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An essay
by Nick
For contact info and more
of the Brit with True Grit: click here.
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I |
Armenians, and their friends, have been promoting the idea
of the Armenian genocide, in one form or another for at least ninety years. The story has
fitted perfectly with a broader assault against the Turks that has gone on since the
Philhellenic romantics got the bit between their teeth at the start of the Greek War of
Independence and went on to encompass a whole range of anti Turkish stories through the
“Bulgarian Horrors” to the “Pontic Genocide” and the “Destruction of Smyrna.”
The story has been heart rending, dramatic and, above all, hugely fictionalised. More than
a glorification of the history of the suffering endured by resilient and noble peoples at
the hands of brutal and primitive oppressors, this has been the glorification of selective
pieces of history and carefully nurtured myths — a glori-fictation of history in effect.
All nations have national myths, usually surrounding their
ancestry, conception and birth. Some nations have aberrational myths that focus on divine
rights and depend on grotesque suffering. The fact is, that in modern times at least, the
details of the arguments between the Turks and the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Armenians
interests nobody except those involved. The general public, in America or France for
example, is not remotely interested in the details of “500 years under the Ottoman yoke”
in Greece or Bulgaria or the “Armenian Genocide” any more. However, in spite of the
lack of interest, the repeated telling of a story has contributed to the poisoning of the
groundwater in terms of Turkey’s relationship with western countries and bubbles to the
surface in films like “Midnight Express” and in sentiments that if expressed
about any other ethnic group would produce outrage. This has been particularly evident in
the USA when the issue of alliance or aid arises or in Europe over Turkey’s EU
membership. The same old stories of the Turks and Islam come tumbling out. The Turkish
Republic is described as a country whose parents were barbarians and whose midwives were
war and genocide. It is a good story; a dramatic story; a compelling story that trips of
the pen. But it is just a story. The Turks have been forced to defend themselves in
academic, even legalistic terms in the face of accusations and distortions. Unfortunately,
people are bored by legalistic arguments and prefer the entertainment of a good story.
Once a good story has been fixed in the mind it mingles with prejudice and half facts that
masquerade as historical knowledge and is very difficult to shift. But these incomplete
conceptions affect the decisions that are made in our world and our time because we live
in countries that have politicians who are populists and are driven by sound- bytes and
sentimentality.
However, a modern Turkish Republic whelped by genocide, is
not so far from the truth — and it is a story that should be told with conviction and
purpose. Between 1783 and 1913 it is estimated that 5-7 million Muslims became refugees,
at least 3.8 million of them from territories acquired by Russia, and poured into the
Ottoman Empire. (1) This is even before the Great War charnel house is accounted
for. These refugees had a profound impact on the Ottoman Empire’s demographic make up
and the memory of them significantly affects events even today but it is a store of memory
held mainly in Turkey and, as yet, has little resonance in the West. Within these bald
statistics are between 5 and 7 million tragic, heart rending stories. The early phase of
these forced migrations was of little interest to people in the west. Western interest was
only sparked by the onset of the Greek uprisings in the early part of the 1800s and
subsequent literary yearnings of the philhellenic romantics and the messianic imperatives
of religious Christian fundamentalists.
The early part of the 1800s was characterised by Russian
meddling in the Ottoman Empire that, generally speaking, alarmed western countries. By
1820 the situation in the Morea (southern Greece) was increasingly fragile and uprisings,
spurred on by Russian agents, broke out in March, 1821. George Finlay, one of the
pre-eminent historians of the Greek War for independence (and a man very sympathetic to
the Greeks) said that in April, 1821 the Muslim population of Greece (the Morea) was
“upwards of twenty thousand” and “before two months had elapsed the greater
part were slain-men, women, and children were murdered on their own hearths without mercy
or remorse.” (2) This was done coldly, cynically and viscously to people who
had been neighbours for centuries. Not only that, when Finlay travelled in the region some
years later, locals would proudly point out the scenes of these atrocities and brag about
their participation in them. Finlay then goes on to describe a liturgy of butchery against
Muslims. He also says that in hundreds of villages where Muslim families were exterminated
the “bodies of men, women and children were thrown into some outhouse, which was set
on fire, because no Orthodox Christian would demean himself so far as to dig a grave for
the carcase of an infidel.” He adds to this, in a footnote, that on one occasion he
witnessed the digging out of the bones of several victims, “well known in the
district,” as the locals were preparing to rebuild the house in which they had been
murdered. (3)
In the town of Vrachori, Greeks burned the Turkish and
Jewish quarters and tortured the Jews to collect money and jewels who were then killed.
The Greeks then turned on the Turks and “men, women and children were slain in cold
blood” in what Finlay says were “circumstances of atrocious cruelty.” (4)
 |
Patriarch
Gregorios gets seriously messed up at the
hands of the bloody Turks. From a Greek site. |
It was not until the general massacre of Muslims in Greece
had begun were there any reprisals in Constantinople — and these were of selected
individuals who were either involved in plotting with Greek insurrectionists and Russian
agents or those who were in positions of authority over the Greeks, the best known of whom
was Patriarch Gregorios.
Then followed the massacre of Trepoliza where, according to
Colonel Raybaud, a French artillery officer serving with the Greeks, women and children “were
frequently tortured before they were murdered.” He went on to report that after “the
Greeks had been in possession of the city for forty-eight hours, they deliberately
collected together about two thousand persons of every age and sex, but principally women
and children, and led them to a ravine in the nearest mountain, where they murdered every
soul.” Many young women were taken off as slaves but “few male children were
spared.” General Gordon, a British eye-witness, estimated when reviewing the
aftermath, that about eight thousand Muslims had been slaughtered. All of this was prior
to limited pogroms against Christians in the Smyrna area (a direct response to the
massacre at Trepoliza) and prior to the much written about and exaggerated massacres on
Chios. Thus was set the pattern that was to be followed for the next hundred years. (5)
 |
William
Gladstone thought the
Turks were really, really bad
people. In the great liberal
tradition continuing today. |
The Greek pattern was replicated almost exactly in Bulgaria
when in the 1870s Bulgarian massacres of Muslims precipitated reprisals that where grossly
reported in Europe and used for political purposes by politicians like Gladstone who made
great capital out of the “Bulgarian Horrors” Again, the instigator here was Russia and
again the result was massacre and expulsions of the Muslim population. When Bulgaria
became independent, the area it covered had been a multi-ethnic region with almost half
the population being Muslims- some of whom had already experienced expulsion from the
Crimea at the hands of Russia. During the war of 1877-78, some seventeen months of
fighting resulted in the expulsion of one and a half million Muslims and the deaths from
exposure, disease, starvation and massacre of 500,000. Following this the Turks of
Bulgaria experienced phases of oppression and deportation up until the fall of communism,
but particularly during and just after the Balkan wars. During the first part of World War
I, the Ottoman government was still trying to settle about 500,000 surviving refugees from
the Balkan wars but roughly 27% of Muslims from Ottoman Europe had died as a result of the
Balkan wars — some 600,000 people. (6)
In some regions Muslims were now a cowed minority while in
others, they had ceased to exist by the close of matters after World War I. And everywhere
was the systematic destruction of all visible remains of Muslim presence. In Salonica, for
example, as soon as population exchanges with Turkey had been agreed the city government
decided to demolish the city’s minarets and mosques and the work was put out to tender.
One journalist wrote “One after the other, the symbols of a barbarous religion fall
crashing to the ground….The forest of white minarets is thinning out. The red fezzes are
leaving, the yashmaks vanish.” (7) In Salonica even Ottoman built baths and
markets were demolished. And so on. All over the Balkans the pattern was the same. People
seemed to think that by erasing the physical evidence of the Ottoman past they could make
history disappear …so that it could be rewritten. Nothing like this was ever carried out
by Ottoman authorities.
In Europe, where the involvement of westerners was
considerable, it is possible to find the truth if one is prepared to look because there
was some honesty to be found.
Even a man like Chedo Myatocich, Serbian ambassador to both
London and Constantinople was able to admit in 1913 that “it is political interest
that has caused us (the nations of the Balkans) to describe the Turks as cruel Asiatic
tyrants, unnameable to European civilisation. An impartial history would show that the
Turks are rather Europeans than Asiatics and that they are not cruel tyrants, but a nation
that loves justice and freedom and that possesses virtues and qualities deserving of
recognition and respect.” (8) Leaving aside the implied criticism of what it
means to be an “Asiatic” his point is clear and has an eerily contemporary
relevance.
In Russia and the Caucasus however, things were
considerably different in that the Russians were not the provocateurs but the direct
agents of genocide. It is also an area where western observers were few, sources of
information limited and, to complicate matters, the regions where Armenians and other
Christian minorities had most involvement. Matters in Chechnya and Dhagestan continue to
fester today directly because Russia’s grotesque efforts at combined policies of forced
assimilation, expulsion, internal exile and murder have been spectacularly
unsuccessful.
II
|
One of the most crucial problems in
analysing the evolution of the Armenian crisis in Anatolia and the Caucasus has been
the fictionalisation of history. This is a region and a people where fact and story
telling have become inextricably combined. If one wants to get a feel for the “Armenian
Genocide” one is better served by reading a novel on the subject, or one of the
dramatised biographies, than the dense pseudo-scientific treatises that are
regularly churned out by the genocide industry. A.H. Hartunian’s dramatised
biography “Neither to Laugh nor to Weep” is a good example. Another is
the collaborative novel written by Hacikyan and Soucy “A Summer Without Dawn
— An Armenian Epic” and published in 1991. It isn’t a particularly good
novel and it abounds with clichés. However it does cover the salient components of
the myth — the meetings between Morgenthau and Talaat, complete with the
conversations explaining the government’s policy of genocide as reported in
Morgenthau’s book, and early in chapter I the often repeated myth that “it
was said that around 300,000 Christians had been killed” in massacres ordered
by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in 1894 — all of this in order to set the scene. The
novel contains all the familiar themes (and contradictions) of innocent Armenian
victims and valiant Armenian freedom fighters; Armenian orphans raised as Muslims
never to know their Armenian birthright; women forced into sexual slavery; bad Turks
and (a few) good Turks; manipulated and misled Kurds — the agents of genocide and,
of course, the wholesale government sponsored massacre of Armenians and eventual
salvation in America. The epilogue briefly covers the “war crimes” trials in
Istanbul, the betrayal of the Armenians by the allies and the establishment of the
Republic.
A ripping yarn. (9)
But stories are not constrained by
fact and one does not need to understand the roots of a problem to soak up the
message — the tree is visible, the roots are not. The roots are to be found in
Russia and in Russia’s expansion into the Caucuses; with their frequent resulting
wars against the region’s inhabitants and the Persian and Ottoman empires. The
Russians first sought to subvert local populations to their cause whether they were
Christian, Muslim or animist. The pattern was a cascade of trade, bribery, division,
assault, occupation and then expulsion, deportation and genocide.
A Russian civil servant called Platon
Zubov tried to formalise this hitherto ad hoc policy in 1834 in a book called “A
Picture of the Caucasian Region and Neighbouring Lands Belonging to Russia.”
Zubov’s thesis involved the subversion of mountain tribes by stimulating a demand
amongst their women for luxury goods. These goods were to be offered by Christian
missionaries who would combine trade with conversion and propaganda to primitives
who would then see the benefits of Russification. Lowland inhabitants would remain
in their homes served by the Russian government and ministered to by the Orthodox
Church. Mountain peoples would be sent to inner Russia and would be replaced by
Russian settlers. Native language, religion and culture would eventually die out.
Clearly a naïve plan because the peoples of the region would hardly appreciate
benefits of deportation and cultural extinction. The initial parts of Zubov’s
thesis were never implemented with enthusiasm or efficacy, but the latter parts
certainly were. (10)
One of the earlier attempts to co-opt
the Armenian population in the frontier zones with the Ottoman Empire occurred in
1829. On the 11th of January 1829 Field Marshall Paskievitch wrote, in a
dispatch to the Emperor, “We can defeat the enemy by the help of our troops; we
can only retain our conquests by inspiring confidence in the population.” He
was referring to the Armenians in this instance who as a result, according to the
contemporary writer John F. Baddely (one of the few westerners to write about this
period and region) “were utterly compromised with their Muhamadan neighbours.”
When the Russians eventually withdrew from Turkish territory, some 90,000 Armenians
went with them.(11) This is also the period where we start to see the
mythologizing of the Armenian struggle for freedom. Khattchur Abovian, an
influential writer and ideologue, considered by many to be the father of modern
Armenian literature, was born between 1804 and 1810 in Erivan, which was then part
of Persia. He was an eye-witness to the Russo-Persian war of 1827-28 and saw the
absorbtion of his homeland by Russia. He wrote what is described as an important
historical novel — “The Woes of Armenia” — as a result. In the book,
he tells “how joyous the Armenians were at the prospects of having a “Christian”
power to rule their country…and describes the ravages that had taken place in the
homeland that the reader wonders if any other country has suffered as much as
Armenia……Abovian made an emotional appeal to his countrymen to be mindful of the
sorrows of their native land and to mourn its martyrs. He drew the mind and heart of
his readers toward their fatherland and, in doing so, awakened in them the desire
for revolution.” (12)
 |
General
Alexei Yermolov wrote to the
Tsar in 1818: he "would find no peace
as long as a single Chechen remained
alive" because "by their example they
could inspire a rebellious spirit and
love of freedom among even the most
faithful subjects of the Empire." |
The defeat of both
Persia and Turkey during this period left Russia with a free hand for many years to
follow and was characterised by brutality, especially in the conquest of Chechnya.
In Chechnya, the Russian general Yermolov campaigned with real barbarity saying when
questioned about his tactics “out of pure humanity I am inexorably severe. One
execution saves hundreds of Russians from destruction and thousands of Muslims from
treason.” Villages with their inhabitants were regularly destroyed and captured
women were distributed among Russian officers as winter entertainment. Following
Yermolov, Veliaminov tried the same tactics against the Circassians where he
resorted to deliberate brutality and scorched earth without success. For a time
there was stalemate in the Caucusus and Circassians were said by Prince Kochubey (to
an American writer) to be like the American Indians “untameable and uncivilized….and…extermination
only would keep them quiet.” (13) Ultimately, this was to be their fate.
Baddely said of this time “it would be unfair to the natives to forget that, time
after time, from their earliest contact with the northern invaders down to the last
shameful act of conquest, the wholesale expatriation of the western tribes in 1864,
we come upon evidence of Russia’s unjust and even treacherous dealing with them,
and this though we are perforce confined to Russian sources for our information.”
The same is, of course, true of other nationalities; the Karbadians were destroyed
by Yermolov and finished off by plague so that barely 10,000 of them remained by
1834 — Russia’s policy can be encapsulated by Yermolov's dictate to “destroy
auls [villages], hang hostages, and slaughter women and children” (14)
Ultimately, by 1864, some 1,2000,000
Abkhaz and Circassian people were expelled to the Ottoman Empire 400,000 of them
dying in the process. (15) The Russians burned villages, destroyed livestock
and burned crops thus, according to a British diplomatic report, “obliging them
to fly.” It goes on to say “As the Russians gain ground on the coast, the
natives are not allowed to remain there on any terms, but are compelled either to
transfer themselves to the plains of Kouban or emigrate to Turkey……..The Ubikh
and Fighett tribes are fast embarking for Trebizond. In fact, after their land had
been laid waste by fire and sword, emigration to Turkey is the only alternative
allowed to these mountaineers who refuse to transfer themselves to the Kouban
steppes………Most of the Abkhaz have been plundered of everything by the Russians
before embarking and have barely been allowed to bring with them the strict
necessities of life for a short period. In many villages….their houses have been
wantonly burnt by the Cossak soldiery and their cattle and other property forcibly
taken away or sold under compulsion to Russian traders at a nominal price.”
And in another report “The
Russian government has now acquired the territory of that brave and devoted race who
have only prized one thing more than country — liberty, or at least the life that
is free from the domination of a foreign foe. They are flying the shores
immortalized by their defence and seeking asylum in a neighbouring empire. In short,
Circassia is gone……” (16) One has to ask — does any of this sound
familiar?
Mortality was very high. Many drowned
in the Black Sea as they had been embarked upon boats that were simply unseaworthy
and crowded to capacity. To this day, there is a folk memory among the descendants
of some of these people that they should not eat fish because their ancestors were,
themselves food for fishes.
Many died of murder, disease,
starvation and exposure on the overland trip to Turkey and many succumbed after they
had reached safety. For example, a tug, arriving at the Dardanelles in tow of two
ships “laden with 1,300 Circassians from Samsoon. The original number shipped
was 1,800 and during the voyage, which lasted 35 days, 670 died from disease,
exhaustion, hunger and, above all, from horrible crowding.”
In 1865 some 5,000 Chechen and Ingush
families were forced to flee to Turkey. This was a typical occurrence and the
pattern was repeated after the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-8. In fact, by Royal Decree
of 31st May 1880, the entire Abkhazian people were officially declared
guilty of treason and those that had not already fled were exiled to eastern and
northern provinces of Russia. Large swathes of central Abkhazia were almost
completely depopulated. (17) And in 1895 in “The Memorandum on the
Colonisation in the Sukhumi District” drawn up by one Colonel Brakker there is the
statement:”It is desirable to save as much free land as possible for the
settlement of exclusively native Russian people.” Some Abkhaz endured and the
supply of Russian settlers was limited — according to statistics collated in 1918
the population of Abkhazia was 21.4% Abkhaz, 42.1% Georgians, 11.7% Russians, 11.7%
Greeks, 10.2% Armenians and 2.9% other nationalities. (18) In the province of
Erivan, roughly now modern Armenia, the population was predominately Muslim. By 1827
the majority was Armenian. And so the pattern continued. (19)
 |
Louise
Nalbandian |
The pattern of manipulation of
Armenians by Russia in order to further their Caucasian and Anatolian goals, and the
apparent willingness of Armenians to co-operate continued unabated with the Russians
being frustrated only by the restraints put on them by the western powers and the
Armenians by their inability to control Russian ambitions. As Louise Nalbandian puts
it “The Armenians had always nurtured the thought of freedom during the
centuries of foreign domination, but now they believed they could move effectively
against it. Even after the great disappointment at the Congress of Berlin, this hope
for a brighter future did not die.” (20) During the Russo-Turkish war
of 1877-88 the Tiflis based Armenian newspaper Mushak said, as Russian troops
marched into Turkey, “If Turkey vanishes from the face of the earth as a
nation, the Armenians of Turkey must try every means to join Russia.” (21)
And from Armenian intellectuals such as Mikael Nalbandian, Rafael Patkanian (aka
Kamar Katiba) and Hakob Melik-Hakobian (aka Raffi) came works of popular literature
that all aimed at the encouragement of “armed force against the Ottoman
government.” Greek and Bulgarian revolutionary experiences encouraged the
setting up of guerrilla bands on the back of Russian support. Groups in Russia
sought to stir up unrest amongst Armenians in Turkey by encouraging them to emulate
the Greeks and Bulgarians by producing brochures with romanticised accounts of
revolt with titles such as “Bulgar Avazakapet “ (Chief of the Bulgarian
Brigands) and “Sarkavag” (Deacon) (22) Beyond the romantic literary
output was, of course, the more sinister terroristic byproduct. Armenian
revolutionaries were, by the early 1890s, involved in military and incendiary
operations aimed at destabilising the Ottoman Empire — men were sent across the
border for military actions against Kurds since it was believed that “such
encounters would attract the attention of the European Powers…..and to collect
information about the condition of the people and the possibilities of uprising:
preparing men in Russian Transcaucasia for possible future armed combat on Turkish
soil; and smuggling arms into Turkey through the Persian frontier.” (23) All
of this is prior to incidents that produced major uproar in western countries such
as the Kum Kapi riots (1890), the riots at Bab Ali (1895) and the Ottoman Bank
attack (1896) and most importantly, the 1896 uprising in Van . It is interesting
that in the matter of arms smuggling into eastern Anatolia in this period the
Armenians were very clever in exploiting the political dynamics of the area and the
mutual suspicions of Russians, Armenians, Persians, Turks and Kurds — the Dashnaks
set up an arms factory in 1891 in Tabriz. This arms factory was an assembly plant
— or what we call today a “screwdriver plant”— skilled men from the Tula
arms factory in Russia, using equipment from the government armoury in Tiflis,
manufactured components for modern arms and ammunition. These components were then
transported to Tabriz for assembly and then stored in various arsenals for use by
guerrilla forces in Turkey. The Turks knew about this but were able to do little due
to limitations placed on their scope for action by international borders. (24) Into
this developing environment of hostility and terror in the heartland of the Ottoman
Empire came the millions of refugees and survivors of massacre, disease and human
calamity from the Caucusus, the Balkans and Greece.
In the context of all this human
misery the deportation of Armenians in WWI was small beer. In the context of a war
of national survival it is surprising that the government resorted to deportation
and not genocide (as the Imperial Russian Government actually did) and it is hardly
surprising, given the recent nature of the sufferings of Muslims and the incendiary
and racist nature of Armenian propaganda that the local responses to the proximity
of Russian armies and the actions of Armenian irregulars was so extreme. As Rafael
de Nogales, an artillery officer with the Ottoman army put it — after the war
started almost all Armenian officers and men of the Third Army joined the Russians
soon to return “burning hamlets and mercilessly putting to the knife all the
peaceful Mussulman villagers that fell into their hands. The altogether
unjustifiable desertion of the Armenian troops, united to the outrages they
committed afterwards, on their return, in the sectors of Bash-Kaleh, Serai and
Bayacet, did not fail to alarm the Turks and rouse their fear lest the rest of the
Armenian population in the frontier provinces of Van and Erzerum revolt likewise,
and attack them with the sword.” (25)
The difference between Muslim and
Armenian experiences lay only in the fact that there was no vociferous lobby in
America or Western Europe campaigning on their behalf; there was no missionary
investment in the souls of the Greek Muslims, Bulgarian Turks, the Crimean Tartars,
the Chechen, the Ingush, the Abkhaz, the Circassians and the numerous other small
nations and tribes who suffered and, in some instances, no longer exist. Double
standards were even more entrenched then than they are today and a similar pattern
unfolded after the Greeks invaded Anatolia in pursuit of a neo-Byzantine imperial
dream in 1919. When George Horton, Christian missionary in Smyrna and a Turcophobe
of no small distinction (author of “The Blight of Asia”), asked a Greek about reports of wholesale
massacres carried out by Greeks against Turks in Western Anatolia during 1921-22,
the answer that he got was that Greek actions were modeled after the punitive
expeditions carried out by U.S. forces in the Philippines between 1899-1905. (26)

It should be noted that there are some
estimates that put the direct and indirect mortality among Filipinos due to American
military action at about 200,000. Mr. Horton’s Greek advisor would certainly have
been familiar with the purpose and format of U.S. operations in the Philippines but
the comparisons seem to have prompted no further comment. In the context of the
Philippines, non Christian Filipinos were referred to, in official texts, as “wild”
thus reducing them to the level of beasts. (27) This was a sentiment that
would have been integral to Horton’s view of the Muslim Turks. He even compares
the policy of laying waste to the land carried out by the Greeks as being similar to
Sherman’s march to the sea during the American Civil War, and therefore
justifiable. (28) The British historian Arnold Toynbee was considerably more
blunt. He dedicated an entire chapter (in his book “The Western Question of Greece
and Turkey”) to this disgraceful episode. He simply called the chapter “A War of
Extermination.” and powerfully validates his testimony as a witness saying “I
was for some weeks in intimate contact with Greek soldiers and civilians then
engaged in atrocities upon Turkish peasants, and with the survivors of their victims
whom the Ottoman Red Crescent was attempting to rescue.” and “I
personally questioned a number of survivors from groups of Turkish villages around
Fistikli about the temper of the Greek chettes during their operations. They all
agreed that they were not in a state of fury or excitement. They plundered first and
killed afterwards, and they sang at their work, even when they got to the killing.
It was the exhilaration of a cat who has caught a mouse to play with.” (29)
This last comment having an uncanny similarity with events in the Morea a
century earlier and at the start of our story.
So there we have it. When Armenians
talk of the “First Genocide of the 20th Century” they are talking
meaningless rhetoric. When Greeks talk about a Pontic Genocide there are simply
trying to slip stream behind the Armenians who are, themselves, aping the Jewish
Holocaust for national, political and financial gain. No one, beyond specialised
academics, has yet seriously looked at the suffering of Muslims in Balkans and
Caucasus during this period and no one has bothered to write the novel; no one is
interested in producing a biographical masterpiece or an epic film. Until then Turks
must continue to confront a history produced by ideologues that are fundamentally
dishonest in their aims and disingenuous in their arguments. When commenting on the
Russian atrocity in the Caucasus, Baddely condemned them on Christian and moral
grounds but he was aware of the actions of other countries, including his own, that
criticism would invariably be muted because, as he put it…..”let it be
emphatically repeated that, while individually any man may have the right to condemn
it, collectively, as nations, it is a case of glass houses all round.” (30)
We are long past the point where Armenians and Greeks should have realised, and
accepted publicly, that they, themselves, are sitting in a very exposed and obvious
glass house.
|
Bibliography
- Telling A Good Story |
-
Quartet, Donald. “The Ottoman
Empire, 1700-1922” Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp 115-116.
-
Finlay, George. “The Greek
Revolution and the Reign of King Otto” Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1877. p 139.
-
Ibid. p 162.
-
Ibid. p 163
-
Ibid. pp 245-276
-
Karpat K.H. “The Turks of
Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority” The Isis Press,
Istanbul, 1990. pp 159-163 and McCarthy, Justin, “Death and Exile-The Ethnic
Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821- 1922” The Darwin Press Inc, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1995. pp 59- 108
-
Mazower, Mark. “Salonica-City
of Ghosts” Harper Collins Publishers, London. 2004. pp. 351-352
-
Ozal, Turgut “Turkey in Europe
and Europe in Turkey” K. Rustem & Brother, Nicosia, N.Cyprus. 1991. p 208.
-
Hajikyan, Agop. J. & Soucy,
Jean-Yves “A Summer Without Dawn- An Armenian Epic” Saqi Books, London, English
language edition, 2000.
-
Broxur, Marie Bennigsen (ed) “The
North Caucusus Barrier- The Russian Advance Towards The Muslim World), Hurst & Co,
London. 1996. pp 8- 11.
-
Baddely, John E. “The Russian
Conquest of the Caucusus” Longmans, Green & Co 1908 rebublished Curzon Press,
London 1999. pp 223-224.
-
Nalbandian, Louise “The
Armenian Revolutionary Movement” University of California Press, Berkely and Los
Angeles, 1963. pp38-39.
-
Broxur, pp46-48.
-
Baddely, p. 33. and 147-148.
-
McCarthy, pp 23-58.
-
Broxur,pp 62-111.
-
Broxur, pp 62-111
-
Chervonnya, Svetlana “Conflict
in the Caucusus- Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow” Gothic Image
Publications, Gastonbury, UK. 1994 (translation from “Abkhazia-1992: Post
Communisticheskaya Vendaya” Mosgorpechat 1993, Moskva), pp 15-24.
-
McCarthy, p 31.
-
Nalbandian, p 54.
-
Ibid. p 53
-
Ibid. p141.
-
Ibid. p 146.
-
Ibid. pp 173-175.
-
De Nogales, Rafael “Four Years
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