Holdwater's Analysis 

^1. This "evidence" may be the most powerful indication that there was a March decision, given what appears to be a credible source, and this is the one we have to focus much attention on. (Even though the timing — that is, whether the "Deportation Law" was formulated in March — is missing. Note as well how Akcam's paragraph begins by referring solely to "massacre," as though relocation is a synonym for massacres, or genocide.) What is this 1934 source, exactly? It was a series of articles appearing in a newspaper about the memoirs of a Special Organization officer nicknamed "A. Mil." In the 1990s, these memoirs were collected and made into a book, and the man's real name turned out to be Cemil Arif. Erman found the book, and hunted for the "March 1915" section that Dadrian/Akcam used from the newspaper.

Arif seems to be following a chronological order in the telling of events without referring to any particular dates. In earlier pages devoted to other events not having anything to do with the Armenian relocation, February is mentioned, and in later pages (again unrelated to Armenians) there is a March reference. It appears, therefore, that this Sakir story took place in March. Sakir is said to have left Artvin (a Russian town taken by the Ottomans at the outset of war in 1914; Sakir was commander of the Special Organization), moved to Erzurum and thereafter arrived in Istanbul (where these meetings are said to have taken place); a rough translation from the book version is as follows:

"Dr. Bahaettin Sakir has witnessed many facts during the period of the four-five months he has spent in Erzurum and at different points of the Caucasian front. The attitude the Armenians have taken up against Turkey and the assistance they provided to the Russian army has led him [Sakir] to the conviction that it was necessary to fear the internal enemies as much as the external ones. The Armenians inside through the banditry organization were threatening the rear of our army and were trying to cut our lines of retreat. Because of its significance, below I provide one of these instruction documents [of Armenian bands] related to the future movements of Armenian bands containing everything including the little details.” (After quoting from a five-page instruction report of the Armenian bands, Arif continues.) "These discussions finally resulted in the formulation of the relocation decision. When Dr. Bahaettin Sakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front after a while, the new situation [became newly apparent. But we won't touch these matters] because the issue of the relocation of Armenians was completely out of the Special Organization’s scope."

How do you like that! Dadrian's witness, Arif, as part of the Special Organization (S. O.), murderously verifies the S. O. had nothing to do with Armenians. (The S. O., of course, is Dadrian's invented "Gestapo Fall Guy.")

We can see Dadrian/Akcam's presentation is totally warped. First, Sakir was not "put in charge" of internal enemies, because it is Sakir himself who is said to have made this decision in the original source. Secondly, and more importantly, note how Dadrian/Akcam refer to the Armenians as “the Armenians inside," making it sound as though all Armenians were in line to get hit by Sakir, when the phrase referred strictly to Armenian rebels or activists via their "banditry organization."

Likewise the sentence, "When Bahaettin Sakir Bey returned to the Caucasian front... the new arrangements had been completely determined,” is completely taken out of context. Akcam gives the impression that based on the supposed extermination plan new regulations were put into practice by the S.O. and Sakir, yet Dadrian/Akcam's very own source maintains that this relocation matter was totally out of the S.O.’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is not that "new arrangements had been completely determined”; the correct translation tells us that a new situation or a new state of affairs had emerged.

Erman notes that the book version is the accurate one, and its words and sentences are in line with Akcam’s 1999 Turkish version of his "Shameful" book. However, in the Turkish book too, Akcam makes manipulations.

In addition, Erman raises the point that we can only wonder what the "March" reference relates to. For example, was it related to the general relocation that began in June, or to local ones? (There were some earlier local and limited relocations in some areas such as Erzurum and Zeitun prior to the Van rebellion, for example.)

Once again, we get another confirmation as to how much Dadrian (and his Turkish instrument) think nothing of displaying such a lack of scholarly ethics, as long as their propagandistic agenda keeps getting affirmed. And those such as Robert Manne think nothing of obliterating their own scholarly credibility by referring to Taner Akcam as "wonderful." (Not that such a description is wholly inaccurate; Taner Akcam does make one wonder, all right.)

^2.  This does not confirm anything in regards to the relocation decision. It only tells us that Sakir was expected in Istanbul for what could have been any number of reasons. Furthermore, if this message was related at all to the Shakir story we have read earlier, the date for which was undetermined, we can see from this one's April date expecting Shakir's visit that we moved even farther away from March. The best information to be gleaned here is that Akcam's copy-pasting from Dadrian's work is interrupted once in a while by the help he receives from some probably "Radikal"-minded Turks in Turkey, in this case, "Fuat Dundar."

^3.  "The battle for Gallipoli was raging" after the Allies had landed on April 25, and we already know from Enver's May 2 telegram (i.e., one week later) that he was of the mind to “remove (the Armenians)… and send them somewhere else.” Is this supposed to serve as "evidence that the decision was made at the end of March"?

What we have here is a great example of Dadrian's "scattershot approach." Dadrian bombards us with so many of the different details he has compulsively gathered through the years, that their collective impact makes it appear as though we have back-to-back "genocide evidence." Yet when one takes the time to really look, one can see it amounts to a big, fat nothing.

^4.  The word to focus on here, regarding what Talat told Mentese, is "reportedly." Since the source is Halil Mentese's memoirs, we are to assume all of this information was derived from these memoirs. Every other bit of information is presented as a "fact" coming from the pages of these memoirs, but only when we get to the critical "Armenian" part are we hit with the word "reportedly." Why was this distinction made? Only a reading of this book will tell the tale as to what Dadrian/Akcam distorted this time. However, it could be that these "important tasks" were not spelled out in these memoirs, and Dadrian/Akcam are indulging in their favorite game of speculation. (The only indication we have that the tasks were Armenian-related will be tackled in the footnote following next.) Furthermore, if Talat really asked how the Armenian topic was handled in Berlin, the question was posed in mid-to-late May, after Mentese's two-month stint in Berlin was up. It could be the Armenian matter was raised toward the end of the stint, as the CUP began to seriously consider the resettlement possibility after May 2nd. A question to be asked is, if these "important tasks" really included the relocation decision, what was the idea? If the Ottomans made up their minds about the necessity to move out the Armenians, what was there to discuss? Is Akcam implying the CUP was trying to get the Germans' permission? All the Ottomans could have done was to inform their German allies of their plans, and it really would have boiled down to delivering a simple message. This is something anyone could have handled, even Cavit Bey, so the logical conclusion is that the "important tasks" were referring to something altogether different.

^5.  Who are Dadrian/Akcam to tell us when the accurate arrival date was? It could easily turn out that Cavit Bey was the mistaken one. Naturally, it would suit Dadrian/Akcam's purposes to make the visit sooner rather than later (to better squeeze the decision into March), and this is why we are being asked to believe Cavit rather than Mentese.

^6.  "Halil himself claimed that the instructions he received, or was about to receive, were to discuss the deportation of Armenians with the Germans." Since that is the "make or break" argument, a footnote would have been absolutely critical. There is none. It looks like we are being expected to take Dadrian/Akcam's "word." In addition, please examine Akcam's next sentence: "What we may extract from all this is that the decision was made toward the end of March, and that it was probably discussed with the Germans." Why "probably"? If Mentese has conclusively written in his memoirs that these "important tasks" boiled down to the "deportation of Armenians," then unless he decided to ignore such orders, he would have "definitely" discussed the matter with the Germans, and not "probably." What do these clues tell those of us who have not had the opportunity to consult Mentese's memoirs? They tell us Dadrian/Akcam's Dashnak "word" is meaningless.

^7.  Absolutely nothing presented so far allows us to "extract from all this... that the decision was made toward the end of March." no matter how many distortions and mistranslations have been provided by these two con men. Furthermore, the uprising in Van that began in late April (specifically, a couple of days before April 20) only applies to the city of Van. The uprisings in Van Province had been going on as soon as war was declared by Russia, gaining momentum in the months ahead. To give an idea, the Erzurum governor, Tahsin Bey, reported on December 21, 1914 that the Armenians of the Karc[h]ekan and Gevas[h] districts of Van Proviince were in revolt, cutting telegraph wires and attacking the kaymakam (district head official), and that the gendarmerie forces were insufficient to put down the revolt. (The Armenian Rebellion at Van, p. 195.) More than a thousand Armenians from Timar (north of Van) and surrounding areas began a revolt in February that soon spread, attacking neighboring Muslim villages and killing Muslim villagers.(P. 193.) The Armenian rebellion had fully begun by February, and not only in the Van Province; Bitlis, Sivas, Adana and Erzurum were also being attacked. "By March 1915 the Eastern Anatolian countryside was completely at war," increasing in a "planned and methodical manner." (P. 195.) The Dashnak chairman of the Armenian Defense Council in the Old City of Van, Haig Gossoian (Gassoyan), in a brief description of the council and its prewar preparations, wrote the rebellious work had begun in October 1914. (P. 198; provided source: The Epic Story, p. 13.) The rebellion was no joking matter, and all of it must be taken into account as leading to the relocation decision, not simply the decisive revolt in the city of Van.

^8.  As this report is dated May 1916, it is absolutely irrelevant as "proof" that the relocation decision was made over one year ago, in March. (So why is it being included? Again, it's the old scattershot approach. The reader is hit on all sides, all in an attempt to detract and confuse.) Yet, let's examine what is being said here. Enver told Ambassador Wangenheim that the plan was to move out the Armenians, the Germans should butt out and even help. Yeah, so? That is probably exactly what Enver said, and what does it prove? (Of course, genociders are hoping for the suckers who listen to think relocation equals genocide. It does not.)
What is especially revealing with this anecdote is that while we don't know when the exchange occurred (Wangenheim wrote in an April 30, 1915 letter to Berlin [A-15363, No. 267] that "The events in Van and the recent attacks by the Russians on the Bosporus and by the united French and English troops on the Dardanelles would not be without influence on the decision of the government," implying he did not know about the decision for "deportation." The reason he did not know is because the decision was not made. Enver's May 2 telegram is the first indication of this decision, so our best guess must be that Enver spoke with Wangenheim after May 2), we can see the decision having been made in March is total bunk. If the Germans knew in March, Wangenheim, the German ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, would have had to be in the loop. There is no way Wangenheim could have written his April 30 letter if he had already known. Furthermore, there is no reason why Enver would have needed to tell Wangenheim, since Taner Akcam has asked us to believe Mentese had already covered this ground with the Germans in March. (Taner Akcam really is a "Shameful Liar.")

^9.  No decision for "genocide" was made, because there was no genocide. A decision for resettlement was definitely made, reluctantly, and after "long consideration," even as treacherous Armenian attacks were piling up over the half-year since war's beginning.

^10. The 1919-20 postwar Ottoman kangaroo courts mean nothing. Even the British rejected their findings, in preparation for their own Malta Tribunal. Naturally, these fake courts from the beaten and occupied Ottoman Empire form Dadrian's bread and butter, and since Akcam is a low-grade "xerox copy" of Dadrian, Akcam must point to the value of these courts as well... the legality of which is on a par with the courts of Vichy France, under Nazi occupation.

^11. This court was the product of the corrupt postwar Ottoman administration, known to do anything to remain in power, especially kowtow to the victorious allies. One purpose of the courts was retribution (another purpose we can learn from Dadrian himself), and a reasonable byproduct of such an illegal undertaking is that any claim could be made without evidence, very much in line with how Dadrian/Akcam present their own "genocide evidence."

^12. Key phrase: "he heard." In other words: "hearsay." In other words: how the bulk of the case for genocide is made.

^13. Some Ottoman officials protested the relocation, as obviously people who were entirely innocent were swept along for the ride. What exactly was Celal opposing? Relocation? Most probably. But since relocation equals genocide in genocide-speak, our "wonderful Turkish historian," as Robert Manne has described Akcam, hopes that you will believe that Celal was opposing an order for extermination.

^14. Remember, gang; Nuri was one of the Ottoman officials Aram Andonian victimized through his forgeries. Andonian put words into Nuri's mouth in eight telegrams, where Nuri emerged as another Heinrich Himmler. Here, Dadrian/Akcam are pointing to Nuri as a credible witness against Talat Pasha, while elsewhere they will have you believe Nuri played a major hand in extermination. (Dadrian/Akcam do so by expecting you to swallow Andonian's evil work as authentic.) So if Nuri was such a mad dog killer, why are Dadrian/Akcam expecting us to take Nuri's word for anything? (Ironic, isn't it? Another irony is that Nuri wasn't even arrested by the British.)

Naturally, all we have is the hearsay of Ihsan Bey, quoted out of context, as the documentation for these proceedings are unavailable. If true, we don't know what motivated Ihsan Bey; he could have been saying anything to escape the hangman's noose himself. Prof. Guenter Lewy's take on Ihsan Bey:"In the absence of corroboration from other reliable sources, it seems difficult to consider this testimony evidence in any meaningful sense of the term." (The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, p. 81.)

^15.  Prof. Lewy on Vehip Pasha (p. 81): "Parts of this deposition were included in the indictment of the main trial and in the verdict of the Harput trial, but an indictment is not proof of guilt. The context of the quoted remarks has been lost. While the entire text of the deposition was allegedly read into the record of the Trabizond trial on March 29, 1919, the proceedings of this trial are not preserved in any source; only the verdict is reprinted in the official gazette." Here is insight as to what made Vehip tick.

^16. While Akcam does not go so far as to call Stange a Special Organization commander as does his mentor, Vahakn Dadrian, the truth is there is no evidence linking Stange with direct Special Organization involvement. See Lewy, pp. 84-5, or this abbreviated version. Note the 2-3,000 irregulars Stange worked with in his detachment were not "armed gangs," but Georgian Muslims (Laz and Acar) who had volunteered to fight the Russians. The Stange Detachment also included... Armenians! Dr. Ed Erickson researched primary Ottoman documents on Stange's background, and concluded that Stange was given command of all units at one point, including the S.O.; but in reality, the S.O. took its orders from Sakir. ("Stange controlled neither the Special Organization nor the volunteers, he sent coordination copies of his own detachment orders to Halit, who passed these on to the adjacent volunteers.[27] This was a clumsy arrangement, and there is no indication that the Special Organization and volunteers reciprocated.")

^17. Steps were taken to "protect the deportees’ lives and possessions," except they weren't always very good steps. This is why U.S. war correspondent and genuine eyewitness George Schreiner wrote that the Armenians' miserable experience had less to do with "intentional brutality," than with "Turkish ineptness." On the other hand, let's look at the situation in perspective: we are dealing with the bankrupt "Sick Man of Europe" here, with insufficient manpower and resources. The nation was in the fight for its life (history tells us that fight was lost), and everyone was dying in droves from hunger and sickness. Under the circumstances, the Ottomans thought they were doing the best they could. Sometimes they suffered from a false "things will work out" optimism, as with the Sarikamish disaster. When things went wrong, as when Armenians got massacred, the Ottomans made changes, such as with choosing alternate routes to minimize the chance of lawless bands or Kurds to descend upon the Armenians. In the aftermath of the chaos of war, it is always easy to look at the choices made and to determine things could, in retrospect, have been done differently.

^18. This passage brings to mind the old expression, "Fiction is Stanger than truth." Yes, there is no end of bigoted westerners weaned on "Terrible Turk" stories to think the worst of Turks, and to accept any hearsay account to feel "justified surmising." How did Stange get his information? He relied primarily upon Consul Scheubner-Richter in Erzurum (Lewy, p. 227), whose sympathies for fellow Christian Armenians are by now well known. (Scheubner-Richter went as far as to once dumbly write, “The Armenians of Turkey for all practical purposes have been exterminated," a contention at odds with the Armenian Patriarch himself.) And how did the bigoted consul get his primary information? From Armenians, who almost certainly served as his interpreters, and missionaries; Scheubner-Richter also served as ambassador to Britain for ten years, where constant exposure to the hysterical anti-Turkish British press surely must have deepened his own existing bigotry.

Ironically Stange, a favorite Dadrian witness, has been accused by Dadrian as being one of the "arch-accomplices in the implementation of the massacres." Yet when it suits Dadrian's purposes, such an alleged mass-murderer becomes a credible witness. In addition, Stange also opined "the decision to eradicate the Armenians during the war was made a long time before the outbreak of the war,” a contention Akcam is certainly aware of as Dadrian has repeated it often. So Stange is contradicting Akcam's own "decision in March" thesis, yet Akcam has no problem in finding Stange credible, when it suits Akcam. (Naturally, Stange was in no position to factually back up his own ludicrous claim.)

The August 23, 1915 Stange report is one that Prof. Lewy read in its original German, and this is the one where Dadrian was exposed in practicing his trademark dishonesty. For example, Stange reports the north-of-Erzurum Armenians "were murdered, with the acquiescence and even the assistance of the military escort, by so-called [volunteers], [tribesmen] and similar scum." Dadrian omits the phrase "wiith the acquiescence." More importantly, the term "Special Organization" appears nowhere in Stange's document. (Lewy, p. 84.)