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The Other Side of the Falsified Genocide

 

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Dr. Dennis Papazian released a couple of early April 2008 communications warning the world that there is evil afoot... and the name of this demon incarnate was Hilmar Kaiser. Perhaps a motivation for the professor in charge of the University of Michigan-Dearborn's Armenian Research Center was guilt, as he, like the similarly unleashing Pandora, was responsible for giving Kaiser his first big break to spread Armenian propaganda, as Papazian also did with Taner Akcam. However, unlike the well-compensated Akcam (through the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Foundation), a man who will gladly wag his tail in whatever fashion Akcam's benefactors require, Hilmar Kaiser has proved to be a bit of a loose cannon. Kaiser, for example, has called Vahakn Dadrian, the "foremost authority on the Armenian genocide," on Dadrian's dishonesty. There can be no greater sacrilege than that!

Any move that is seen to be out of step of Hai Tahd, or the Armenian Cause, even in the slightest way, provides grounds for ostracism and worse, by the Dashnak-minded extremists governing the genocide industry. If you are a part of this industry, you are not allowed to deviate from the Biblically established propaganda (or as Kaiser nicely worded it in an interview cited below: "All these concepts about the Armenian genocide are developed on generalization of a very narrow source basis. We have developed a lot of Holy Grail items that we hear over and over again"), and you are certainly not allowed to criticize a fellow propagandist in any shape, manner, or form. For example, when Vincent Lima found fault with Richard Hovannisian's intolerance, even though this criticism was expressed in a tiny little footnote, Levon Marashlian was all over poor Mr. Lima, with the implication that Lima actually might be a secret agent for the Turkish government. ("Vincent Lima's less than professional tactics include destructive manipulation—apparently driven by irresponsible arrogance and some unannounced agenda which appears to have little to do with defending the truth ...")

When Ara Sarafian, Lima's former co-editor of Armenian Forum, dared to challenge the Blue Book propaganda of the drownings in Trabzon, as well as the familiar "genocide map," Dr. Rouben Adalian of the Armenian National Institute (ANI) angrily accused Mr. Sarafian of having "ulterior motives," which implies Sarafian actually might be a secret agent for the Turkish government.

Dr, Dennis Papazian

In his message entitled, "Hilmar Kaiser Warning!!! From Dr. Dennis Papazian" (likely by the one who posted this message, without Dr. Papazian's permission, at a Yahoo group) and "sub"titled (probably by Papazian himself), "Danger of Hilmar Kaiser: A Warrning!", we learn that Adrienne McOmber (whom Dr. Papazian would identify in a later communication as "an Armenian woman," "active in the community," and "a very successful lawyer") phoned Dr. Papazian with the news that she and her husband, Richard, attended a Rutgers University talk with Kaiser, reporting that Kaiser "badmouthed and denigrated just about all Armenian genocide scholars in the US and Europe, including Vahakn Dadrian and Taner Akcam, and put into question the very reality of a genocide sponsored by the Young Turk government against the Armenians in 1915-1923."

(Note that line comes from someone who calls himself a "professor" versed in "1915" history, and he still appears unaware that the "Young Turk government" basically ceased to exist as an independent entity by 1918's end, once the British occupied the devastated empire, initially with one million soldiers, as accounted for by Peter Balakian in The Burning Tigris. It would be very difficult to conduct a state-sponsored genocide campaign, particularly for five long years until 1923, when there is no real state.)

Papazian believed there were "apparently high-ranking Turks who smiled and nodded throughout the lecture." The report clamed that Kaiser was invited to dinner by these nasty Turks, speaking to Kaiser in Turkish, but there was a Turkish speaking spy (who was there thanks to "we," as Papazian put it) "who understood what was going on."

Cloak and ARF Dagger

Did this spy trail our villains to the restaurant? This sounds like a real cloak-and-dagger adventure. The information Papazian received led him to conclude that Kaiser is "attempting to put into question all the valuable scholarship produced by Armenians and their cohorts regarding the Armenian genocide and thus deny that the genocide was sponsored by the Turkish central authorities, making it only a series of massacres carried out on the local level. This is subversive activity at its worse."

Can it be? Can Kaiser actually have been recruited by the Turks, and is now an "agent for the Turkish government"?

"[A]n important Armenian patriotic organization," continued Dr. Papazian, "had unwittingly sent Hilmar on a speaking tour around the United State[s] a couple of year[s] ago," where Kaiser was similarly not sticking with the program. Papazian then "asked people to record his 'lectures'" (Dr. Papazian curiously chose to put the word "lectures" in quotation marks; if the content changed from what Dr. Papazian preferred to hear, does that make a lecture any less of a lecture?) in order to have proof of Kaiser's deviltries.

Papazian wrote that he finally had to contact some "higher ups" who made sure Kaiser got the warning that if Armenian genocide scholars should be criticized (such a transgression, as we know, cannot be permitted), that would spell the end of Kaiser's tour.

This would be akin to the scene in the original "Frankenstein" movie, where the doctor brings his creation to life, and when the creature develops a mind of his own, the doctor has to find a way to control the creature. (Will it be through fire? Dissection? Will Kaiser be chased atop a windmill, by Dr. Papazian's huge network of "people" wielding torches and pitchforks?)

 




Dr. Papazian sounded very worried that Kaiser, not unlike Willy Nelson, is "on the road again," speaking to "Armenian student organizations," those whose genocide-obsessed minds might well be corrupted, at least theoretically. Kaiser, Papazian wrote, represented "a clear and present danger." Should "the work of our best genocide scholars" come under doubt, "then the Turks have a natural and effective ally against us." (Dr. Papazian really believes the "Turks" would be that organized and determined; at one time, he thought the operator of this site — that would be me — was an agent of the Turkish government, as well. When his boy, Taner Akcam, came up with what he thought was the operator's identity, I wonder if Dr. Papazian — naturally believing whatever his Turkish agent would say — realized he couldn't have been more wrong. Then again, unfortunately, Dr. Papazian does not dwell on the many times he has been mistaken; what one should really wonder about is that if the Turks were so determined, how could the genocide situation have degenerated to the pitiful state it's in today, where Dr. Papazian's "people" have so wildly succeeded in conning practically everyone?)

Kaiser, Dr. Papazian added, worked for Papazian years ago, and Papazian had to fire his new recruit for Kaiser's "dishonesty." He then issued the call: Kaiser must not be sponsored by Armenians, but if his lectures do slip through (this time "lectures" had no quotation marks), they should be recorded, with a copy sent to Dr. Papazian, so that "our genocide scholars" may be defended "against his false accusations."

If the University of Michigan-Dearborn, which houses Dr. Papazian's Armenian Research Center, pays Dr. Papazian's salary, what are they paying for? Dr. Papazian's research and scholarship, or for his politics and intrigue? For a "genocide scholar" to be intolerant of views not in complete agreement with the pious genocide industry is nothing new, of course; but this kind of "shut him down" strategy is hardly an academic approach, let alone a gentlemanly one. Why, it's exactly the kind of approach a propagandist would undertake.

A March 29 dated communication by Dr. Papazian, which was a follow-up to "Danger of Hilmar Kaiser: A Warrning!" (meaning the previous one's April 2nd date probably indicated when it was posted, and not when written), voices his concern that Kaiser's talk is not a matter of historical opinion, but of "radical revisionism which leans toward accepting the official Turkish position on the Armenian genocide, and without clear evidence." (I think we can all agree Kaiser isn't creating things from the air, but backs up his findings through what he presents as evidence. Whether right or wrong, of course that would fall under the category of "historical opinion." Even the shameless conclusions of Vahakn Dadrian would technically be considered in the realm of "historical opinion," particularly since, in Dadrian's case, we would rarely be talking about "historical fact.")

Dr. Papazian accuses Kaiser of "poisoning the well." Does he mean in the manner that the retreating Armenians of 1918 performed, by filling up the wells of Eastern Anatolia with the bodies of their Muslim victims? No, what he is getting at is that Kaiser is guilty of "lies, half-truths, innuendos, and snide remarks to demean other scholars." Papazian has based his conclusion on the information provided from his people "all over the United States, including many members of the Dashnak Party, whose veracity I do not doubt."

(That last reference is too scary for words, beyond Papazian's admission for choice of friends. Indeed, if duplicitous Dashnaks are famous for anything, it would have to be their "veracity.")
(While it remains to be seen whether Papazian will get warm and fuzzy about the following, Kaiser appears to enjoy chumming it up with Dashnaks as well. According to the interview that will be cited below, Garabed Moumdjian, the only other Armenian besides Ara Sarafian to have hit the Turkish Archives [according to Kaiser], accompanied Kaiser for two weeks in 2006 — one week short of the time Taner Akcam spent, by the way, as Kaiser also mentioned — and with Mr. Moumdjian's perfect knowledge of Turkish and Ottoman, "sent shock waves through the whole establishment." Kaiser got tickled pink, as "The idea of the ARF, fanatic, blood-drinking killer and so on got a devastating blow." Of course there are very nice people in the Dashnak Party who do not dwell on the beloved dagger, much as there were nice people in the Nazi Party, too. Since Mr. Moumdjian sounds like a great guy, does that mean we can now discard what lies at the criminal heart of the ARF?)

(We do, however, need to keep in mind that this analogy is far from perfect; we're comparing ordinary Germans who joined the Nazis for reasons having nothing to do with ideology, vs. Mr. Moumdjian, who appears to have embraced the adorable Dashnak "end justifies the means" way of thinking. Moumdjian wrote a most uncritical, and fairly gushing, article on the unscrupulous forger Aram Andonian, as we'll be observing later.)

As an example of Kaiser's dishonesty, Dr. Papazian faults Kaiser's having pointed to Akcam's "A Shameful Act" as unreliable, because Akcam "could not possibly have employed all the primary evidence from the Ottoman archives as he purports to do in his book. This is tantamount to calling Taner Akcam a liar."

(Taner Akcam... a liar? Are we talking about the same fellow who is on record for claiming the killings of Muslims by Armenians is a "legend," that the Armenian rebellion is a "lie," and that he can "prove genocidal intent without any problems"? Would this be the same Taner Akcam who might possibly fall into the "liar" category? What an interesting concept.)

(In a March 8, 2008 published interview in The Armenian Weekly, Kaiser faults Akcam — without naming him — for claiming that an Ottoman official went "to Germany in March 1915 to coordinate the decision of the Armenian genocide, and [Akcam] gives the source. The source says exactly the opposite." This would be in relation to Akcam's absurd hypothesis on the Ottoman government's convenient "genocide" decision in March of 1915 that foolish genocide scholars as Robert Manne have accepted at face value. After expressing how mindlessly "celebrated" these works of pseudo-scholarship have been — another foolish genocide scholar who has accepted Akcam's "Shameful" book at face value was Michael Oren — Kaiser points to the "unscholarly" way in which "Turkish materials have been used" — he must have been referring to the team of Akcam/Dadrian, since hardly any other pro-Armenian "scholar" has made use of original Ottoman sources — "because no one is able to check the sources.")

 



The bulk of "A Shameful Act" relied on research already performed, primarily Dadrian's research. The original version of this book, in Turkish, was published in 1999, and it's doubtful Akcam paid many visits to the Turkish archives before that year, if at all. "Researchers are allowed to make xerox copies of the documents they receive," Dr. Papazian tells us, in his defense of Akcam. Actually, that is not true in all of the departments. If memory serves, Michael A. Reynolds pointed out in his late 2003 dissertation (an excerpt), different departments of the archives have different rules. One forbids the making of copies entirely, meaning the researcher must make notes then and there. Since Akcam's knowledge of the complex Ottoman language is nearly nil (probably no different than Hilmar Kaiser's), of course Akcam could not be relied upon to make reliable translations — even if conditions were not as demanding. "It is not the business of you, Hilmar, or the Turkish government as to how Taner gets his materials," Papazian fumes to the one he was addressing, perhaps in desperation to cover the fact that Taner Akcam has the muscle of the Zoryan Institute, if not the formidable forces of the genocide industry, supporting their paid-off front man with ready research.

The great scholar, Dennis Papazian, condemns Kaiser because Kaiser, in the aforementioned Armenian Weekly interview, had the gall to refer to the researching wherewithal of Yusuf Halacoglu, the head of the Turkish Historical Society (THS), in a positive manner. Papazian dismissed Halacoglu as "an implacable enemy of the Armenian people who publishes tendentious and corrupt materials." That is a terribly libelous thing to say; Halacoglu is no more an "enemy of the Armenian people" than the French historians Gaston Gaillard, Gilles Veinstein or any other contra-genocide scholar who supports his or her findings with reliable and non-propagandistic facts. (Guenter Lewy conducted excellent research and found no evidence implicating the U.S. government on genocide against the Indians. Only a fool, or a hopelessly dishonest party, would label Lewy as an "implacable enemy of the Indian people.")

(As a backdrop, Kaiser was generous with his appraisal of Halacoglu in the interview. When the interviewer, Khatchig Mouradian, tried to bait Kaiser with Kaiser's opinion on the scholarship of Halacoglu, whom Mouradian described as "a notorious genocide denier," Kaiser surprised Mouradian by saying it would not be "productive" to criticize Halacoglu on "past weak scholarship or political fanaticism," and that Halacoglu should not be underestimated. Kaiser added that he disagreed with him "emphatically," but that he respected him, calling Halacoglu an "extremely smart guy, very professional" and that "in some regards," he was "ahead" of Kaiser [as an example, material regarding Ottoman prosecution of Turkish criminals during the war]; furthermore, Kaiser praised Halacoglu for being friendly, and for his willingness to talk to those from the opposite camp. Kaiser also made two highly impressive statements, "First of all, the description of deniers as a group is false" being one. The other: "Respectable scholarship has nothing to do with the name of the person who has written it—it is assessed on its own merit.")

Is Papazian telling us everything Halacoglu has put on the table is "tendentious and corrupt"? So Ottoman archival sources, largely based on internal reports never meant to be publicized (kind of like Papazian's revealing communications being examined here), as well as the foreign archival material that Halacoglu also relies on (the valuable information on this page, regarding an explosive Armenian Patriarch report, among others, came from, I believe, a THS publication) can be summed up as "tendentious and corrupt"? These are sources largely lacking conflict-of-interest; how could they possibly be termed "tendentious and corrupt"? Meanwhile, the sources Papazian usually prefers to point to, sources such as Ambassador Morgenthau and the missionaries (here is how the desperate Dr. Papazian once supported the latter: "...Did the American missionaries tell the truth? One would think so. We certainly will not ... call these God-fearing men and women liars without seeing strong evidence to support that contention. ... We must accept the missionary reports as dependable evidence"), were totally conflicted, the kind of evidence that was often corrupt to the core.

Papazian supports his denunciation of Halacoglu by pointing to Taner Akcam's articles showing how the THS, in the person of Halacoglu, has misrepresented archival materials. Well, two can play at that game, and Taner Akcam is a master at it. Here is a study of how Akcam has misrepresented the misrepresentation of said archival materials.

Dennis Papazian reveals that his original communication was never meant to be made public, as it was in the form of an e-mail, and someone (likely one of his own "people," since the professor was not going to share such thoughts with those in what he regards as the "implacable" enemy camp) posted it at the Yahoo Armenian groups. He is absolutely right about that; even the privacy of a propagandist like Dr. Papazian must be respected. Since the cat was out of the bag, I felt free to quote from his messages, much as I would have preferred to reproduce them in their entirety.

Now let's get to the crux of the matter. Was Dr. Dennis Papazian's flying fit justified? Has Hilmar Kaiser, possibly to get back at those representing his former employer, Dennis Papazian, because Dr. Dennis Papazian "fired" Kaiser, defected to the other side? Did Kaiser, in other words, decide to ditch his life's work simply because he took the immortal words of Sarkis Atamanian to heart? ("Without retribution, justice is merely a word," The Armenian Review, Nov. 1960; music to the ears of revenge-minded Dashnaks, as well as too many dogmatic genocide scholars.)

 




The Armenian Weekly's Khatchig Mouradian came to Kaiser's rescue in an April 5, 2008 article wittily entitled, "The Kaiser Effect." It turns out that Mouradian himself was present at the Rutgers lecture and made "a digital recording" of it, from which he prepared a shortened transcript, in order to "set the record straight." (Mr. Mouradian explained the reason for the shortened version was due to "space constraints." Since it was Mr. Mouradian's aim to defend Kaiser — and Mouradian must be applauded for doing so, as Kaiser has obviously been wrongly accused — we can see, however, that any references the Armenian community would not approve of, such as criticism of Akcam and Dadrian, have been deleted.) Mr. Mouradian did concede that Kaiser criticized other genocide scholars, and that Kaiser dismissed the idea of a genocide blueprint, on which "most scholars" agree (without, of course, providing real evidence — which would hardly make these "scholars" scholarly), instead going for the possibly even more devastating notion "that there were not one but several decisions for mass murder, all centrally planned and executed."

On the "plus" side, Kaiser "consistently used the term 'Armenian genocide' when referring to 1915-16." (Could Mr. Mouradian have been mistaken on those years? We heard Dennis Papazian talk earlier, after all, about "a genocide sponsored by the Young Turk government against the Armenians in 1915-1923." Surely Dr. Papazian must be better trusted with the facts, since Dr. Papazian is a "scholar" and has a Ph.D. in his possession, which Mr. Mouradian probably does not.) Kaiser also "clearly made the point that the massacres were centrally planned, and put the number of 'losses' at 1-1.5 million." (Kaiser's definition of "losses" includes not only those killed, but taken into Muslim households, and not returned. Stay tuned for an examination of that point.)

Mr. Mouradian added, "The Turkish members of the audience were anything but happy with Kaiser’s documentation of the genocide and threw all kinds of denialist and revisionist arguments at him during the question and answer session."

Given the kinds of statements Hilmar Kaiser has made, which we will be taking a good look at, it's obvious that the Turks — or anyone familiar with the historical truth and who can retain objectivity — would have been "anything but happy." A minor point to raise here is, much as we know Dennis Papazian is not a man to dwell on his errors (since all else falls before him in pursuit of his Dashnak agenda), shouldn't Dr. Papazian awaken to the fact that his "people" can't always be trusted? Here is one of his spies, the lawyer lady, who fed her kingpin with absolutely wrong information. Probably there was a point in the lecture when the Turks shook their heads in approval, when Kaiser referred to the dishonesty of Akcam and Dadrian (a point where any honorable person should have been shaking his or her head in approval), but because even this deviation from the "Cause" was too hard for the lady to handle, she totally closed her eyes to the pro-genocide crux of Kaiser's message. She got blinded by her emotions, and provided an erroneous report, which Dr. Papazian, similarly blinded by his emotions, was only happy to accept. To hear Dr. Papazian, it was as though Hilmar Kaiser went before that audience and waved the Turkish flag.

Let's focus on Khatchig Mouradian for a moment now. As editor of The Armenian Weekly, of course Mr. Mouradian must also be a genocide proponent. The fact that he was not willing to go as far as to tar and feather Hilmar Kaiser, but instead actually stepped to the defense of this "traitor" already tells us (as may be determined from the typically rational tone of his interviews, where he has managed to maintain a professional distance) that he is able to check his "Hai Tahd" emotions, unlike Dennis Papazian and most of his "people." But now take a look at the wording Mr. Mouradian chose to describe the issues raised by the Turks in the audience: "denialist and revisionist."

Now why would an intellectual, and someone as reasonable as I'd like to believe Mr. Mouradian is, choose the route of such dismissive and defamatory labeling?

I don't know what these Turks said, and maybe some said stupid things. But if an objective person has studied the issues, and has concluded that the "1915" events did not constitute a genocide (at least not as far as the word is defined by the 1948 U.N. Convention on Genocide, which we must follow, otherwise the word would become meaningless), such a person is aware that the real facts are backed up by sources that are difficult to argue with. (Not that such would stop people like Dennis Papazian or Taner Akcam from coming up with the weirdest arguments in an attempt to discredit these sources, but let's limit our thinking to people who are reasonably honest, like, hopefully, Mr. Mouradian.)

The fact is, whatever these Turks said can, in all likelihood, be backed up by sources we can trust, sources that were not friendly to the Ottomans. Even Armenian sources frequently expose today's propagandistic claims as the canards they are. For example, you've read earlier that Taner Akcam's response to the Armenian rebellion was that it was "a lie," and Dennis Papazian, in his "Misplaced Credulity," actually wrote, "No such revolt ever took place!" So let's say a Turk in this audience brought up the fact that there was indeed an Armenian rebellion. This is critical, because if the whole of the Ottoman-Armenian population was forced to choose sides, after being worked on for years by fanatical Dashnaks/Hunchaks and missionaries, then what we wind up with is a far cry from what the Genocide Convention requires. The Convention disallows political groups, and on that count alone, the Ottoman decision to temporarily relocate its treacherous Armenian community cannot be labeled a genocide.

 



We don't have to travel far to prove how extensive the Armenians' rebellion was, having been in the works for years with the Dashnaks' "Instructions for Self-Defense" distributed in Armenian villages since 1910, with nearly half of the pamphlet focusing on how to "attack" Muslim villages.There is a plethora of Western and Armenian sources that gives us the clear idea of what the Armenians were up to; since the A.R.F. had forced Armenian males over the age of 13 in a good many of the provinces to join their movement, either as soldiers or functionaries, based on confessions by captured Armenians, the treason was widespread. (In 1910, there were 100,000 Dashnaks in Bitlis alone, according to the Russian consul.) In other words, an Ottoman-Armenian did not have to brandish a weapon in order take part in this rebellion; the Armenian community as a whole, including the women and children, provided the support system for the rebels. (Not to say there weren't loyal ones around. But unfortunately, they were stuck between a rock and a hard place.)

Of course, in any nation, if there is a treacherous community that fights against the nation's army and that commits massacres upon fellow citizens (there is an example of a February 1915 account below) who don't fit into the required racial and religious mold, particularly during a life-and-death war, it would be the duty of any nation to protect itself. The Soviet-Armenian historian Borian himself pointed out this would be the duty of a nation, not that we need him to tell us the obvious. During World War I, Britain and Russia deported or interned or relocated elements that were not even disloyal, as did the USA and Canada during WWII. Imagine what these nations would have done if these elements had behaved in the ways of the Ottoman-Armenians! But what the Ottomans did was resettle the Armenians, in what Dr. Lewy termed a "relatively humane" process (at least insofar as the intentions of the central government; things obviously sometimes went wrong at the local level, much as the majority of Armenians clearly survived), until the danger was past. The Armenians lost their war gamble, and then decided to make a "genocide" out of their belligerence.

A dramatic way to prove the extent of the Armenian rebellion is to point to what Boghos Nubar is on record for admitting, that "the Armenians have been belligerents de facto, since they indignantly refused to side with Turkey." That says it, in a nutshell.

Now this is Boghos Nubar we're talking about here, one of the most dynamic leaders of the Armenian Cause of the period. His is not the only voice confirming the Armenians' treachery — we can also point to other leaders who are on record for demonstrating evidence, such as Hovhannes Katchaznouni, "Armen Garo" Pasdermadjian, and Vahan "The Doctor" Papazian — but, again, this is Boghos Nubar himself! He is clearly someone the Armenians can respect, much more so than the creepier heroes of Armenian mythology, as the mass murderers Dro and Antranik.

So if Turks in this audience pointed to this rebellion, they would not be the "revisionists"; the Armenians were shouting from the rooftops after the end of the war, as to how loyal they were to the Allies. It's the Armenians who revised their story, because it didn't suit their image as poor, unarmed, innocent victims of genocide to admit their own treachery, and their own great crimes of ethnic cleansing against hundreds of thousands of defenseless villagers. It is the Armenians who are the real "revisionists."

Now let's get back to the point in question, Khatchig Mouradian, and why he chose to dismiss and defame the Turks in the audience as "denialist and revisionist." Surely Khatchig Mouradian is not a man who blindly falls victim to the "Lemming Effect" of too many Armenians trained by their parents, teachers and churches to become genocide-obsessed, and who lose the capacity for independent thought regarding such an emotional topic; that is, the Armenians whom K.S. Papazian described as "The rank and file [who] have continually been kept under the spell of their invisible rulers." (Although sadly, even some of these rulers, not always invisible, such as Dennis Papazian, appear to fall under the spell of their own propaganda.) Khatchig Mouradian is a man who can distance himself, and who can distinguish between fact and fiction. So why does he engage in such propagandistic terminology?

(It is very likely that as intelligent as Mr. Mouradian is, and as "fair" as he appears to be, his emotions run too deep to bear a careful study of the ways in which those who disbelieve in genocide have backed up their position. All he needs are industry leaders — like Dadrian, Hovannisian, Balakian — to say, for example, that there was no Armenian rebellion, and that would be enough. Of course, that would be more than enough for the immature-minded rank-and-file in the Armenian community, but this is an "intellectual" we're talking about. In his interview with Kaiser, Mr. Mouradian gives away his naive faith, when Kaiser brings up the notion of Turks and others who had committed crimes against Armenians during the war being taken to court by the Ottomans. It's simple logic that a genocide-committing state would not take their own perpetrators to court. The idea that the Ottoman Turks punished people who committed crimes against Armenians, dozens via execution, should set off alarm bells in the mind of an intellectual; at this point, a true intellectual would try to go beyond his belief system, unpleasant a process though that might be, and say: "I've got to look at that! Is it possible I've been wrong?" We can see Mouradian was struggling with his deep faith, in the way he posed his question to Kaiser: "But they aren’t punishing them for stealing from the Armenians, are they?" [In other words: "Please! Please don't let it be so, I've got too much at stake, emotionally."] Fortunately for Mr. Mouradian, Kaiser's own genocide belief system prevented him from bursting Mouradian's bubble, and Kaiser replied that more research would be necessary. All the way back in 1985, with Kamuran Gurun's English version of The Armenian File, we learned that 1,397 were taken to trial for crimes against Armenians, and [although aside from the locales, Gurun did not itemize, and we could only suspect] the crimes were not just for "stealing." New Turkish research has upped the ante to 1,673, with details on how many got punished, and in what manner. [67 got the death penalty.] If Hitler had taken one SS man to trial for harming Jews, many would find it difficult to understand the colossal incongruity. Even if only 16, instead of 1,673, Ottomans were taken to court for harming Armenians, that should serve as a huge eye-opener — but according to Kaiser, we still need more research. Perhaps Kaiser was influenced by his "Shameful Liar" rival, Taner Akcam, who has called these punishments a "tall story.")

We're fully aware if Khatchig Mouradian were to allow himself to speak more truthfully, mincemeat would be made of him, by the fanatics among his own. For that, we can't judge him too harshly, as no one would enjoy coming under the hammer-blows of the terrroristic Dashnak mentality, of whom K.S. Papazian further commented, acts "true to its traditional method of blackening the character of their victims." (If not blackening their eyes, or committing even more serious forms of harm.) But wouldn't an honorable person, too prudent to speak publicly, at least choose the alternative of not getting involved with such a vicious program of dishonesty and hatred? Why doesn't such an obviously smart and otherwise honorable person as Khatchig Mouradian disallow his "patriotism" to take command of his life? After all, didn't Tony Soprano himself say from his hospital bed, that "every man is judged on his own merit"?

It is heartbreaking. The good Armenian people can only salvage their reputation once the honorable ones among them choose to separate themselves from destructive Dashnak ideology that has so "disgraced our people before the civilized world," as the true Armenian patriot, K.S. Papazian, wrote. (Of course, the civilized world has closed their eyes to the terroristic ideology that has gripped the Armenian people, at least those who have allowed themselves to be genocide-centric, mainly because the terrorists who rule them are masters of propaganda — and the civilized world thinks of Turks as a lesser people, which Dashnak propaganda has made sure to reinforce. But the day will come when the world will awaken, and it is the duty of the good and honorable Armenians, the genuine "patriots" to do what they can to distance their people from the horrid ways of the Dashnaks — whose "veracity" those as Dr. Dennis Papazian does "not doubt.")

 




Now let's get to the eye of this storm, Dr. Hilmar Kaiser.

I have been reading some of the articles prepared by and regarding Hilmar Kaiser, and it's not always easy to get a bead on him. On one hand, he is 99.3% "pro-Armenian," as far as his selectivity with historical references, as well as his willingness to sometimes point to the most outrageous claims as actual history, while closing his eyes to facts not in keeping with the genocide agenda. On the other hand, it is to his credit that he has pointed out the dishonesty of those such as Dadrian and Akcam, especially since these two have gone so far and beyond what should even be propagandistically allowable, it's about time for scholars, honorable or not, to expose those who have become utterly shameless. (Granted, that's a difficult line to determine; even someone as "respectable" as the Dutch historian Erik Jan Zürcher can go pretty overboard. The propaganda is now so overwhelming, it has become simply contagious. Yet it may be said that Dadrian, and by extension his devoted Turkish protégé, are entitled to special [dis]honors. As even the professionally reserved Dr. Guenter Lewy phrased it, after his preface regarding the "many Armenian scholars [who] use selective evidence or otherwise distort the historical record": "V. N. Dadrian is in a class by himself. His violations of scholarly ethics... are so numerous as to destroy his scholarly credentials.") So in a sense, Hilmar Kaiser is an enigma. One cannot be certain in which direction his wind is going to blow, at least in regards to some minor points that are out of keeping with genocide commandments (which serve as sufficient reason for those as Kaiser to be branded as traitors, in the unforgiving and near-fanatical genocide environment).

As far as the major points, one can be deadly certain where Hilmar Kaiser's heart lies. He begins:

"The Armenian community is a democratic, complex and politically competitive community. And when I now say that the leading political party was the ARF, some in the community might be offended. I just reflect the views of the Ottoman Ministry of Interior and Ottoman Intelligence. The only political group that was seen as politically of any relevance was the ARF."

 

TAKEOVER OF OTTOMAN-ARMENIAN SOCIETY BY THE DASHNAKS

The Tachnaktzoutioun’s power is felt in all Armenian communal affairs in localities where, as at Mouche, the Tachnakists have succeeded in monopolizing the spiritual administration. The Armenian Member of the Ottoman Parliament for Mouche obeys the order of the Tachnakists. In the Mouche law courts, Armenian judges carry out the advice given by the Tachnaktzoutioun; finally, in the valley of Mouche, the teachers and Elder councils execute voleus noleus, the orders of the Mouche committee.

With regards to Armenian village folk, although they complain now and again to the Ottoman authorities of the Vilayet, they cannot get rid of the Tachnakists, and all the others, with more or less hesitation, enlist in the Tachnakzoutioun’s membership; and under the influence of blows and threats give a part of their earnings for objects which they are not even able to understand. Admitting that the village folk were formerly partial towards the Committee, they are far from being that at present.

REPORT BY THE RUSSIAN CONSUL IN BITLIS. Dated 3rd December, 1910. No. 602. As included in THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION, Ahmed Rustem Bey, Former Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Berne, 1918.


INFLUENCE OF DASHNAKS ON COMMON OTTOMAN-ARMENIANS

“The activity of the Tachnaktzoutioun Committee has a great deal to do with the excitement of Armenian public opinion. This committee is unrelentingly working to bring about collisions between Armenians and Moslems in order to avail itself of the misfortune that may arise therefrom, and cause a Russian intervention, and the occupation of the country by our army.

REPORT FROM THE RUSSIAN CONSUL IN BITLIS TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY AT CONSTANTINOPLE Dated 24th December, 1912 No. 63; As included in THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION, Ahmed Rustem Bey, Former Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Berne, 1918.


OPENNESS BY WHICH DASHNAKS WERE ALLOWED TO OPERATE

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT
Handed by the Dachnak Committee to the Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, in 1910.

“. . . .Our organization is the same in Turkish Armenia. At Van and Bitlis, in both those large Armenian provinces, we had, until 1908,enlisted under the banner of our Committee, the village folk and the sane and sound population to form political bands. The latter still exists, but their number is naturally more restricted.

Until 1908, the activity of our Committee in Turkey was clandestine and operated only by night. In the daytime, the members of the Committee were not to be seen abroad: armament, exercises, everything was done at night. Our activity had quite a political and revolutionary character. This same activity continues nowadays in all the centers of the Ottoman Empire, with this difference – that it is now openly displayed in broad daylight. In other parts of Turkey inhabited by Armenians, our Committees have large detachments of well-organized revolutionaries. . . .”

As highlighted by Ahmet Rustem Bey in THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION, 1918, adding the comment: "As an auxiliary weapon, the Dachnak often used socialism, posing as a partisan of this system; it could thereby more easily attract the sympathies of the Armenian mass as well as those of the European proletariats."







Mr. Kaiser would surely be welcome to point to any Armenian group that was of greater relevance. One by one, the other groups, as the Hunchaks and Armenagan/Ramgavarists, practically went by the wayside (not necessarily through Dashnak efforts). According to the millet system, the ones governing the Ottoman-Armenian community was the Church. The ARF took over the Church. Anyone who went against Dashnak principles was eliminated by the Dashnaks, just as today, those as Lima, Sarafian and Kaiser, who voice the slightest objections, come under vicious attack. (But back in the old days, Dashnak silencing methods were generally more permanent.) Even loyal Dashnaks who raised disagreements were fatally picked off, as when Mihran didn't like the Dashnaks' new socialistic ideas (Mihran received the "death penalty" in 1907, as the Dashnak historian, M. Varandian, wrote in his 1932 book, History of the ARF). Some of the other country bumpkins who wanted only to kill Turks also didn't care for new Dashnak ideas (which were mainly a sneaky cover to attract a broader range of adherents), the most famous being Antranik. The only reason why Antranik wasn't snuffed out was because he was too great a hero. (Yet leaving the ARF did not prevent Antranik from carrying out basic Dashnak principles, symbolized by the dagger in their logo.)

Now, there were Armenians, particularly those in the merchant class, who hated the Dashnaks and wished them to go away, but who was going to step up to the plate to tell them off? Those who tried, like the wealthy Armenian who became the mayor of Van, quickly got whacked. So, of course "The only political group that was seen as politically of any relevance was the ARF," and that was not just the viewpoint of the Ottoman government. (That's like saying the only ones who tell us there was no genocide is today's Turkish government.) Today, that statement regarding exclusive relevance is equally true; the ARF controls the worldwide Armenian diaspora, as well as the Republic of Armenia, much as Armenia's previous leader stood up to the Dashnaks. (Yet voices of fanaticism quickly drown out the voices of reason.) So if there are "some in the community [who] might be offended" about this plain and simple fact, who are they? And why don't we hear from them publicly? (We well know the reasons why we do not hear from them, but the point here is recognizing the disingenuousness of Hilmar Kaiser.)

 
 



The next thing Hilmar Kaiser told his audience is that "The Ottoman government approached the ARF and proposed an alliance," so that "the ARF should start attacking and sabotaging" behind the Russian lines," and the carrot on the stick was "the political concession they denied the Armenian community for years." Kaiser wrapped up the idea with, "Basically, the offer was, 'You join the war on our side, take the risk, and then we promise you what we have denied you for years.' So it wasn’t really a good offer. What would happen to the Armenian community in Russia?" The result, Kaiser reported, was that "The ARF declined the offer and assured the Ottoman government that the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire would faithfully serve the common Ottoman war cause."

Since Kaiser has read McCarthy and Company's "The Armenian Rebellion at Van," he already knows this account of the Ottoman government's representatives to the Dashnaks' 1914 Erzurum conference is not confirmed by any non-Armenian source. That does not mean this meeting did not take place, but given the Armenians' penchant for "exaggeration," a true historian would pause before accepting this meeting and subsequent deal as a pure fact. But let's imagine what we've been told is the truth. (And it is possible Kaiser knows something McCarthy and his team of Turkish professors failed to unearth, as slim a possibility as that may be.)


OTTOMAN-ARMENIAN LOYALTY

LETTER FROM THE DACHNAK TO THE DAMAS BRANCH.

Constantinople, 1914.

. . . The Ottoman Government ordered mobilization on the 21st [of] September, 1914. The same day, there was an extraordinary activity at the Tachnaktzoutioun Committees in Constantinople. The chiefs met together and issued instructions in cipher to the provincial branches. The same activity was observed at the Hintchak, the Ramgavar and the Veragazmial. All those Committees were already agreed on the matter of reforms, and were endeavoring to maintain and consolidate their union.

Should the Russians advance beyond the border and Ottoman troops withdraw before them, all will have to rise at the same time everywhere and use all the means at disposal. The Ottoman army will be caught between two fires. All State buildings will have to be destroyed. The Government forces will be busy in the interior, and supply convoys will be attacked. On the other hand, should the Ottoman army advance, Armenian soldiers will desert their battalions, form into bands and join the Russians.

THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION, Ahmed Rustem Bey, Former Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Berne, 1918





As with the "genocide," the details of this meeting did not take place in a vacuum; there was some history from years past that led to this meeting, facts that must be taken into account. Here is how K.S. Papazian educates us, from Patriotism Perverted, also answering Kaiser's question, "What would happen to the Armenian community in Russia?" The answer to that question would have needed to take into account "What would happen to the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire?":

In August 1914 the young Turks asked the Dashnag Convention, then in session in Erzerum, to carry out their old agreement of 1907, and start an uprising among the Armenians of the Caucasus against the Russian government. The Dashnagtzoutune refused to do this, and gave assurances that in the event of war between Russia and Turkey, they would support Turkey as loyal citizens... The Turks were not satisfed. They suspected them of duplicity...The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. The Dashnagtzoutune... were swayed in their actions by the interests of the Russian government and disregarded, entirely, the political dangers that the war had created for the Armenians in Turkey. Prudence was thrown to the winds; even the decision of their own convention of Erzurum was forgotten and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasus front.

So it would not have been as though the Turks came in cold and asked the Dashnaks for a "favor." There was the promise of the Dashnaks from 1907 to contend with, when the Dashnaks tried their hand for one brief window in time, as loyal Ottomans. What the Ottomans reportedly promised the Dashnaks was not "the political concession they denied the Armenian community for years," as Kaiser stated, which we can only presume meant autonomy for the eastern provinces where Armenians formed a minority. (What we're getting at here, folks, is "independence," which the Ottomans would have been fools to offer. within their own territory. Besides, as Richard Hovannisian has educated us, the Armenians had already enjoyed an "internal autonomy" for centuries.) In reality, the Turks "promised to aid in the establishment of an autonomous Armenia in the Transcaucasus," as the Dashnak historian Hratch Dasnabedian wrote in History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890 - 1924), 1989, p. 109. (If Kaiser is going to rely strictly on the Armenians' version of history, he ought to be more careful with the facts they themselves provide. By the way, ironically, the Ottomans would deliver on this offer, regardless of the Dashnaks' treachery, helping to form and being the first to recognize the Armenian Republic, in 1918.) The thing that seduced the Dashnaks was Russia's own offer "of the autonomy for the six vilayets and Cilicia," as Dasnabedian continued to instruct on p. 119 of his propaganda book, adding, "But with the Russian victories came the return of what had been the policy of Lobanov-Rostovsky: creating an ‘Armenia without Armenians.'”

So Kaiser has misled us on several levels here, by neglecting to mention the Dashnaks' original commitment from 1907, on the correct details of this reported offer (assuming Kaiser was aware of the facts behind these last two points; otherwise his misleading would have been borne out of ignorance), and also by maintaining the illusion that the Ottomans were negotiating with what sounds like another country. These were Ottoman-Armenians in Erzurum! Of course if there was going to be war, the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were expected to perform their patriotic duty to their Ottoman nation. When the USA decided to make war on Iraq, did representatives of the Bush administration consider having a powwow with, say, Reverend Al Sharpton, to insure that black Americans in the military can be counted upon to perform their duty?

 




Kaiser also made it seem as though the Dashnaks were sincere in their offer of loyalty. In his lecture, he went on to explain that the "minority" of "radical ARF members" preferred to support Russia instead, but they were "overvoted," and the ARF leadership made a point of going with "the party line." If they chose to go with the party line, that would have been perfectly understandable, because if the party line was openly "Rah, rah, Russians," that would have entailed suicide. Of course the Dashnaks were going to maintain a sneaky front, while they performed their real aims. They were in preparation to stab their nation in the back for years, and had already stockpiled weapons in every corner of the empire, just waiting for the glorious moment when the Ottomans would be distracted by war.


"The action of Armenian leaders had succeeded in uniting the greatest majority of the people into a compact group..."


Unfortunately, Union and Progress were sincere whereas the Dachnak were full of duplicity. Secretly clinging to their counterfeit ideal of autonomy, they had resolved to attain their ends, by availing themselves of the facilities allowed by the new Government. Almost on the morrow of their agreement with Union and Progress, they threw off their mask and started their campaign. Carried away by the wine of liberty, all the other Armenian organizations followed suit. This was more particularly the case with the Hintchak, which had been mortified by the fact that Union and Progress had preferred to deal with the Dachnak, it assuming thereafter an attitude as extreme as that of its rival.[1] Thus with great gusto, Dachnakists and Hintchakists, the educational and ecclesiastical authorities of the community and of numerous new associations, created for soi-disant benevolent and cultural objects, started a campaign purported to generalize the Armenian revolutionary movement. This action took the form of political dissoluteness, one of the most striking phenomenon of the new order of things.

Think of it: abusing of the freedom acquired by the country and which was added to the franchises they already enjoyed as an autonomous community, forming a real State within the State [2]; thinking further that the concessions made by Union and Progress were due to weakness instead of considering them as the effects of too much confidence and perhaps of momentary elation, Dachnakists and Hintchakists, priests and school masters, writers and artists, undertook a frenzied propaganda the boldness of which was on par only with the tolerance shown by the new imperial authorities. The Press, the church, the theater, the school were used openly and impudently for the purpose of obtaining the support of the masses. Not a newspaper article, a sermon, a dramatic performance, or a conference out of ten, but the subject of which was independent Armenian, which it was the sacred duty of the race to re-establish by wresting the co-called Armenian provinces from the domination of the “barbarous and sanguinary Turk”. When recalling that period to mind, one doubts whether it was not a dream. The only mistake of the Young Turk Government towards Armenians was to encourage their proceedings by its benevolent attitude. When it awoke from its strange heedlessness, at the eve to the present war, it attempted to react, but it was already too late. The action of Armenian leaders had succeeded in uniting the greatest majority of the people into a compact group, which had resolved to avail itself of the first favorable opportunity to create an autonomous Armenia I the provinces of Eastern Anatolia which they obstinately claimed as their own, in spite of the facts laid down by statistics and history. In this, Armenians were supported by Russia, England and France, which had formally entered into a common policy of hostility towards the Empire after the Revolution of 1908.


[1] A violent hostility had sprung up between both organizations almost from the first day of their inception, each aspiring to predominate in the minds of their countrymen. The question of money played a great part therein. They concluded an agreement only after the Balkanic War.

[2] The maintenance in the Empire of the organization of non-Moslem elements into distinct bodies enjoying special privileges, even after the establishment of the Constitution, was an anomaly explained by the fact that their suppression would have raised general protest not only in the country but also in Western Europe. Union and Progress did not feel powerful enogh to touch those institutions, although they warped the working of the new Constitution.

THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION, Ahmed Rustem Bey, Former Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Berne, 1918, ca. pp. 16-17





British Consul J. Molyneux-Seel wrote, for example, that the Armenians of Van "have thrown off any pretense of loyalty they may once have shown, and openly welcome a prospect of a Russian occupation of the Armenian vilayets." (FO 881/10376, Molyneux-Seel to Lowther, Van, April 4, 1913) As you can see from the source, this was over a year before the Dashnak Convention in Erzurum; and you can bet this attitude was not limited to Van Armenians.

Kaiser backs up the concept of Armenian loyalty by pointing out how intelligence reports demonstrated that "the ARF and the Armenian community supported the war effort by answering to the draft much more faithfully [than] the Muslim population." We can be fairly certain these "intelligence reports" did not single out the ARF when it came to pointing out how some Armenians were doing their duty by answering the call, because there were still loyal Armenians in "the Armenian community" despite the ARF. (Whether these reports actually made the comparison with how much more dutiful the Armenians were than the Muslims remains to be seen. If Kaiser ran into one or two reports praising Armenians in certain localities, that does not mean there weren't reports pointing out the many Armenian men who refused the conscription. For example, the first Armenian rebellion in Zeitun, on August 17, 1914, was sparked by the mobilization. In addition, "Armenian deserters from military units [were] increasing," as with this Oct. 1, 1914 report, which further recommended "punishment for villages which shelter and protect the gangs and the dispersing of such villages." To get an idea of how extensive was the refusal of Armenians to enroll in the military, the seventeen-year-old Soghoman Tehlirian of Erzurum crossed the border in 1914 to join the Russians, only to find, entirely by coincidence after he had "maneuvered his way into the infantry under the command of General Antranig," that his brother, Missak, had done the same. (Armenian Review, Nov. 1960.)

 


ARMENIAN SUPPORT OF THE WAR EFFORT

Ambassador Ahmed Rustem Bey takes issue with a Zeitun rebellion report in the Blue Book, Bryce and Toynbee's The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (From THE WORLD WAR AND THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION,, Berne, 1918):


Let us now take up No. 122, a statement by Rev. Dikran Andreassian, an Armenian, which is reported by Rev. Trowbridge, an American:

“On the 10th of August, 1914, the Turkish authorities in Zeitoun proclaimed general mobilization... Many inhabitants of Zeitoun fled to the mountains in order to escape military service. Among them, there were about twenty-five notorious highwaymen who made a living by deeds of violence (naturally at the expense of Moslems). This little band was sincerely disliked and dreaded by the peaceful and thrifty inhabitants of Zeitoun (then why did they tolerate them in their midst?); it attacked a detachment or raw Turkish recruits, robbing them and insulting them (as a matter of fact they were murdered). Thereupon, Haidar Pachak the Mutessarif of Marache, appeared on the scene, on August the 30 th , with 600 soldiers. . . The Zeitoun population was informed; one of its best known citizens, Yehya Agha Yenidounyayan, advised his cousin, Nazaret Tchaouch (corporal), to go and meet Haidar Pacha with 5 or 600 armed young men, because he feared the latter’s intentions were not kindly. But Nazaret Tchaouch answered: No, his arrival may mean my death (why? Was he not a peaceful resident of Zeitoun?), but I would rather die than to see Zeitoun in ruins, and I know that the moment is not at hand yet to show opposition (consequently the idea of resistance existed in some minds, and its outbreak was only a matter of opportunity). . .

“This force was not opposed. The Pacha demanded the surrender of the 25 highwaymen. They were all arrested and handed over to the Turkish governor. This seemingly satisfied the Pacha’s most extreme demands. Yet, he was not content, and he issued a proclamation requesting the surrender of all fire arms, and others (how strange!).

“There were in all about 200 Martini rifles among the 8,000 inhabitants of Zeitoun, 150 of which were confiscated by the Turkish officers (as a matter of fact, there were 3 or 4 times more, and the question rises to the lips: how is that the population had such arms?).

“Then, about the end of February (1915), several hot-headed individuals assembled one night and conceived the plan of attacking the governmental palace. (Had they thought otherwise, they would no doubt have approved it?).

“Then about 25 young men who had been brutally ill-treated by Turkish officers took to the mountains. They attacked and killed nine mounted constables on the road to Marache. All the Zeitoun population inveighed against this deed. But a night attack against Zeitoun was carried out by this band, and failed...

“Gradually, 5,000 soldiers were collected round the city. . .

“The Armenians agreed unanimously to the Government’s proposal (that it be informed of the band’s hiding place) and stated the insurgents were in the monastery.

“The next day, 25/27 th April, the monastery was attacked. . . The fight lasted until the evening. But during the night, the insurgents effected a sortie, killing an officer and many men, making good their escape into the mountains, leaving only a few of their own behind.

The Turks lost between 2 and 300 men. . . The Zeitoun inhabitants eagerly desired that the Allies should break through the Straight of Gallipoli. They hoped that the Turks would suffer a crushing defeat, but there was no insurrection (again, this disclaimer, recurring as a leitmotiv!). the two or three seditious plots that had been hatched miscarried owing to the opposition of sane Armenians. The whole evidence proves (?) that the destruction of the Zeitoun population was deliberately (?) planned by Turks and Germans.”

To sum up: Many Armenian had fled to the mountain in order to avoid military service; a band of twenty-five attacks Moslem recruits and robs them; the question is discussed whether a party of 5 to 600 armed Armenians should or not oppose Haidar Pacha’s entrance in the city; several “hot heads” plan to attack the Palace; another band, only 25, takes to the mountain, killing none mounted constables on the way; it fails in a night attack on the city, but seeks refuge in a monastery and kills 2 to 300 of the soldiers sent to dislodge them; the inhabitants have in their possession 200 Martini rifles of which 150 are given up; the whole population wishes that the Turks should suffer a crushing defeat at Gallipoli.

All this is explicitly admitted by the Rev. Andreassian who nevertheless concludes that there was no insurrection.

No doubt, it was not a general outbreak as at Van, because circumstances were not so favorable, but there is no question about the fact itself.

There were attacks committed by the bands spoken of by Andreassian, and the latter were much more numerous than he admits (for instance, the party that sought refuge in the monastery mustered at least 200 men, and the very fact that it inflicted a loss of 300 men to the regular troops who besieged it, in the course of a few hours, conclusively proves that it consisted of a great number than admitted by the Reverend); the arms concealed in the city were in any case numerous enough and of sufficient quality to quip the men whom it was suggested should resist the 600 well armed and instructed soldiers of Haidar Pacha; the revolutionary spirit was undoubtedly rampant, awaiting only an opportunity to break out; the former deeds of the peaceful population of Zeitoun, who has already taken part in 51 insurrections [1] ; its sympathies for the cause of the Entente against which Turkey was at war, and the possibility of a landing in the neighboring region of Zeitoun; all this was more than enough to justify the transfer of the local population. It should also be observed that this measure was ordered by the military commander of the zone, pursuant to he discretionary powers held by all officers in his position with regards to the civilian population, and not by the Porte, whose general deportation order was issued only after the Van rebellion.

Admitting that the soldiers were brutal towards the inhabitants during the search for arms, and that they assaulted women, as stated by Andreassian, yet it should not be forgotten that there was deliberate concealment of arms, considering that only 150 of the 200 Martinis were given up (the figure of 200 had been stated by the population itself), and that the troops had serious cause to be suspicious towards people who had killed twenty of their comrades a few days before; further, there is always more or less brutality in war operations. It could not be reasonably expected, under the circumstances, that the Turkish troops should conduct themselves better than the European and American detachments sent against the Chinese Boxers. . .

Document No. 121 merely states that on June 14 th , the Christian inhabitants of Zeitoun had all been removed.


[1] See the book already mentioned by Minas Tcherza: Zeitoun.




It's absolutely absurd for Hilmar Kaiser to present the notion that the ARF was loyal to the Ottoman Empire, when Dashnak history itself confirms how hard at work they were in arming the people and in causing uprisings in the years before 1914. (Dasnabedian tells us, circa p. 101 of his book, that the ARF presented a list of their arrogant demands to the CUP government in 1911, and officially broke with them the following year. Soon after, negotiations with the Russians began, through "Armenian community authorities in Constantinople" — these would constitute some of the innocent Armenian "cultural leaders" arrested in April 24 of the next year, famously marking the beginning of the "genocide" — and Boghos Nubar led the "Armenian National Delegation" formed by the Catholicos, Kevork V.)

 



Kaiser follows up with how this ARF "minority opinion" had been leaked to Talat Pasha, wherein the Ottoman government regarded it as "the real policy of the ARF" — and with good reason, because it was "the real policy of the ARF" — "and began acting on it." Entirely because of this "minority opinion," the Ottoman government "began a campaign of repression" from Oct. 1914 to May 1915. Never mind about the many reports learning about traitorous Armenian activities, as this one from Oct. 20, 1914, warning about "8000 Armenians gathered in Kagizman," forming "some sort of guerilla band," composed mainly of Ottoman-Armenians as well as "army deserters."

Kaiser then tries to minimize the effects of the ARF's reactivation of "an earlier, secret, semi-clandestine armed wing of the party, the Self-Defense Organization," the purpose of which was to protect Armenian villages in remote areas, "from Kurdish attacks, bandits... and other outrages that occurred regularly." (Was that its real purpose? How shamefully insincere.) He tells us this wasn't really a big deal, since per village we would have maybe 6-10 armed men, plus mobile units of perhaps a dozen who would be rushed in when needed. Is that so? That is, naturally the Dashnaks were not going to maintain troops in each village that would simulate actual armies, but we have to get at what the real intent of this "Self-Defense Organization" was. This organization must have followed the "Instructions for Self-Defense," a pamphlet that (as mentioned earlier) began to be distributed in 1910 in the thousands, with sections such as "To Attack Villages," which obviously provided a different idea than self-defense. ("Self-Defense" is frequently the Armenian synonym for "Attack"; see Dasnabedian's book and his comical insistence on using this term for every single conflict.) Since Kaiser has read McCarthy & Company's The Armenian Rebellion at Van, he was surely aware of this "blueprint for rebellion," as described on p. 183, and reproduced in its entirety in the book's appendix, followed by "An Example of Attacks on Villages" in Appendix 5, taken from an internal archival document, dated March 15, 1915, relating the atrocities committed upon the Muslims of Mergehu Village, and reproduced here. The reader may also study portions of these "Instructions" on this page.

Following the Instructions, on p. 184 of The Armenian Rebellion at Van, McCarthy and Company present a highly revealing report, dated Jan. 10, 1914, from Consul Smith at Van, relating the activities of the Dashnaks, which "during the past year has actively concerned itself with the secret importation of arms and their distribution amongst its followers." The weapon of choice was the Mauser pistol, and the consul reported the reason for such arming as "the general lack of security," and stressed how the "selling of arms in Van is a very profitable trade — a rifle or pistol being sold for nearly three times its real value — and this makes the arming of the villages a not unattractive business for the Dashnakist leaders... " Note this report was prepared half a year before the Erzurum Dashnak Convention, where Hilmar Kaiser tried to portray the Dashnaks as loyal Ottomans.

Kaiser continued:

"The Ottoman government knew who the militants were, they began taking out local party leaders one by one and also tracking down the members of the organization, thereby trying to destroy it. This was very easy because in those days the winters in Armenia and Kurdistan were very severe in 1914-15, high snow, so there was no way for the militants to escape to the mountains and hide; and even if they were to leave the villages, there’s a trace."

Dr. Hilmar Kaiser

Is Kaiser actually trying to make a criminal of the Ottoman government for tracking down these terrorists who were committed to having the Ottomans' mortal enemy, Russia, come in and take over? What plane of reality are these genocide proponents living on? (And as far as "Armenia and Kurdistan," designating areas that overlapped one another: were there countries at that time called ""Armenia and Kurdistan"? No, the country was called "The Ottoman Empire," and the Ottomans were attempting to maintain law and order in their own nation which — surprise! — happens to be the duty of any nation. After all, international law at the time regarded these guerillas as "outlaws," who may be punished "as robbers and murderers." The U.S. Army Instructions stated "Men or squads of men who commit hostilities..., are public enemies," and if captured shall be treated not as prisoners of war, but "as highway robbers or pirates.")

Ohanus Appressian gave a more accurate picture on Ottoman efforts to stamp out the ARF agents: "The Dashnacks were in continual open rebellion against the Turkish Government. The Turks took severe measures to stamp out this society but without achieving any great success because they had nothing tangible against which to direct their rage. It was as though they were battling with the air."

 




Since Kaiser established the Ottoman government as the villain of this story, he concluded, "The ARF leadership, based in Van, decided that it had to put up with the situation."

"And now comes a very important document, dated March 25, 1915. The document has been used by Justin McCarthy in the book The Van Rebellion, but it seems Professor McCarthy was so overworked that he could only use half the document. I use the other half. "


This is the part of Kaiser's talk that served as perhaps the most irritating, as he tried to "diplomatically" (or was it "sarcastically"?) establish McCarthy as a kind of crook. Now let's review the honest rules for excerpting. If there is a document that a scholar or writer wishes to make use of in order to prove a point, a writer is within his rights to use only a part of the document that suits his purpose. Documents cannot always be reproduced in their entirety for obvious reasons. (If you're not catching on, see Katchig Mouradian's explanation above: "space constraints.") The only time it's immoral to leave out the parts a writer does not desire is if the other parts serve in some way to contradict the gist of the parts that serve the writer's agenda. If such contradictory information forms part of the document, then the honorable writer must also include, or at least give the idea, of the parts that are not "convenient." Are we agreed on that?

This is one reason why those such as Vahakn Dadrian and Taner Akcam are notorious for going against these honest rules; Guenter Lewy provided a number of examples of Dadrian's crimes of omission. This is the kind of thing that led Kaiser, as Lewy has pointed out, to criticize Dadrian (in "Germany and the Armenian Genocide, Part II: Reply to Vahakn N. Dadrian's Response," Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies, 9, 1996, pp. 139-40), for Dadrian's "misleading quotations" and the "selective use of sources," concluding that "serious scholars should be cautioned against accepting all of Dadrian's statements at face value." (Which is exactly why those as Dennis Papazian are not too crazy about Hilmar Kaiser.)

McCarthy prefaced his excerpting of Cevdet's March 25 telegram pages earlier (p. 192) by writing: "Cevdet did not discount the danger of Armenian revolt, but he felt that the greatest cause for worry was not the Armenians of the city of Van, who seemed to remain peaceful at the end of 1914. It was the activity of Armenians and Nestorians to the east and southeast of Van and on the Iranian border that he feared." In the next few pages, McCarthy outlined how the rebellion was spreading, and by March, "the Eastern Anatolian countryside was completely at war." (p. 195.) "The rebel attacks and murders increased in a planned and methodical manner. The rebellion began to spread throughout the Van Province." (This book is a must-read for anyone wishing to understand what was truly transpiring.)

On p. 196, we learn Cevdet, who had been with Ottoman forces in Iran, was expected to put down what internal reports used to describe as "banditry" and "disloyalty," and were only now catching on to what was really going on: a full-scale rebellion. Making use of military records, McCarthy and Company pinned down the limited men Cevdet had at his disposal. The depleted Third Army was of little help, and "even if the Russian army had not been a threat to Van, the troops would not have been adequate to put down the rebellion." At this point, McCarthy reproduced Cevdet's March 25 telegram (pp. 196-197), which stated: "The Armenians have prepared a general revolt that will aid the upcoming Russian attack..." Once the enemy saw that the defensive forces did not arrive, "they began to assault the Muslim villages that were near the villages where the Armenians had gathered ... attacking gendarmes and tax collectors. Unable to refrain until the time of the general rebellion, their actions showed their intentions." Cevdet warned that the situation will grow far worse, particularly once the Russians came in. "When that occurs there is no doubt that the Armenians will revolt on every side."

 



So now are we all on the edges of our seats as to what McCarthy left out? Kaiser:

"In the second part of the report by Cevdet, the governor, to Talat (there is not a single decision at Van that was not supervised and approved by the central authorities), it says that the Armenian population is entirely peaceful, calm, doing nothing; however, in reality they are rebels, they are only waiting for the Russians to come and then they will kill every Muslim."

As we can see, McCarthy's reportage was entirely honorable. There was no need to include the second portion of this telegram, as McCarthy had already conveyed the idea that the Armenians in this neighborhood were trying to control themselves, biding their time. On the very next page (p. 198), McCarthy began his sub-chapter on "Rebellion in the City of Van" with: "The city of Van had remained relatively quiet as the countryside erupted in rebellion. The peace was not to last." Perhaps Cevdet was referring strictly to the city, in which case it was most dishonorable of Kaiser to have given the impression that McCarthy was trying to hide something. In any event, it is doubtful that the second part of Cevdet's telegram presented the notion that the Armenians were totally innocent. The telegram's first part gives an excellent idea of what was on Cevdet's mind, that the Armenians who were restraining themselves were coiled and ready to strike, and (getting back to the telegram), "They are only waiting for the roads to open [from the winter snows]... (engaging) only in occasional and isolated incidents..."

As far as Kaiser's contention that "there is not a single decision at Van that was not supervised and approved by the central authorities," naturally Cevdet consulted with the home office when it came to major decisions, but how absurd to give the impression that Cevdet never took the initiative and did not make decisions on his own. For example, Rafael de Nogales provided an idea of Cevdet's criminality (in "Memoirs of a Soldier of Fortune," NY, 1932) by turning his guns on the missionary sick bay, and "Djevded" only desisted when de Nogales reminded him of international law. If Cevdet actually did this (which sounds most believable; at this point, he must have hated the missionaries for the part they played in their stirring of and support of the Armenians), of course he would not have contacted the home office for "permission." (Any more than he wouldn't have contacted the home office for permission to turn the guns away.) It is also highly unlikely that Cevdet asked for permission to nail horseshoes onto Armenian feet, as Peter Balakian charmingly wrote in his "The Burning Tigris," without providing any evidence, of course.

The reason why Kaiser is desperate to tell us that every Van decision was "supervised and approved" is because, like your usual genocide scholar, Kaiser's genocide conclusion is pre-determined. It suits his purpose to provide such speculation as fact, because he is in a rush to prove that the central government decided upon "genocide." Kaiser continued:

"At this point, the Ottoman government decided that it does not make a difference at all if an Armenian would be fulfilling his civic duties, obeying the law, or would be in open rebellion. He would be killed anyhow. On March 25, the Ottoman forces decided to attack the Armenian community in Van and wipe them out. It didn’t work."

What is Hilmar Kaiser basing the above absurdity on? When he went to the Turkish archives, did he actually find a telegram from Cevdet asking for permission to try and wipe out the Armenians, and a reply telling Cevdet to go ahead? If there was no such documentation, how could Hilmar Kaiser, in good conscience, make a statement like that?

We know there is no documentation, because we already have a March 25 telegram from Cevdet. There is nothing there indicating the asking of permission as to whether he should go into Van and kill all of the Armenians; it is only a report warning of the impending situation. Since Kaiser confidently informed us that "there is not a single decision at Van that was not supervised and approved by the central authorities," how could the central authorities have even had the time to consider their response, assuming there was a mysterious "Can I please kill the Armenians" request by Cevdet? Kaiser is telling us that this attack took place on March 25, the very day Cevdet wrote his telegram informing of the general situation.

(By the way, Cevdet's March 25 telegram was not sent to Istanbul, but to the Third Army Command. Is Kaiser expecting us to believe that a governor was going to bother central headquarters with every day-to-day decision, when central headquarters had enough to deal with? Particularly when "There was no solidly established government in Turkey at that time. A political committee... headed by Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, controlled the Central Government, but their authority throughout the empire was exceedingly tenuous," as Ambassador Morgenthau summed up on March 18, 1915? .If a governor was so incompetent as to not take charge with day-to-day decisions, such a pain-in-the-neck could not have possibly lasted very long.)

 

 




"And then the defense started. It was a defense, not a rebellion. The defense was successful by accident."

How peculiar, then, that another ally of the Armenians, the French, reported in one of their newspapers (Le Temps, August 13th, 1915): "At the beginning of this war, Aram took up arms and became the head of the insurgents of Van. Russia which possesses at present this province named Aram governor for it, wishing to satisfy the Armenian element which so brilliantly participated in the war against Turkey." And we have no shortage of Armenian-friendly sources corroborating the rebellion. An Armenian book, La Défense héroique de Van ("The Heroic Defense of Van”), freely explains how Ottoman-Armenians seized Van, in plans of handing the city over to joint control with the invading Russian forces. (The book also tells us that Cevdet Bey asked the Van Armenians for 3,000 soldiers, and they refused, officially for fear of dying from epidemics.)

Kaiser's attempt to push the ridiculous "self-defense" notion is working wonders with obliterating his credibility. Simple logic tells us it would not have made sense for the Ottoman forces to have fired the first shot, since there weren't even enough forces to battle the invading Russians, thanks to the debacle of Sarikamish (which proved to be a disaster in no small part due to the treachery of Armenians; McCarthy's book informs Cevdet was barely able to scrape together a force of 2,300, mostly gendarmes, and not regular soldiers). Was this the time to go off and start using Armenians for target practice? Particularly since the well-armed Van Armenians had become a formidable force by this point? (In a couple of months, via a May 25 telegram, Ambassador Morgenthau pointed to nearly 25,000 insurgents in Van; of course, these would have included the Armenians the Russians had brought with them.)

 

FROM THE BLUE BOOK:

AN ARMENIAN EXPOSES THE TREACHERY OF THE ARMENIANS


Our witness is Armenian, and a noted personality, Mr. G. Kh. Chalkussian, vice-president of the Armenian pan-Russian Congress held in St. Petersburg on the 24th May, 1916. Here are the munitions he places at our disposal.

In a speech he delivered on this occasion, he spoke as follows: “Reports on the national misfortune will be read during the next three days. A terrible calamity has struck us, owing, firstly to our sympathies for the Entente, and secondly, to the direct participation of the Armenian people in the present war. The French have picturesquely and amicably called us “their little allies.” It may be that we have rendered little services to the worldwide cause, but we have paid for them a price worthy of “big allies.” The war has implicated the whole Armenian people, but there was no hope for us from the beginning(?). The Russian Government would not have any complication and endeavored by all means to prevent the war(?). This point of view coincided with our wishes, because we feared pogroms (sic) and massacres. But from the beginning, our sympathies were for the Entente, because Russia was at her head(!) and Armenian loyalty towards her has been a feature of history. Take for instance the wars against Persians and Turks. Armenians went to meet the Russians [with] all the bells ringing loud, the priests in their sacerdotal dress, and in this war, the Armenian people was entirely on the side of the Russian people. A little before the Turkish War, private conferences were held between Armenian leaders and the Turkish authorities, in which the Turks endeavored to bring Armenians to their side. The latter rejected those proposals with aversion. Then the war broke out, and volunteers began to enlist. Armenians came in crowds from Armenia (Eastern Anatolia), from Egypt (a portion of the Turkish Empire), from Roumania, from Bulgaria (both of which were inhabited by Ottoman Armenians and not by Russian Armenians), volunteers who knew Asia Minor so well (it was their own country) that they were able to render great services to the Russian Government. Then an unparalleled massacre began, leaving us the only alternative, as the Spaniards say, of crying from the gaps of our wounds.[1] (Chronologically, therefore, the massacre began after Armenians had passed over to the Russian side).

The second general question we have to deal with regarding the Lord Bryce collection of documents is to determine whether the Ottoman Government used unnecessary or excessive rigor in carrying out the deportation measure, and if it is responsible for the great loss of life and the excesses which accompanied it.

Undoubtedly, the whole Armenian population was transferred, including women and children. But that was because the whole Armenian population, without exception, women and children, were poisoned with the revolutionary