Lewy writes: “The argument that the deportations [of Armenians] in reality constituted a premeditated program of extermination of the Armenians of Turkey is difficult to square with many aspects and characteristics of the relocations ...The fact that large numbers of Armenians died or were killed during the course of the deportations can give us no reliable knowledge of who is to be held responsible for these losses of life. The high death toll certainly does not prove in and of itself the guilt of the Young Turk regime” (pp 251, 54). In fact, he contends, “no authentic documentary evidence exists to prove the culpability of the central government of Turkey for the massacre of 1915–6” (p 250). Undoubtedly, there were deaths, but they resulted from “harsh climate, the long distance to be traversed on foot, and the arbitrariness of local officials” (p 254). In addition to starvation and disease, Armenians were “killed by Kurds ...or fanatic Muslims, who regarded the Armenians as infidels and traitors” (p 256). But a “large number of Turkish civilians [also] died as a result of severe shortages of food and epidemics,” and “large numbers of Turkish soldiers ...perished ...these results surely do not prove that the Ottoman government—ultimately responsible for all of these conditions—sought and intentionally caused the death of its own civilian population, of its own soldiers ...” (p 54). “There is a difference,” Lewy argues, “between ineptness, even ineptness that has tragic and far-reaching consequences, and the premeditated murder of a people” (p 256). [47]

In order to buttress these assertions, Lewy declares to be untrue, invalid, and unreliable the documents and related materials produced by those who characterize the experience of 1915 as genocide or a crime against humanity. 5 Prime among these “unreliable” documents are those of Naim–Andonian; 6 [48] Lewy contends that Orel and Yuca 7 “have raised enough questions about [the documents’] genuineness as to make any use of them in a serious scholarly work unacceptable” (p 73). A second set of documents that Lewy considers unacceptable are those obtained in connection with the proceedings of the Istanbul court-martial after the war. The trials were launched for political reasons and “lacked many basic requirements of due process” (p 78); “throughout the trials, no witnesses were heard; the verdict of the courts rested entirely on documents and testimony mentioned or read during the trial proceedings” (p 80). Moreover, “none of the original documents, sworn testimony, and depositions on which the courts based their findings and verdicts” is extant (p 80). Accordingly, Lewy does not hesitate to characterize as “alleged documents” those obtained in the 1919–20 period (p 250). [49]

A third group of documents that Lewy declares invalid are those implicating the Special Organization (hereafter, SO) in the Armenian deportations and massacres. These charges first came to light in the key indictment, by the Turkish Military Tribunal, of the Ittihadist leadership. But according to Lewy, “there is no credible evidence other than the assertion of the indictment of the main trial for the allegation that SO, with large numbers of convicts enrolled in its ranks, took the lead role in the massacres ...There is no evidence anywhere that ...any ...SO detachment was diverted to duty involving the Armenian deportation” (pp 84–85).

Lewy consigns to the sword all other conceivable sources that might be used to demonstrate that the extermination of the Armenians was the result of a deliberately exterminatory decision of Istanbul’s central authorities, i.e. the government and the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). [50] German documents are indeed important to “help establish the terrible suffering of the deported Armenians and occurrence of massacres,” but “they do not prove the responsibility of the central government in Constantinople for these killings” (p 135). The British Blue Book is “based on hearsay” (p 138) and “contains no evidence proving the responsibility of that government for the massacres that did occur” (p 139). Missionary reports reflect prejudice and one-sidedness, portrayed Muslims as “the terrible Turk” and Armenians as “innocent victims” (p 144). As to “survivor accounts,” they are hardly reliable, since they “do not so much reproduce reality or reconstruct history as present a version of reality in tune with the survivor’s personality, perceptions, and experiences” (p 148). As for consular agents in the field, who “concluded that the high death toll was an intended outcome of the deportations,” though these officials were “well-informed ...about the horrible events unfolding before their eyes, their insight into the mindset and the real intention of the Young Turk leadership was necessarily limited to hunches and speculation” (p 251).

After attempting to demolish these diverse sources [51], Lewy counters with his own “alternative explanation”: “that the various decrees issued by the government in Constantinople dealing with the deportation and its implementation are genuine and were issued in good faith. The Ottoman Government, I am inclined to believe, wanted to arrange an orderly process but did not have the means to do so” (pp 252–253).

If there was a well-intentioned government in Istanbul, how is one to explain the magnitude of Armenian mortality? [52] Lewy seeks to provide us with a model. One leg concerns “the incompetence and the inefficiency” of the authorities in Istanbul. Despite their good intentions, they did not have the tools or the organization to implement such a gigantic undertaking. It was a “bureaucratic fiasco” (p 253). [53] A second leg is that local authorities did not listen to Istanbul, and acted on their own initiative, while “the ability of the central government to influence the events ...remained limited” (p 208). As a result, “some killings ...[were] organized by CUP fanatics, who in certain towns formed a kind of shadow government,” and the central government “had little or no control” over “the arbitrary actions of the local authorities” (p 231). Local leaders disobeyed the edicts of the central authorities in part because many of them “were Muslims who had been forced to flee from the Balkans or Russia and therefore hated all Christians with great vehemence” (p 231). In places, as at Erzurum and Adana, this led to a “tug of war ... between the constituted authorities and the CUP radicals” (p 165). Others responsible for the atrocities that Lewy cannot deny were committed include Kurds, gendarmes, brigands, volunteers and or irregulars (whose identities he is unable to pinpoint accurately)—in any case, not people closely identified with the CUP.

The picture grows clouded, however, when it comes to Syria and Iraq. Since such categories as “brigands” and “irregulars” were no longer operational, and only gendarmes and Circassians were left, then the murders in question were perpetrated by members of these two groups. [54] As for German reports from Ras-ul-Ain, where the kaymakam (county executive) had, upon the orders of the central government, organized the killings there, Lewy’s verdict is as follows: “Whether the massacres had indeed been perpetrated on command from above, and, if so, on whose command, will probably never be known” (p 210). [55]

Lewy stretches his theory of lack of control so far that for him, the gendarmes themselves, who were tasked to “protect” the deportee convoys [56] and who were under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, were beyond the control of the government. [57] Yet even Halil Mentese, the wartime Ottoman Foreign Minister, conceded that the anti-Armenian crimes were perpetrated by the gendarmes (p 225). [58] Lewy confirms this, stating that “Turkish gendarmes and Kurds often cooperated in arranging for massacres and the looting of Armenian convoys” (p 224). He is unable to explain how contingents attached to the Interior Ministry could operate beyond the control of that ministry, suggesting only that the gendarmes “were known to be ignorant, corrupt, and poorly trained” (p 224). [59] The wartime release of convicts from jail, and their integration into the gendarmerie, aggravated the situation. Lewy maintains that these “hardened convicts” were the “men who in many towns murdered the Armenians arrested in the spring of 1915” (p 225). It was the government that emptied the prisons and released the convicts; it was again the government that incorporated them into gendarmerie units. Yet as far as Lewy is concerned, the behaviour of these gendarmes had nothing to do with central government dispositions. [60]

Another point eagerly pushed by Lewy concerns the systematic liquidation of Armenian conscripts enlisted for labour battalion work. By declaring, “in most cases we do not know who was responsible for the killings” (p 229), Lewy— who grants that the practice occurs—tries to squeak through the implications of the evidence: “many questions, including the ultimate responsibility for the massacres, remain unanswered” (p 168). [61]

Holdwater's Notes 

^37. It is truly difficult to stomach the utter gall of Taner Akcam. Here he is, needing to switch to a new career since his old one became life-threatening (once his fellow Kurdish terrorists came gunning for him), and what a perfect bedfellow he found in the deep-pocketed Armenian network. The extremist Armenians hate the Turks, and will do everything to get Westerners to share in the hatred that binds their diaspora together. Taner Akcam is also allergic to matters Turkish. Each took their common purpose, and made use of the other for the rewards both would richly provide. Under the tutelage of his mentor, and by practically copy-pasting Dadrian's poisonous research, Akcam earned his university degree and has continued his one-note academic career ever since, nicely compensated by Armenian foundations. So he is a propagandist through and through, and without any shame, presents himself as a real scholar, not only the equal of Guenter Lewy, but one who is superior!

^38. His rapid-fire assaults would have spun the head of Machine Gun Kelly. [1] Lewy had no reason to "excuse" this genocide myth; his purpose was to find the real evidence. There was none. Had there been, Lewy would have had no reason but to present such evidence. [2] We have already presented the agreement of powerful Armenians of the period who agreed no less, such as the terrorist Armen Garo, and Prime Minister Katchaznouni, who added that it is the national psychology of the Armenians to blame others, but the "terrible fact," as he put it, was that the mishap that befell the Armenians would have never happened if the Armenians did not stir things up. [3] Even if "academia" disagrees with the findings of Dr. Lewy, since when do we go with the majority's word, if our objective is to find truth? Most of American society also agreed, at one time not very long ago, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Consent can easily be manufactured by the ones in power and the ones with an agenda, if only one view of events is controlled and allowed to seep through.

But what is this "academia" that blindly agrees with the genocidists? Historian Donald Quataert, in his review ("The Massacres of Ottoman Armenians and the Writing of Ottoman History") of Bloxham's book that was referenced above, outlines reasons for the "long lapse of serious Ottomanist scholarship" regarding the Armenians. (No reason is provided, other than "self-censorship." What was the idea, to protect Turkey and to cover up Turkish crimes? Why would American graduate students of Ottoman history from the 1960s have done so? Quataert has mysteriously become pro-genocide, and let's hope the impression he was trying to convey was not that the Turkish government was paying off these students. Otherwise, he and the others weren't doing their historical duty, if they avoided what looked like dark chapters in Turkish history. He then embarrassingly cites — through Armenian sources — the late 2005 genocide conference in Turkey (Footnote 17), where Turkish historians are supposed to have "debated" the subject, as though debate in Turkey had been nonexistent before then, and as though debate could have been possible in this "fixed" conference where those with contra-genocide views were barred. In point of fact, real historians in the USA and other Western nations were getting into the act in the 1970s and 80s, but were quickly frightened away by unscrupulous genocidists bent on assassinating their character and reputations. (With the threat of physical attack by Dashnak thugs rarely far behind, in those frightening years of Armenian terrorism.) Since propaganda-pushing Armenian and genocide scholars are mostly what is left in the study of this subject, only those who are full-fledged members of this gang can describe themselves as "academia," and still keep a straight face.

^39. Cue in the far more reliable opinion, above, of one who at least has a degree in history, informing us of the reality. Thank you, Prof. Naimark.

^40. As Ronald Reagan worded it, "There he goes again," straying from the main point, in order to distract and confuse. What the dishonest Armenian propaganda machinery does is present the "extermination" conclusion as though these events had existed in a vacuum. That is what Lewy was getting at. We don't need this dopey lecture about perpetrators' always having a reason; the whole idea is to find out whether the accused were perpetrators in the first place.

^41. "Annihilation" is the favorite word of Master Vahakn Dadrian. It means "not a trace is left." Around 1.1 million survived, about two-thirds of the pre-war population. Moreover, the bulk died from non-murderous reasons, like the bulk of all Ottomans who died during these years. Not honest.

^42. Dr. Lewy will address this horrid point in his rebuttal, which will follow. What is Akcam implying, that Guenter Lewy is an "agent of the Turkish government"? Since Lewy came upon his conclusions independently and objectively, what Akcam is really telling us is that the anathema of genocidists, “the official Turkish position," must actually be coming from an honest perspective.

^43. Should not the reason, and the only reason, for this self-described member of "academia" be, what is the truth?

^44. Note how this point is presented, as "one of Lewy's claims," as though Lewy was trying to put one over on us. Is there any reason to suspect this claim is false? If not, why would anyone who is not wily attempt to present Lewy as a potential and secret "agent of the Turkish government"? (Dadrian had put Lewy in the position of a "committed partisan," in Dadrian's own smear effort against Lewy. It appears Dadrian's Turkish protégé must always follow in the master's footsteps.)

^45. If this were a boxing ring, this chumpion would have been disqualified for such a low blow. (And he would have been counted out for raising the specter of "denialism," thus further prejudicing his genocide-sappy audience, with the citing of Lewy's Gypsy book, as Akcam does with his following point.) Lewy's job is to interpret all views on the events of 1915, not just one, and to see where the truth lies. By even mentioning that Lewy's notion was to primarily interpret the "opposite" (i.e. "Turkish") views, and to imply that this is such a novel idea, Akcam exposes himself to be the scholarly fraud he is. For it is the duty of a real scholar to take all relevant information into account, before arriving at a scientific conclusion, which is exactly what Guenter Lewy has done.

^46. It is debatable whether this should come as news to Taner Akcam, but what he has described is exactly the "intent" of any honorable and professional scholar, to see if there is actual evidence to prove something as serious as "state-sponsored premeditation." Is Akcam telling us that had Lewy found such evidence, Lewy's "intent" would have been to cover it up? (Putting aside the notion that Lewy has ignored nothing, and has not covered anything up; in other words, the one thing Guenter Lewy cannot be accused of is practicing the fine art of "omission" that those as Taner Akcam and Vahakn Dadrian excel at.) What reason would Guenter Lewy have to do so? Such dreadful insinuations.

^47. And such logic, honesty and devotion to fact is what separates, ladies and gentlemen, the "man" of a scholar that Lewy is, and the "boys" that comprise those propagandists and fools who are part of the genocide world, anxious to latch on to anything, regardless of how corrupt, in order to buttress their precious agendas.

^48. Note how our favorite village idiot put the word, unreliable, in quotation marks, as if the disgusting Aram Andonian forgeries should actually be paid serious attention to, in this day and age. The British rejected them for the Malta Tribunal (1919-21). Even the 1921 Berlin kangaroo court trying Soghoman Tehlirian rejected them. No one, not even the bulk of Armenian scholars today, would be caught dead pointing to them. Only those who have hopelessly lost touch with reality, or who are desperate, in the service of their propagandistic agendas, would dare point to this evil work, and two of the most notable are Vahakn Dadrian, and Taner Akcam himself. (The reader will note that although Mr. Akcam has made it sound like Lewy is off-base here, since it is only Lewy that "contends" the Andonian matter is rotten and Akcam does not indicate that Lewy could have a point, Akcam does not follow up with why Andonian should be reliable, despite going on to furiously address the two other key components that failed to earn Lewy's respect, the 1919-20 courts and the Special Organization. As an additional point, we can see through his Footnote 6 that Akcam flat out writes: "Andonian received these documents from an Ottoman officer by the name of Naim Bey." Now, since Andonian's work is such an obvious exercise in fakery — so crude, that in the book itself, the "narrator" who is supposed to be Naim suddenly adopts Andonian's voice, alternating off and on — how can any "historian" write a line like that as though it were a fact, when it is fairly obvious that "Naim Bey" was none other than Aram Andonian? Akcam himself, in a rare brush with honesty back in 1992, had written: "There are important grounds for considering these documents fake." )

^49. Perhaps, indirectly, this was Akcam's way of validating Andonian (see previous footnote), since Andonian had claimed that he had "lost" his precious originals. (He was certainly not going to be foolish enough to have anyone examine these originals for their authenticity.) If the 1919-20 Ottoman courts-martial materials are also "lost" (as Akcam has told us in more places than we can count, as in a recent interview where he was quoted as saying, "The originals of these documents are not known. We assume that they have been destroyed after Turkish nationalists took over Istanbul"), and all that survives are what has appeared in the corrupt newspapers of the corrupt postwar puppet Ottoman governments, then what real scholar would or could trust these nonexistent documents? If documents are not to be found, of course they would be "alleged documents," and only a fool, an amateur or a propagandist would point to secondhand, "hearsay" sources as trustworthy.

^50. And it is about time, since Armenian propaganda is so full of nonsense and forgeries. (Of the latter, a few examples that Lewy analyzed, something we all must be grateful for, as I have never encountered any other reliable source that so comprehensively has done the same.) The question here, however, is if Lewy put these corrupt claims "to the sword," did Lewy did so frivolously, as Akcam is making it sound? Or did he do so with class-A scholarship backing up such conclusions?

^51. And every conclusion is the truth. This is why Armenian propaganda will be in immense peril once the Turk-prejudiced world proves willing to look at all of this non-evidence with a serious and objective eye. (Rest assured, that day will come. Those as Akcam know his dishonest world of genocide is in trouble, and that is why he is taking Dadrian's lead, putting emphasis on statements of the Ottoman Turks, very often "hearsay" in their own right. But that is all right, as Akcam knows the prejudiced Western world will accept whatever Akcam says, without any scrutiny. This is why Akcam's duty is to try and "demolish" one as Guenter Lewy, because a non-partisan crackerjack scholar would be listened to — although given the non-listening of someone as Norman Naimark, even that is in question.)

It must be added that in one of the examples provided, we have the greatest proof of how far Lewy bent backwards to be fair to the Armenians. The racist missionaries were the allies of the Armenians, their prayers giving them a God-given license to vilify the heathen Turks, and (in general) I would not consider missionary testimony to be reliable at all. Yet Prof. Lewy has made extensive use of missionary testimony. In a way, he (i.e., one who is trying to go straight down the middle of both sides) cannot be blamed, as missionaries, besides the consuls, were the only Westerners around, and these people were the closest thing that came to serving as "neutral" witnesses, much as the missionaries and bigoted consuls were anything but neutral.

^52. By the same token, then how are we to explain the magnitude of the Ottoman non-Armenian mortality, the bulk of whom similarly died of famine and disease? Did the Ottoman government perpetrate a "genocide" on these Muslims and Jews, as well?

^53. Even the missionary Mary Graffam agreed with that assessment, at least while the events were transpiring: "Most of the higher officials are at their wits end to stop these abuses and carry out the orders which they have received, but this is a flood and it carries all before it."

^54. Syria and Iraq? Aren't they where most of the Armenians were transferred to? So let's tackle this point by simple logic. If the gendarmes (and the "Circassians" who, it sounds, must have been under the command of the gendarmes, as Akcam presented both in one lump sum) were under orders to exterminate these hundreds of thousands of transported Armenians, how many Armenians would have been left? (The rational answer: close to "zero" Armenians. The reality: most survived, the ones who died dying mainly from non-murderous reasons.) Secondly, were all the other irregular bands and lawless chettes absent from these regions, all of a sudden? In other words, is that true, the only non-Armenians around who could cause harm were the gendarmes and the Circassians? (It is not as though the Kurds were absent from these regions, for example; we know even from today's headlines that Kurds comprise a good part of Iraq.) Let's see now, who were the main residents of Syria and Iraq? Why, that would be the "Arabs," wouldn't it? Weren't the Arab tribes perhaps second only to the Kurdish tribes in swooping down on convoys and other helpless folks? (Just as this movie classic depicted?) And a good few internal reports (reports we must believe, as they were not meant to be publicized), indicate these Arab tribes were keeping busy. For example, in Talat's Sept. 8, 1915 telegram to the Governor of Urfa, the Aleppo governor reported that about two thousand Armenians ("transferred from Suruc to Aleppo via the route of Menbic") were attacked by Arabic tribes, and stripped naked. In a Nov. 3, 1915 telegram to the Diyarbakir governor, Talat instructed the routes be changed, because "the convoys sent through the said [previously established] route had to turn back due to attacks by Arabs and the other tribes." (Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, 2007.) These Arab tribes not only made trouble for Armenians, in Hrant Sarian's diary (see FN 56, below), but Turks and Kurds, too; Sarian even related a massacre of Turks by the Arabs, near war's end. Lewy provides the opinions of both U.S. Consul Leslie Davis and Wellington House propagandist Arnold Toynbee that such chettes/brigands (who were certainly still in operation in these areas, unlike what Akcam claims) were out for loot (Toynbee), and preyed "upon all travellers, not just Armenians (Davis)."

If Akcam is referring to Armenians who were murdered after they had reached their destinations, no honorable party would be able to pinpoint accurately their identities, because the factual evidence does not exist, and if one wishes to conjecture the killers were "people closely identified with the CUP," based on hearsay, one would be welcome. That is, if such a party does not care about being regarded as an honest scientist, given the absence of the evidence.

^55. The critical sentence that followed on p. 210, which must have been innocently omitted by Akcam, reads as follows: "Those perpetrating the killings had an obvious interest in pleading superior orders." In other words, even if the kaymakam told Rössler that he was only following orders (and the evidence for this was the German consul's report to Berlin; did Rössler speak fluent Turkish, or did he have to rely on interpreters, who were, in most cases, Armenian?), that does not mean the kaymakam was telling the truth. We have a bunch of other theories outlining this episode, as two Arab deserters who implicated the Kurdish gendarmes guarding the camp ("the Kurds, too, were said to have acted on orders from above." You see, ladies and gentlemen? That is one example of the big difference between an ace scholar as Lewy vs. a propagandist as Akcam. Lewy does not leave any pertinent information out, because Lewy does not take sides. By the way, the source for that last point was what appears to be a British publication — it's a British archival source — called Arabian Report. The key word is that the Kurds were said to have so acted, meaning there was no direct confession, meaning it's only hearsay), as well as a German missionary who felt the "motive for the killings had been greed." Yet what is Akcam's conclusion after all of this uncertainty? He tells us flat out that the kaymakam acted "upon the orders of the central government." Indeed, this is exactly the kind of "proof" that would satisfy a propagandist eager to confirm a pre-arranged conclusion.

^56. Addressing the sarcasm implicit in the quotation marks surrounding "protect," some gendarmes were dirty scoundrels, and some were even killers, or at least coordinated killings. Yet, others dutifully lost their lives in defense of Armenians. The majority was not a bunch of SS thugs, as Dadrian and Akcam are anxious to portray. When we take a look at Hrant Sarian's diary, for example, there is not a word of condemnation of the guards. If anything, we see how they tried to help Sarian's family, for example, when Sarian's mother got sick.

^57. For those who love Holocaust parallels, let's get real. We are not dealing with the cold precision of German efficiency. We are dealing with the laid back, "a la Turca" style of the "Sick Man of Europe."

^58. This Mentese reference does not exist on p. 225, nor in the entire section entitled "The Wartime Gendarmerie" (pp. 224-226), nor is Mentese listed in the index. Akcam must have confused this with a source that was probably Mentese's memoirs, and since Akcam has found him to be such a reliable witness, one wonders why Akcam has ignored the rest of what Mentese had to say that has contradicted Akcam's thesis.

^59. That explains it pretty well, doesn't it? We might add they were poorly paid, and there were times some did not even receive their pay in the bankrupt empire. A natural consequence would be corruption, and a "screw you" attitude toward their "employers."

^60. What Akcam fails to explain (surprise!) is that this "wartime gendarmerie" sub-chapter makes it clear as to how desperate the Ottomans were for manpower. Even the missionary Henry Riggs was recruited to give testimony on p. 224: "The Turks were desperately short of men..." Lewy goes on to explain that "The enlistment of the convicts did not in fact end the shortage of gendarmes," and he did remind the reader elsewhere in his book that recruiting convicts was not an unusual practice in many of the world's armies. (Those who remember the film, "The Dirty Dozen" may attest to that; the fictional film was inspired by the USA's WWII usage of convicts, and it is not like the USA was desperate for men. ADDENDUM: Today's U.S. Military, desperate for recruitment, has issued thousands of so-called "morality waivers," allowing criminals/"scum" to enlist for service in Iraq. Many are gang members, America's modern day equivalent of "chettes" or "brigands.") The Ottoman Empire, already at a low for men given the wars immediately preceding WWI, was besieged on multiple fronts by three of the world's strongest powers, who had arranged to divide the lands of the empire between them. The Ottomans faced a life-or-death ordeal, precisely why the Armenians' rebellion/disloyalty was a dangerously serious affair.

^61. Since when do the "the implications of the evidence" substitute for the "evidence"? What is the evidence that the occasional massacres of Armenian labor battalion soldiers, perpetrated by loose cannons, some of whom actually got executed as punishment, were "systematic"? In addition, if most Armenian soldiers died through famine and disease (given their poor working conditions, typhus outbreaks were frequent), in the same manner that more Ottoman soldiers died of famine and disease rather than combat, how could any honorable party stoop so low as to use the term, "systematic liquidation"?

^62. It is ironic that Taner Akcam, of all people, should suddenly stress the importance of a necessary document, or evidence.

^63. The "Afghanistan" parallel is Akcam's, not (as I recall) Lewy's; I did not at all get the impression that Lewy conveyed the idea that there was an impotent central government basically in control of Istanbul (as the current Afghan government is mainly in control of Kabul), with powerful warlords controlling their own districts — and neither would any other objective reader. That is an absurd parallel; of course, ultimate control rested with the CUP. If ever there was a serious conflict between a local official and the CUP, as something approaching a mutiny, of course the local official would stand no chance, since the CUP ultimately controlled the military. The idea is that there was a lot of "Oriental" wiggle room, and if less honorable locals thought they could get away with something, they would. That is a far cry from challenging the central government outright, or to call attention to not following orders faithfully.

^64. The report I find readily believable is from Jemal Pasha's memoirs, where he wrote in response to Amb. Morgenthau's trying to depict the ones in charge as (in Jemal's word) "Apaches" that "it would never have occurred to Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and all my colleagues even to use a bitter word to each other — much less resort to weapons — ...during the period when we were together in the Ministry."

^65.  But then there is that annoying internal report from Ambassador Henry Morgenthau himself, who wrote that in March 1915, the very month Taner Akcam tells us his "genocide" was decided upon (without offering valid evidence, of course), central control was so weak, the government was about to collapse. And shades of those Afghan warlords, Henry reported that "All over Turkey ambitious chieftains had arisen"! Moreover, the situation was so bad, some Turk "was believed to be plotting to set up his own government. Arabia had already become practically an independent nation." If genocidists can't trust Ambassador Morgenthau, whom can they trust? (Anyone who reads Dr. Lewy's section entitled "THE POWER OF LOCAL OFFICIALS," pp. 231-2, can determine Lewy's conclusions are anything but "hollow speculation," given that the conclusions of these local officials sometimes getting away with disregarding central orders are based on diverse sources friendly to Armenians, including the German Ambassador, a German consul, a U.S. embassy official, and Liman von Sanders. Lewy winds up by reminding his readers that "The local hotheads did not always prevail," meaning that if a showdown was forced, the CUP government held the ultimate cards.)

^66. "Pretence of competence." Mee-OWW! (By the way, did you catch the spelling of "pretense"? Akcam's English fixer-upper appears to have been schooled in "British" English.)

^67. When Dadrian tried to "get" Lewy with this Liparit point in his Jihad Watch smear effort (see FN 44), my response was: "sometimes even the best of us slips up. Slip-ups like Dr. Liparit Nasariantz not being 'a German missionary but an Armenian political activist' are not wholly unimportant, but really approaches nit-picking territory." Let's be fair, here. Dr. Guenter Lewy had a billion details to keep track of, and he was almost certainly working entirely on his lonesome. It's not as though he had the tremendous genocide support network that Taner Akcam has. It's actually rather offensive for Akcam to try and present himself as such a superior scholar by pointing to this triviality, when we all know that if Akcam were left to his own devices, he would have had no idea who "Liparit" was... to say the least. (Another point to ponder: at the least, if Dadrian is correct, this was an honest error, with no misleading intent. Very unlike, for example, Andrew Goldberg and Peter Balakian's PBS Armenian propaganda show [guest starring Taner Akcam], where Auguste Bernau was explained as a simple "traveling businessman," when in reality he was hardly a disinterested party who just happened to be in the vicinity; instead, his mission was to help the Armenians.) 

^68. With the implication that Yalman would have been historically unworthy, it looks like Akcam has inadvertently instructed us to ignore the constant genocide ramblings of his nutty journalist pal, Robert "Tsk-Tsk" Fisk, as Fisk is certainly no historian either. Anyone who has read Kamuran Gürün's excellent book, The Armenian File, knows that Gürün became every inch the historian; his researching skills were overwhelmingly greater than Akcam's, since Akcam has most everything handed to him on a platter, and Gürün's sense of fair play was much in the right place; Gürün even refused to repeat the unflattering descriptions of Armenians that are found all over the memoirs of traveling Westerners. Yes, Gürün was a diplomat, and as a good several other Turkish diplomats, he was forced to become a historian, since no one else in Western nations would defend the disliked Turks; someone had to go up against the unrelenting attacks from those whose mission was to give constant black eyes to the Turks, those like Taner Akcam. Gürün took on this role, and he did a magnificent job. He may not have earned an Armenian-sponsored Ph.D. in history, and in this regard he was exactly as Taner Akcam... since Taner Akcam, who calls himself a "historian," earned an Armenian-sponsored Ph.D. not in history, but in sociology.

^69. If witnesses were dispensed with in even one of these trials, then we can see the ones behind the trials did not have their hearts in the right place, and we can see these trials for what they were — kangaroo courts. Furthermore, if the originals are missing, and all that has survived are excerpts appearing in the newspapers, almost certainly copied from what appeared in the government-controlled newspaper(s), how can we be certain that witnesses for the defense were "allowed," in every single one of the remaining trials? (See following footnote.)

^70. Akcam's "Footnote 9" is most revealing. What we have here are a few cases where references to defense witnesses have been made, and what Vahakn Dadrian has done is point to these few excerpts and speculate that there were defense witnesses in every single one of the 54 other trials. (Stands to reason, doesn't it? All we have are these excerpts that have survived in the newspapers.) Furthermore, since Akcam's knowledge of Ottoman is, at best, next-to-nonexistent, what our self-described "historian" is doing is asking us to take the word of his master, Vahakn Dadrian, as far as the correct translations; anyone who is aware of Dadrian's slimy tactics would be a fool to take such translations at face value. (That's what Dadrian was counting on; who is going to take the trouble to dig up these old newspapers and to double-check the translations? The sleeping Turks?) In addition, even if Dadrian performed an ethical job with the translations, what do these excerpts prove if the newspapers were the organs of the corrupt puppet governments? These postwar governments were rotten to the core — one even signed the Sèvres Treaty, the death-blow to their very nation — and their newspapers were going to publish anything the governments told them to. This is exactly why no legitimate scholar can seriously consider Dadrian and Akcam's "bread and butter," these 1919-20 trials, if the original court transcripts have disappeared.

^71. Zzzzzzzzz.... oh. (Yawn.) Are you still there, dear reader? Yes, that was one incredible stretch of Dadrian blather, wasn't it? Piling on one detail after the other, making you think, by God, Taner Akcam must be on to something, all right. However, those of us who are still able to maintain our sanity are fully aware of these Dadrian tricks, attempting to trap us in those small and prickly bushes, meanwhile neglecting the reality of the rest of the forest. And what the forest tells us is: [1] The British refused to use any of the findings of these kangaroo courts for their own planned Malta Tribunal, because even the British felt these corrupt trials served as a travesty of justice, and [2] — we can't say this often enough — these were the courts of a puppet government that was at the helm of a foreign power occupying the puppet government's nation. This foreign power held a gun to their Turkish lackeys' heads, demanding that culprits had better be found, or else. No court of a vanquished nation, a nation that is occupied by the victors looking to serve their own interests, may be deemed a legal and legitimate court. For a further elaboration, please visit this page.

^72. Prof. Lewy has written a powerful and very comprehensive mini-chapter on "The Role of the Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization)," pp. 82-88 (here is an abbreviated version), and this is what Taner Akcam chose to concentrate on? The entirety of the quote above reads: " The defendants denied any connection between the Special Organization and the central committee of the CUP, however, as well as any role of the SO in the Armenian deportations and massacres.” Isn't that the critical point, whether Vahakn Dadrian's "Gestapo Fall Guy" served as the exterminating squads? The point is that there is no evidence demonstrating that the SO had direct business with Armenians. This point that Akcam has selected to try and trip Lewy up with is practically irrelevant; of course, technically the CUP was in charge of the SO, but the point is, the CUP frequently had no idea what the SO was up to, much like the White House and Congress are usually in the dark regarding CIA activities. It is revealing that Akcam focused on this bit of nothingness, when Lewy has presented an abundance of reliable information that turns Dadrian's SO theories on its ear; in other words, once again, the tactic is not to honestly tackle the big points with solid counter-evidence, but to see how much discrediting may be achieved through the itty-bitty points.

^73. With this pathetic conclusion that has no bearing upon reality, our lovable "village idiot" once again meanders into full-fledged "idiot" territory.

Akcam Responds to Lewy

Taner Akcam responds

I regret that Guenter Lewy feels that I attacked his personal integrity, [74] and am ready to apologize if there is any hint of that in my review. [75] I do insist, however, on my argument that he is not in command of the subject matter. [76]

One can say generally that he makes a lot of assumptions, and goes through contortions to explain away the existing evidence. In fact, he does not provide us with a coherent narrative of the events, but focuses on points of technical detail of which he is not in command. [77] I will give here only two examples, related to his letter.

Since we do not possess the original documents, Lewy dismisses the materials from the supplements of the official gazette of the Ottoman government and the press coverage as unreliable. It is hard to believe that an historian would dismiss so easily the official gazette of a government, when it is the main source for the cabinet decisions, laws, and regulations. [78]

The task of the historian is to uncover and verify information and evidence. Let me give just one example. One of the main documents is the written testimony of Vehip Pasa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman 3rd Army during World War I. Lewy categorized this as unreliable, because, he says, we have only quoted remarks in indictments, and without the full text we lose the context of the quoted remarks.

What Lewy appears to be unaware of is that the entire text of Vehip Pasha’s testimony was published in the daily newspapers of the time (Vakit, March 31, 1919). The same document is available in the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The text of the Jerusalem copy is identical to that published in the Turkish newspaper Vakit, just as with the excerpts of the same document incorporated in the Key Indictment and the Verdict issued by the Turkish Military Tribunal. In other words, the accuracy of Vehip Pasha’s testimony can be determined and corroborated through different sources. [79]

The second point is related to the Teskilat-i Mahsusa. Lewy says that “there is no credible evidence that it had any role in the massacres of Armenians that we know to have taken place.” He cites military historian Edward J. Erickson as his evidence. This shows clearly that Lewy (and also Erickson) is not in command of the subject matter. [80]

First of all, the high officials and responsibles in the Special Organization had personally testified to the involvement of their organization. Yusuf Riza, in the seventh sitting, stated: “Regretfully, we have now reached a point where it becomes evident that under the direct orders of the CUP’s Central Committee, the Special Organization became instrumental for the commission of all the crimes” (Takvimi Vekayi, no 3561, May 29, 1919 issue, seventh sitting, May 17, 1919). [81] At the April 5, 1919 sitting of the Trabzon trial series, Avni Pas[h]a, who was Commandant at the Trabzon province’s Lazistan area during the deportations, stated that “A band of brigands, known as Cemal Azmi’s (Trabzon governor-general) volunteers, and involved in deportations and massacres, were actually S.O. brigands” (Alemdar, April 6, 1919).

Lewy granted in his book that “brigands, irregulars, chettes, volunteers” were involved in massacre operations, and accordingly discussed them at some length. However, he maintains that he was unable to pinpoint the individual identities of the members, and those who organized them. This is another point where Lewy’s lack of knowledge becomes clear. These terms—brigands, irregulars, etc.—are used in official Ottoman language for the Special Organization units. At the fourth sitting of the main trial series, May 8, 1919, for example, the judge posed the following question: “What was meant by the term c[h]ete you have been using? Is it appropriate to designate as brigands a detachment that is connected to the War Ministry and is part of the Army?” In response, Cevad stated that “in the orders issued by the War Ministry,” these kinds of different labels were used, adding that some detachments were called volunteers, others were described as brigands (T.V., no 3549, May 15, 1919; from fourth sitting on May 8, 1919). The terms “brigand, chettes, volunteers” are used for Special Organization units not only in the telegrams introduced in different sittings of the tr[ia]ls, but in the ciphered telegrams sent by the Interior Ministry to the regions. In the Istanbul Prime Ministerial Archive there are dozens of documents showing that the Interior Ministry was involved in the organization of S.O. units in different provinces, and that the terms S.O. and brigands (cete), volunteers, etc., are used synonymously. [82]

These are only some examples among others that I introduced in my lengthy book review of Lewy, published in the Armenian-Turkish journal AGOS in summer 2006. An English translation is forthcoming in Genocide Studies and Prevention. The reader can confirm there, in extensive detail, the factual mistakes that Lewy has made in his book. My hope is that Lewy is ready to revise his position. [83] To make mistakes is normal in our profession. To accept that one has made them is a virtue. [84]

Taner Akcam c 2007
University of Minnesota