Aside from a slight disagreement over motivation, Horton and Housepian (utilizing many of the same eye eyewitness sources) are firmly united by their conviction that the actual firing of the city was the work of organized Turkish military units.

*
* *

To anyone familiar with the Turkish nationalist struggle between the years of 1919 – 1923, the Horton-Housepian school of thought (predicated upon a view of Turks as brutal barbarians) rings somewhat hollow. In September of 1922, the Aegean port city of Izmir was the long-awaited goal of the nationalists in their three year struggle against the invading Greek armies. The staging point for the Greek occupation of western Anatolia, it was veritable storehouse of all the items needed by the forces of Mustafa Kemal. Its warehouses overflowed with much needed supplies of food, clothing, medicine and weapons. Yet, within days of the entry of the Nationalist forces, a massive fire destroyed over three-fourths of the city, and the victorious Turkish armies found themselves in possession, not of the only real city in the territories they controlled (Istanbul was still under Allied occupation ), but rather with a smoldering ruin occupied by several hundred thousand homeless refugees. Indeed if one is to accept the Horton-Housepian analysis, we are faced with one of the few incidents in history where a victorious army systematically destroyed the fruits of their victory. Even the barbarian Huns made certain they retrieved movable properties before firing the cities they overran. Logically then, the Horton-Housepian account suggest that the Turkish Nationalist forces were not only barbarian, but lacked the instincts of earlier barbarian hordes !

To counter the version of the Izmir fire presented in such works, we must turn to western accounts written by scholars who are specialists on the Turkish history of the period. Names such as Bernard Lewis, Donald Webster, Lord Kinross, Richard Robinson, and Stanford Shaw, come to mind. A quick survey of their works dealing with this period reveals the following :


a) Bernard Lewis : <<The Turks won a crushing victory at
Dumlupinar, and, driving the Greeks before them, re-occupied Izmir on 9 September, thus completing the reconquest of Anatolia>>[6]. In other words, Lewis does not mention the fire at all;

b) Donald Webster : <<All the world heard about the great fire which destroyed much of beautiful Izmir. While every partisan accuses enemies of the incendiarism, the preponderance of impartial opinion blames the terror-stricken Armenians, who had bet their money on the wrong horse – a separatist national rather than a cultural individuality within the framework of the new, laique Turkey>>[7]. Webster, who does not footnote this passage,
presumably formed his opinion while serving as teacher at the International College in Izmir between 1931-1934:

c) Lord Kinross : <<The internecine violence led, more or less by accident, to the outbreak of a catastrophic fire. Its origins were never satisfactorily explained. Kemal maintained to Admiral Dumesnil that it had been deliberately planned by an Armenian incendiary organization, and that before the arrival of the Turks speeches had been made in churches, calling for the burning of the city as a sacred duty. Fuel for the purpose had been found in the houses of Armenian women, and several incendiaries had been arrested. Others accused the Turks themselves of deliberately starting the fire under the orders or at least connivance of Nur-ed-Din Pasha, who had a reputation for fanaticism and cruelty. Most probably it started when the Turks, rounding up the Armenians to confiscate their arms, besieged a band of them in a building in which they had taken refuge. Deciding to burn them out, they set it alight with petrol, placing cordon of sentries around to arrest or shoot them as they escaped. Meanwhile the Armenians started other fires to divert the Turks from their main objective. The quarter was on the outskirts of the city. But a strong wind, for which they had not allowed, quickly carried flames towards the city. By the early evening several other quarters were on fire, and a thousand homes, built flimsily of lath and plaster, had been reduced to ashes. The flames were being spread by the looters, and doubtless also by Turkish soldiers, paying off scores. The fire brigade was powerless to cope with such a conflagration, and at Ismet’s headquarters the Turks alleged that its hose pipes had been deliberately severed. Ismet himself chose to declare that the Greeks had planned to burn the city.>[8] Kinross devoted and entire chapter of his work to the fire which destroyed Izmir.

d) Richard Robinson : <<The battle of Sakarya began on August 22. By the end of the first week of September the Greeks began to weaken. In another week, they were falling back. One year [sic. week] later they were literally driven into the sea at Izmir, where they were evacuated by Allied ships. The date was September 9, 1922.>>[9] Robinson likewise does not make any reference to the burning of the city;

e) Stanford Shaw : << On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of the city. It spread rapidly through gasoline-soaked buildings while the Turkish army’s effort to extinguish it were stymied by the discovery that all the city’s fire hoses had been cut and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day as many as 25,000 buildings were burnt and half the great city destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestion, quickly taken up by the western press, that the victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire. Actual culpability has never been proved>>[10]. Shaw, while rejecting outright the suggestion that the Turkish army fired the city, remains neutral on the question of who did.

More important than her rejection of the Turkish publication of Grescovich’s testimony, is her failure to deal with a very important document housed in the Bristol Papers, relative to Grescovich and his testimony. This document (a newspaper report) was written by Mark O. Prentiss, an eyewitness to the burning of the city in his capacity as a member of “Constantinople Disaster Relief Committee”, and as a representative of the “ Near East Relief” organization[18]. Prentiss, together with his fellow members of the ‘CDRC’ arrived in Izmir at 8:30 a.m. on the morning of September 9, 1922 aboard the USS Lawrence[19]. Prentiss provides the following information relevant to Grescovich and his eyewitness testimony of the conflagration:

a) He identifies Grescovich as: << Paul Grescovich, Chief of the Smyrna Fire Department>> [20]

b) Reports that Gresgovich told him that on Wednesday, September 13, 1992 << he had discovered bundles of discarded clothing, rags and bedding, covered with petroleum, in several of the institutions recently deserted by Armenian refugees>> [21];

c) Grescovich, whom Prentiss had first met on Sunday, September 10th is described by Prentiss as follows: << I needed no interpreters, as he speaks English fluently. He is an engineer, born and educated in Austria, and has been identified with several large engineering enterprises in Turkey. Twelve years ago he became chief of the Smyrna fire department, which he continued to conduct in a very efficient manner, for that part of the world, during the Greek occupancy>>[22]

d) On the week prior to the entry of the Turkish forces to the city, Grescovich stated the following: << During the first week of September there had been an average of five fires per day with which his crippled department had to cope. In his opinion most of these fires were caused by carelessness, but some undoubtedly were of incendiary origin. The average number of fires in a normal year, he said, would be about one in ten days, and the increase to the five a day seemed significant>> [23]

e) Following the arrival of the Turkish authorities, Grescovich << applied for additional men and fire fighting equipment. Instead of helping him, the Turkish military governor, learning that there were still twelve Greeks in the fire department, ordered their immediate arrest, which left the department with only thirty-seven men. Sunday night [Sept 10th], Monday and Monday night [Sept. 11th] and Tuesday [Sept. 12th], so many fires were reported at such widely separated points, that the fire department was absolutely unable to deal with them. They were extinguished by Turkish soldiers>>[24].

f) As to the source of the fire which ultimately destroyed the city << it was on Wednesday [Sept. 13th] that Grescovich himself found evidence if incendiarism. He told me that early that morning he had seen two Armenian priests escorting several thousand men, women and children from the Armenian schools and Dominican Churches where they had taken refuge down to the quays. When he presently went into these institutions, he found petroleum-soaked refuse ready for torch>>[25]

Grescovich himself stated << that his own firemen, as well as Turkish guards, had shot down many Armenian young men disguised either as woman or as Turkish irregular soldiers, who were caught setting fires during Tuesday night [Sept. 12th] and Wednesday [Sept 13th] morning>> [26]

g) Grescovich described Turkish response to the fires in the following terms (as reported by Prentiss): << Shortly after noon [Wednesday, Sept. 13th] Grescovich convinced that the city was doomed, again went to the military authorities to ask for help, and again it was not forthcoming. It was not, until six o’clock in the evening that he was given a company of 100 soldiers to serve under his direction and it was eight o’clock at night before soldiers began the destruction of buildings by bombs in order to check the spread of the fire>>[27].

h) On Grescovich's veracity Prentiss states: << Grescovich impressed me as a thoroughly reliable witness>>[28]. In support of this assessment he provides the following account of the nature of his discussions with Grescovich: <<It was not until three days later [Saturday, Sept 16th] that I saw Grescovich again. He told me he had no sleep for five days and nights and he looked the part. Not only was he physically exhausted, but his emotions had been so wrought upon by the sights he had seen, that he begged to be excused from talking over details. Realizing, however, that this was the time to get the truth, I pressed him for information, and went over in chronological order of history of the fire. On that, and on several succeeding days, we explored greater part of if the burned area of the city, and I made notes of the most important things he told me. Later, when Lloyd’s men came to ascertain the extent of the damages, he refused to make any statement at all >>[29].

Regardless of whether or not one credits the testimony of Grescovich, the individual charged with fighting the fire, no serious discussion of the burning of Izmir is possible without taking his account under consideration. As a case in point, we may cite Housepian’s one example of an American eyewitness who claimed to observe Turkish soldiers lighting fires in the city. Her source is the American Vice-Consul Maynard Barnes who she states:

<<Had seen Turkish soldiers pouring gasoline liberally along the street in front of the consulate, was meanwhile working feverishly to save the consular records>> [30].

Barnes’ account, the most frequently cited source of official Turkish complicity in the fire, appears somewhat differently in the official American account, that compiled by Hepburn. There in describing the events of Thursday evening, September 14th, the following description is given:

<< The fire continued to burn throughout the night though considerably diminished. Several separate fires were observed to start in locations distant from the general conflagration, plainly indicating incendiarism. The Passport office, located upon the North pier of the inner harbor, burned after midnight with many heavy explosions, probably caused by gasoline, as a number of drums had been observed in and near this building a day or two previously. This building was only a few hundred yards from the “Litchfields” anchorage, and the actions of the person that fired it were plainly observed by Vice-Consul Barnes from the forecastle, although the distance was too great to allow of any sort of identification. A number of Turkish troops were stationed at the inshore end of the building at the time>> [31].

Prof. Heath Lowry (Ottoman War Machine)

Leaving aside the major discrepancies between Housepian’s version and that found in the Hepburn report, and recalling Grescovich’s account of attempts to halt the spread of the fire, it is clear that from six o’clock on the evening of Wednesday, September 13th forward, a company of 100 Turkish soldiers, under his orders were destroying buildings by bombs, in an attempt to check the spread of the fire. [32] In other words, any description of uniformed Turkish soldiers lighting fires in the city, which occurs after 6: 00 pm on Wednesday the 13th September, may be assumed to be part of the fire-fightings rather than incendiary attempts.

Vice-Consul Barnes offered his own assessment of the fire and its causes in another document preserved in the Bristol Papers. As in the case of the Prentiss report, Housepian conveniently and selectively managed to ignore Barnes’ conclusions:

<< American press accounts of the Smyrna irregularities arriving here contain gross exaggerations and untruths. Impossible to say definitely number of Greeks and Armenians killed-perhaps 2,000. Atrocities committed in the interior by Greeks and Armenians outstrip those committed by the Turks in Smyrna in savagery and wanton destruction. Majority of the Americans here believe Smyrna fired by Armenians. >> [33]

Housepian’s failure to deal with the testimony of Fire-Chief Grescovich, also raises serious questions in regard to her attempts to use the testimony of two of the city’s Greek firemen vis-à-vis Turkish culpability [34]. Specifically, her reliance on the accounts of a Sergeant Tchorbadjis and fireman Emmanuel Katsoros as preserved in the transcript of a London trial in 1924[35], suffers from her failure to rebut Grescovich’s statement that following the arrival of the Turkish authorities on September 9, 1922, he had :

<< applied for additional men and fire fighting equipment. Instead of helping him, the Turkish military Governor, learning that there were still twelve Greeks in the fire department, ordered their immediate arrest, which left the department with only thirty-seven men. Sunday night [Sept. 10th], Monday and Monday night [Sept. 11th] and Tuesday [Sept. 12th], so many fires were reported at such widely separated points, that the fire department was absolutely unable to deal with them. They were extinguished by Turkish soldiers>> [36].

The statement must be reconciled with Sergeant Tchorbadjis claims that he was fighting fire on Tuesday [Sept. 12th.] and Wednesday [Sept. 13th.] morning [37]. If, as Grescovich states, Tchorbadjis and his eleven fellow Greek members of the department were under arrest, his account of the following incident on Wednesday [Sept. 13th] morning, is highly questionable:

<< The ten thirty alarm on Suyane Street disclosed ten houses ablaze. These fire were barely under control when an alarm came from the Armenian church several streets away. Leaving some fireman at the church, Tchorbadjis hurried on alone toward some flames on Tchoukour Street; “I climbed to the roof and found bedding on fire”, he testified later. “Then, I went down into one of the rooms and saw a Turkish soldier, well armed. He was setting fire to the interior of a drawer. He looked rather fiercely at me when he saw me, but he left. I caught the strong smell of petroleum.>> [38]

By “selectively” ignoring the contemporary eyewitness testimony of the Fire-Chief Grescovich, and totally endorsing that of Tchorbadjis (delivered two years after the event), Housepian raises serious doubts as to her historical methodology.

In short, Housepian’s study fully illustrates the truth of Macaulay’s observations:

<< He [she] who is deficient in the art of selection, may by showing nothing but the truth, produce all the effect of the greatest falsehood >>.

As even these few examples establish, Housepian’s highly selective utilization of the materials preserved in the US National Archives and the Library of congress, casts serious doubt upon her contention that the Turkish military were the perpetrators of the conflagration which destroyed the city of Izmir on September 13-15, 1922. Her study while well written (as befits a professor of English), adds up to very poor history, i.e. she has produced a work of polemic rather than one based on sound historical scholarship.

*
**

What is important here however is not the quality of Housepian’s scholarship, but rather, the fact that the testimonies preserved in the United States National Archives and the Bristol Papers in the Library of Congress, are, to say the least, conflicting. On the basis of a selective utilizations of their contents each of the following conclusions may be reached:

A) The Izmir fire was deliberately set by Armenian population of the city.

B) The Izmir fire was deliberately set by Greek inhabitants of the city;

C) The Izmir fire was deliberately set by the Turkish army;

D) The Izmir fire was an accident- stemming from the looting of Turkish irregular troops.

Given the diversity of the interpretations it is possible to draw from the wide variety of testimonies preserved in the American accounts (as well as those in British, French and Italian sources), the actual cause and origin of the conflagration will never be determined on the basis of this material alone. One key missing element is obviously the records of the Turkish military authorities, nominally in control of the city throughout the period in question (Turkish forces entered the city on September 9, 1922) [39].To date, no scholar (Turkish or foreign) has been given access to any of the records surviving for the events in question.

Footnotes

 
^1. Hovannissian, Richard G, << The Armenian Question, 1878 – 1923 >>, Published in : A crime of Silence – The Armenian Genocide Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal. Edited by Gerard Libraridian. London ( Zed Books Ltd. ), 1985. pp. 11-33. For the quotation in question, see: p. 27.

^2. Housepian, Marjorie. The Smyrna Affair. New York ( Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. ), 1966 [ Hereafter: Housepian, Smyrna ].

^3. Housepian, Smyrna : Chapter XIV., pp. 141

^4. Horton, George. The Blight of Asia. Indianapolis ( the Bobbs – Merrill Company ), 1926 [ Hereafter: Horton, Blight ]. See: Chapter XVII. ‘ Where and When the Fires Were Lighted,’ pp. 144-154.

^5. Horton, Blight : pp 153-154

^6. Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Second Edition. London ( Oxford University Press ), 1968, p. 254. [ Hereafter : Lewis, Emergence].

^7. Webster, Donald Everett. The Turkey of Ataturk - Social Process In The Turkish Reformation. Philadelphia (American Academy of Political and Social Science), 1939, p. 96.

^8. Lord Kinross, Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Turkey. New York (William Morrow & Company), 1965, pp 370-371. Kinross devotes Chapter 40 of his work, “The Burning Smyrna” [p 365-375] to the fire which destroyed Izmir.

^9. Robinson, Richard D. The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development. Cambridge( Harvard University Press ), 1963 p 74.

^10. Shaw, Stanford J. & Shaw, Ezel Kural. History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic : The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1977, p. 363.

^11. Housepian, Smyrna: pp. 105-140 & pp. 251-255. As previously noted, Housepian fails to conform anything resembling standard scholarly apparatus in her work. In place of ‘footnotes’, she provides notes for each chapter at the end of her study. Arranged in the same order as the contents of the chapter they refer to, the reader is forced to attempt to determine which item referred to in the ‘notes’ serves as her sources for the statements made in the text. Stated differently, in order to evaluate her utilization of the sources she uses, the reader must actually check the originals of the documents she cites. The extent to which she relied on the Bristol Papers in her discussion of the fire may be determined by checking the ‘notes’ for Chapters X-XIII (pp. 251-255).

^12. Given the fact that most of the relevant documents pertaining to the fire Record Group #45, are likewise found in the Bristol Papers, it is difficult to determine why Housepian chose to cite these two sources in the manner she did, i.e., rather than referring to both she generally provides a reference to one or the other. For her utilization of RG #45 materials on the fire see: pp.251-255.

^13. Among the ‘Files of the Department of State’ used by Housepian are : Nos 763.72, 767.68, 867.00 and 868.48. See Housepian, Smyrna: p 235 & pp. 251-255.

^14. Housepian, Smyrna : p 229

^15. Housepian, Smyrna: pp 229-230

^16. Housepian, Smyrna: p. 229.

^17. Housepian, Smyrna: pp 251-255.

^18. Housed in the Library of Congress series titled: Bristol, General Correspondence, Container # 38 (November-December, 1922 & January-February, 1923), is a letter from Mark O. Prentiss to Adm. Mark Bristol dated January, 11, 1923. Attached to it is a 7 page article titled: << The Hitherto Untold Story of the Smyrna Fire Told by Mark O. Prentiss, American Representative of the Near East Relief. Armenians, not Turks, Set the Fire. Evidence of Smyrna Fire Chief Revealed >>. [Hereafter : Prentiss, Fire]. This key document appears as Appendix I. at the end of this paper. Given the extent to which Housepian utilized the Bristol Papers, it is hard to imagine that she remained unaware of this document. As its testimony runs counter to her arguments, one of two reasons must account for its absence in her work: a) she missed it in the research of her work; or, b) she was aware of its existence and for reasons of her own decided to suppress it.

^19. For the most important day by day account (covering September 8-16, 1922) is that compiled by A.J. Hepburn, the senior American naval official present in Izmir throughout the time in question. Hepburn’s “Report Upon Smyrna Disaster” was submitted to Admiral Bristol (Commander, U.S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters) on September 25 1922. It provides a day-by-day record (comprised of 48 single-spaced typed pages). In his own words, Hepburn’s report was intended to be <<a narrative of the significant and outstanding features of the period, with such comment and explanation as are necessary to clear understanding of events , measures taken, and the general situation as they appeared to me at the time.>> Selectively utilized by Housepian, Hepburn’s account [see: National Archives if the U.S. : Naval Records Collection, Record Group # 45 (Box 713) ] of the origins of the fire [pp. 46-7] is totally ignored by Housepian. For his analysis of the origins of the fire see: APPENDIX II. attached to this paper. [Hereafter : Hepburn, Smyrna Disaster].

^20. Prentiss, Fire: p. 1.

^21. Prentiss, Fire : p. 4

^22. Prentiss, Fire : p. 4

^23. Prentiss, Fire : p. 4

^24. Prentiss, Fire : p. 4.

^25. Prentiss, Fire : p. 5.

^26. Prentiss, Fire: p. 5.

^27. Prentiss, Fire: pp. 5-6

^28. Prentiss, Fire: p. 4.

^29. Prentiss, Fire: p. 6.

^30. Housepian, Smyrna: p. 155.

^31. Hepburn, Smyrna Disaster: p. 33.

^32. Prentiss, Fire : pp 5-6.

^33. Library of Congress: Bristol Papers- ‘Subject Files ’. Container #75 ( Folder on High Commissioner Messages Received, 1922; and, Inquiry, 1919). Barnes’ dispatch is dated October 9, 1922 and was sent from the USS Edsall by radio.

^34. Housepian, Smyrna: pp. 142-144.

^35. Housepian, Smyrna: pp. 235 & 142-144. The trial in question was held at the Royal Courts of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Commercial List, London, on December 2, 1924. It was a law-suit brought by the American Tobacco Company, Inc versus Guardian Assurance Co, Ltd. Housepian used a copy of the transcript preserved in the Bristol Papers- U.S. Library of Congress.

^36. Prentiss, Fire: p. 4.

^37. Housepian, Smyrna: pp. 142-143

^38. Housepian, Smyrna: pp. 143.

^39. The clearest chronology of what occurred in the following days is that preserved in Hepburn, Smyrna Disaster: pp 1-48. He provides the following detail on the actual sequence of the fire:

a) Saturday, September 9, 1922: At 11.30a.m. the first Turkish cavalry forces entered the central city [p.7]. The senior Turkish officer is a Murcelle Pasha [p. 8];

b) Sunday, September 10, 1922: Reports of isolated incidents of sniping and looting [pp 10-12]; Murcelle Pasha is replaced by Noureddine Pasha [p.12]; looting and scattered killings are reported [p.13];

c) Monday, September 11, 1922: American relief officials establish first personal contact with Nur-ed-din Pasha [pp14-20].

d) Tuesday, September 12, 1922: Meeting with the military commander Kiasım Pasha [pp. 21-2]; plans for evacuation of naturalized American citizens [p.23;]

e) Tuesday, September 12, 1922: US Consul-General Horton sails from Izmir for Piraeus with naturalized Americans [p.24]; First report of fire: a house burning in the Armenian quarter in the forenoon [p.25]; 2:00 pm reports of three fires burning around the compound of the Intercollegiate Institute [p.25]; By 6.00pm Hepburn observes that: << Three district lane of fire were to be seen, two of which appeared to have originated in the Armenian district close to the Collegiate Institute, so far as I could judge, and the third was somewhat to the left. The first two fires were burning fiercely and sweeping directly towards the water front. The Consulate was directly in the path of the southernmost blaze. The adjacent fire to the northward was on a somewhat broader front and its center appeared to be headed about for the Smyrna Theatre. The third and most northernmost fire seemed to be under control, or almost burned out. The wind had been very light during the day from the southeast and it was now increasing. I judged the fire would reach the Consulate in about two hours if the wind held; but this estimate was considerably in error, as the Consulate did not burn until about midnight>>[pp. 26-27]; at approximately 9.00 pm Hepburn reports: <<The wind had been steadily increasing since sunset and was now blowing fresh on the port quarter>> [p. 28]; <<From the point to the Passport office, a distance of about a mile , the broad waterfront streets appeared to be one solidly packed mass of humanity, domestic animals, vehicles and luggage. Beyond, still separated from the crowd by a few short unburned blocks, the city was mass of flame driving directly down upon the water front by a still breeze>> [p.29];

f) Thursday, September 14, 1922: << The fire continued to burn fiercely all day. It had reached the waterfront about 1:30 am, at a point near the open square just south of the Smyrna Theatre. It did no immediately spread along the waterfront from this point, but during the course of the day worked slowly in from the rear at several points both north and south of its original outbreak on the quay >> [p.31]; << The fire continued to burn throughout the night though considerably diminished. Several separate fires were observed to start in locations distant from the general conflagration, plainly indication incendiarism. The Passport Office, located upon the north pier of the inner harbor, burned after midnight with many heavy explosions, probably caused by gasoline, as a number of drums had been observed in and near this building a day or two previously. This building was only a few hundred yards from the LITCHFIELD's anchorage, and the actions of the person that fired it were plainly observed by Vice-Consul Barnes from the forecastle, although the distance was too great to allow of any sort of identification. A number of Turkish troops were stationed at the inshore end of the building at the time>> [p.33];

g) Friday, September 15, 1922: << The fire burned itself our during the night to such an extent that in the morning, the situations could no longer be regarded as one of imminent personal danger for the refugees on the shore.>> [p.33]; Hepburn visits Kiazim Pasha, who, << with a dramatic gesture he answered my expression of condolence with “We have lost the war!” Neither he nor Vali gave any evidence of having heard any rumor as to Turkish responsibility for the disaster>>. [p. 35]

h) Saturday, September 15, 1922: No more reference to the fire.

^40. See: A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk —1927. Istanbul, 1963. Indeed, Mustafa Kemal’s account of the conquest of Izmir avoids any mention of the fire whatsoever:

<< In a wireless telegram which was sent to me personally, I was informed that the Allied Powers had given the requisite authority to their consuls at Izmir to enter into negotiations with me and I was requested to decided what day and at what place I would grant them an interview. I replied that we would be at Nif [a small town cast of Izmir] on the 9th September,1922. It happened that I was at Nif on that day, but those who had begged for an interview were not there; for our armies, which were already on the quais at Izmir, had reached the first aim which I had indicated to them in pointing them to the Mediterranean>>. [p. 567].

SMYRNA FIRE

NOTE: HOUSED IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS – BRISTOL PAPERS COLLECTION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATION: BRISTOL, GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, CONTAINER #38 (NOVEMBER – DECEMBER, 1922 & JANUARY – FEBRUARY, 1923).

*******

(For Release Not Before January 16th.)

THE HITHERTO UNTOLD STORY OF THE SMYRNA FIRE TOLD BY MARK O. PRENTISS, AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEAR EASTERN RELIEF. ARMENIANS AND GREEKS, NOT TURKS, SET THE FIRE. EVIDENCE OF FIRE CHIEF REVEALED.

(COPYRIGHT ## 1923, BY NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE IN UNITED STATES, CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN AND SOUTH AMERICA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED).

--- BY MARK O. PRENTISS ---

NEARLY EVERYBODY IN AMERICA, IT APPEARS, IS CONVINCED THAT THE TURKS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIRE WHICH ADDED THE FINAL TOUCHES OF TRAGEDY TO THE SMYRNA [IZMIR] HORROR. THE UNANIMITY AND FIRMNESS OF THIS CONVICTION SURPRISED ME AT FIRST, AS I BELIEVE IT WOULD HAVE SURPRISED ANYBODY ELSE, OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY OR POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE, WHO HAD RECENTLY COME FROM THE SCENE OF THE DISASTER. THE MOTIVE, USUALLY CONSIDERED OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE IN CRIMES OF THIS SORT, DOES NOT CLEARLY POINT TO THE TURKS. THEY HAD CAPTURED SMYRNA. THE CITY, AS IT STOOD, WAS ONE OF THE GREATEST PRIZES EVER TAKEN IN ORIENTAL WARFARE. THE TURKS HAD UNQUESTIONED TITLE TO ITS FOODS, ITS COMMODITIES OF ALL SORTS, ITS HOUSES. IT WAS A STORE HOUSE OF SUPPLIES MOST URGENTLY NEEDED FOR ITS PEOPLES AND ARMIES. WHY DESTROY IT?

IT WAS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THE ARMENIANS AND GREEKS WERE DETERMINED NOT TO LET THIS BOOTY FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THEIR HATED ENEMIES. THERE WAS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED REPORT IN SMYRNA, FOR SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THE FIRE, THAT AN ORGANIZED GROUP OF ARMENIAN YOUNG MEN HAD SWORN TO BURN THE CITY IF IT FELL TO THE TURKS.

EVIDENCE GATHERED BY PAUL GRESCOVICH, CHIEF OF THE SMYRNA FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND CAREFULLY CHECKED BY MYSELF, TOGETHER WITH INFORMATION WHICH CAME TO ME FROM OTHER SOURCES, POINTS TO THE ARMENIANS AS AUTHORS OF THE FIRE. THE SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE FINAL TERROR ON THE SMYRNA WATERFRONT, AS I WAS ENABLED TO FOLLOW THEM, BEGAN IN THE FIRST DAYS OF SEPTEMBER, WHEN REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL, UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER AT CONSTANTINOPLE, ORGANIZED THE SMYRNA EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMITTEE IN ANTICIPATION OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE CITY IF IT FELL, AS THEN SEEMED INEVITABLE, TO THE TURKS.

AN AMERICAN RELIEF UNIT IN SMYRNA

THE USS DESTROYER LAWRENCE, UNDER COMMAND OF CAPT. WOLLESON PROCEEDED TO SMYRNA, CARRYING THIS COMMITTEE, OF WHICH I WAS A MEMBER. WE ARRIVED ON THE EVENING OF FRIDAY, THE EIGHTH OF SEPTEMBER, IN TIME TO SEE THE LAST OF THE GREEK ARMY LEAVING THE CITY. EARLY IN THE MORNING OF THE NINTH, WE WENT ASHORE AND IMMEDIATELY ORGANIZED A RELIEF COMMITTEE WHICH CONSISTED OF PRACTICALLY ALL OF THE AMERICAN RESIDENTS THERE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEAR EAST RELIEF AND THE AMERICAN RED CROSS FROM CONSTANTINOPLE. ADMIRAL BRISTOL HAD SENT HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, CAPTAIN HEPBURN, AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS COMMITTEE.

ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS SITUATIONS THAT CONFRONTED THE COMMITTEE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRE. THIS SITUATION DEVELOPED INTO ONE OF EXTREME ANXIETY WHEN WE LEARNED THAT THE ENTIRE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOGETHER WITH NEARLY ALL THE GREEKS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE FIRE DEPARTMENT, HAD DESERTED THEIR POSTS AND FLED THE CITY IN FEAR OF THE APPROACHING TURKISH ARMY.

I MADE IT MY BUSINESS TO MAKE A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE SITUATION, AND I FOUND THAT THE FIRE FIGHTING FORCES CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY SIXTY MEN WITH TWO SMALL STATION HOUSES. I FOUND TWO REASONABLY GOOD FIRE ENGINES AND ABOUT HALF A DOZEN HAND MACHINES THAT WERE USED ALONG THE WATERFRONT BY DROPPING AN INTAKE HOSE OVER THE SEA WALL INTO THE WATER. THERE WERE ONLY A FEW BUILDINGS IN THE CITY OVER THREE STORIES HIGH, THE GREAT MAJORITY BEING TWO. THE WATER PRESSURE WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO FORCE STREAM OF WATER OVER ALMOST ANY BUILDING IN THE CITY AND THERE APPEARED TO BE PLENTY OF HYDRANTS.

THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY MORNING, MR. JAQUITH, OF THE NEAR EAST RELIEF, MAJOR DAVIS OF THE RED CROSS AND I TOOK A TRIP BY AUTUMOBILE IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. THE TURKS BY THIS TIME, WERE IN FULL OCCUPATION. WE SAW THREE WIDELY SEPARATED FIRES TOTALLY CONSUME ISOLATED BUILDINGS. ONE OF THESE WAS A SMALL SHOP, AND IN THE BURNING DOORWAY WERE THE BODIES TWO WOMEN. OBVIOUSLY, LOOTING, MURDER AND ARSON HAD BEEN COMMITTED HERE BY TURKISH SOLDIERS.

SIGNS OF INCENDIARISM

ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, WEDNESDAY, THE THIRTEENTH OF SEPTEMBER, THE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL IN THE EXTREME. PAUL GRISCOVICH, CHIEF OF THE SMYRNA FIRE DEPARTMENT, TOLD ME THAT HE HAD DISCOVERED BUNDLES OF DISCARDED CLOTHING, RAGS AND BEDDING, COVERED WITH PETROLEUM, IN SEVERAL OF THE INSTITUTIONS RECENTLY DESERTED BY ARMENIAN REFUGEES.

GRESCOVICH IMPRESSED ME AS A THOROUGHLY RELIABLE WITNESS. I HAD MET AND HAD A LONG TALK WITH HIM THREE DAYS PREVIOUSLY, ON SUNDAY MORNING. FORTUNATELY, I NEEDED NO INTERPRETER, AS HE SPEAKS ENGLISH FLUENTLY. HE IS AN ENGINEER, BORN AND EDUCATED IN AUSTRIA, AND HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH SEVERAL LARGE ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES IN TURKEY. TWELVE YEARS AGO HE BECAME CHIEF OF THE SMYRNA FIRE DEPARTMENT, WHICH HE CONTINUED TO CONDUCT IN A VERY EFFICIENT MANNER, FOR THAT PART OF THE WORLD, DURING THE GREEK OCCUPATION. HE TOLD ME THAT DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN AN AVERAGE OF FIVE FIRES PER DAY WITH WHICH HIS CRIPPLED DEPARTMENT HAD TO COPE. IN HIS OPINION MOST OF THESE FIRES WERE CAUSED BY CARELESSNESS, BUT SOME UNDOUBTEDLY WERE OF INCENDIARY ORIGIN. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIRES IN A NORMAL YEAR, HE SAID, WOULD BE ONE IN TEN DAYS, AND THE INCREASE TO FIVE A DAY SEEMED SIGNIFICANT.

AS SOON AS THE TURKISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES ASSUMED CONTROL, GRISCOVICH HAD APPLIED FOR ADDITIONAL MEN AND FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT. INSTEAD OF HELPING HIM, THE TURKISH MILITARY GOVERNOR, LEARNING THAT THERE WERE STILL GREEKS IN THE FIRE DEPARTMENT, ORDERED THEIR IMMEDIATE ARREST, WHICH LEFT THE DEPARTMENT WITH ONLY THIRTY-SEVEN MEN. SUNDAY NIGHT, MONDAY AND MONDAY NIGHT, AND TUESDAY, SO MANY FIRES WERE REPORTED AT SUCH WIDELY SEPARATED POINTS THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THEM. THEY WERE EXTINGUISHED BY TURKISH SOLDIERS.

I DISCUSSED WITH GRESCOVICH THE DANGER OF FIRE AT THE PLANT OF THE STANDAR OIL COMPANY. ALTOUGH THESE TANKS WERE LOCATED AT LEAST A COUPLE OF MILES FROM THE CITY, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS THERE WOULD DO TERRIFIC DAMAGE, AND IN SPITE OF THE DEPLETED PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE ISOLATION OF THE PLANT, WHICH WAS BEYOND MUNICIPAL JURISDICTION, HE SAT AND MAINTAINED TWO MEN TO ACT AS GUARDS THERE.

DURING TUESDAY NIGHT AND WEDNESDAY MORNING, THE TURKISH SOLDIERS SHOT DOWN MANY ARMENIANS WHO, THEY CLAIMED, WERE CAUGHT THROWING PETROLEUM AND STARTING FIRES IN THE ARMENIAN QUARTER AND ALSO AROUND THE WAREHOUSES AND STATION OF THE CASSABA RAILROAD. IT WAS ON WEDNESDAY MORNING THAT GRISCOVICH HIMSELF FOUND EVIDENCES OF INCENDIARIES. HE TOLD ME THAT EARLY THAT MORNING HAD SEEN TWO ARMENIAN PRIESTS ESCORTING SEVERAL THOUSAND MEN, WOMEN, CHILDREN FROM THE ARMENIAN SCHOOLS AND DOMINICAN CHURCHES WHERE THEY HAD TAKEN REFUGE DOWN TO THE QUAYS. WHEN HE PRESENTLY WENT INTO THESE INSTITUTIONS HE FOUND PETROLEUM-SOAKED REFUSE READY FOR THE TORCH.

THE CHIEF TOLD ME, AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HE WAS SURE OF IT, THAT HIS OWN FIREMEN, AS WELL AS TURKISH GUARDS, HAD SHOT DOWN MANY ARMENIAN YOUNG MEN DISGUISED EITHER AS WOMEN OR AS TURKISH IRREGULAR SOLDIERS, WHO WERE CAUGHT SETTING FIRES TUESDAY NIGHT AND WEDNESDAY MORNING.

AT 11:20 WEDNESDAY MORNING, AT LEAST HALF A DOZEN FIRES WERE REPORTED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY AROUND THE FREIGHT TERMINAL WAREHOUSES AND THE PASSENGER STATION OF THE AIDINE RAILROAD.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THESE FIRES BROKE OUT IN BUILDINGS WHICH IT WAS GREATLY TO THE ADVANTAGE OF TURKS TO PRESERVE, AND TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ENEMIES TO DESTROY.

AT 12:00 O'CLOCK FIVE FIRES WERE REPORTED AROUND THE ARMENIAN HOSPITAL, THEN OCCUPIED BY THE TURKS. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, TWO FIRES WERE REPORTED AT THE ARMENIAN CLUB, AND A FEW MINUTES LATER SEVERAL FIRES STARTED SIMULTANEOUSLY AROUND THE CASSABA RAILROAD STATION.

SHORTLY AFTER NOON GRISCOVICH CONVINCED THAT THE CITY WAS DOOMED, AGAIN WENT TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ASK FOR HELP, AND AGAIN IT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING. IT WAS NOT UNTIL SIX O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING THAT HE WAS GIVEN A COMMAND OF 100 SOLDIERS TO SERVE UNDER HIS DIRECTION AND IT WAS EIGHT O'CLOCK AT NIGHT BEFORE THE SOLDIERS BEGAN THE DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS BY BOMBS, IN ORDER TO CHECK THE SPREAD OF THE FIRE.

“WHY SHOULD WE BURN THE CITY?”

DURING SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER THE FIRE I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH MANY TURKISH COMMANDERS, AND THEY WERE ALL OF ONE MIND IN LEVELING EITHER BITTER OR PHILOSOPHICAL ACCUSATIONS AT THEIR ENEMIES FOR DESTROYING THE CITY. THEY WERE CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE SUGGESTION, MADE IN A FEW QUARTERS, THAT THEY HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BURNING.

"WHY SHOULD WE BURN THE CITY?" THEY WOULD ASK. "SMYRNA, WITH ALL ITS WEALTH AND TREASURE, WAS OURS. THE FLEEING GREEK ARMY HAD ABANDONED HUGE QUANTITIES OF MILITARY STORES AND FOOD SUPPLIES THAT WERE DESPERATELY NEEDED BY OUR ARMIES AND CIVILIANS. THESE HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, TOGETHER WITH THE WAREHOUSES AND STATIONS WHERE MANY FIRES BROKE OUT. BESIDES, THE FLEEING GREEKS AND ARMENIANS, MANY OF THEM WEALTHY AS YOU KNOW, HAD ABANDONED EVERYTHING IN THEIR HOMES AND THEIR STORES. WE WERE IN ABSOLUTE AND UNDISPUTED POSSESSION. DO YOU THINK THAT WE ARE SUCH FOOLS AS TO HAVE DESTROYED EVERYTHING?"

MY ATTENTION HAS BEEN CALLED TO MANY STATEMENTS PUBLISHED BROADCAST IN THIS COUNTRY THAT THE TURKS WERE SEEN POURING PETROLEUM AROUND THE AMERICAN CONSULATE. I WAS IN THE VICINITY OF THE CONSULATE MOST OF THE TIME AND SAW NO PETROLEUM.

IT IS A FACT WORTHY OF ATTENTION OF THE HONEST HISTORIAN THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE IN SMYRNA AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE, OR DURING THE SUCCEEDING WEEKS, BELIEVED THAT THE TURKS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. THAT THE TURKS WERE GROSSLY AND CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT IN THE MATTER OF ORDINARY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AN OUTBREAK OF FIRE, WE ALL REALIZED, AND THAT THEY WERE TRAGICALLY INEFFICIENT IN FIGHTING THE FIRE WAS OBVIOUS TO US ALL, BUT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND NO EVIDENCE THAT EITHER TURKISH SOLDIERS OR TURKISH CIVILIANS DELIBERATELY FIRED THE CITY OR WISHED ITS DESTRUCTION.THE EVIDENCE ALL POINTS IN ANOTHER DIRECTION.

NOTE: THIS APPENDIX CONSISTS OF THE FINAL TWO PAGES (PP. 46-7) OF THE “REPORT UPON SMYRNA DISASTER,” COMPILED BY A.J. HEPBURN, THE SENIOR AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICER PRESENT IN IZMIR FROM SEPTEMBER 8-16, 1922. SUBMITTED TO ADMIRAL BRISTOL ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1922, HEPBURN’S REPORT PROVIDED A DETAILED DAY-BY-DAY RECORD OF THE PERIOD IN QUESTION. LOCATED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES: NAVAL RECORDS COLLECTION, RECORD GROUP OF # 45 (BOX 713), THIS IS THE MOST DETAILED EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT BY AN AMERICAN WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE CONFLAGRATION:

ORIGIN OF FIRE

THE ONLY DIRECT EVIDENCE BEARING UPON THIS SUBJECT WHICH CAME TO MY NOTICE AT THE TIME WAS THE STATEMENT OF VICE CONSUL BARNES THAT HE SAW TURKISH SOLDIERS POURING KEROSENE IN THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE. THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN FIRE MADE CONSIDERABLE HEADWAY, AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT AT LEAST A LARGE PART OF THE CITY WAS BEYOND SAVING. THERE WERE OTHER REPORTS THAT SIMILAR ACTIONS HAD BEEN OBSERVED BY SOME OF OUR MEN ON DUTY AS GUARDS, BUT I DID NOT HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATE THESE FULLY AT THE TIME. IT IS EVEN UNDERSTANDABLE THAT INDIVIDUAL TURKISH SOLDIERS SEEING THE CITY BURNING, AND EITHER ASSUMING THAT IT WAS BY ORDER OF TURKISH AUTHORITY OR SEEING IN THE EVENT A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR LOOT AND DISORDER, SEIZED THE OCCASION TO HELP THE CONFLAGRATION ALONG.

WITH REGARD TO ALL COLLATERAL EVIDENCE ON THE SUBJECT, AND ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF MOTIVE, THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION SEEMS TO ME TO EXONERATE THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES, SO FAR AS DELIBERATE INTENT TO BURN THE CITY IS CONCERNED. THE ONLY TWO MOTIVES I HAVE HEARD SUGGESTED ARE, FIRST, THAT THE INTENTION WAS PRIMARILY TO BURN THE ARMENIAN QUARTER IN ORDER TO DESTROY EVIDENCE OF LOOTING AND MURDER; AND, SECOND, THAT SMYRNA WAS LARGELY A FOREIGN CITY, KNOWN AS ‘INFIDEL SMYRNA,’ AND THE TURKS HAD DETERMINED TO RID THE COUNTRY OF ALL NON-MOSLEMS. THE LATTER SUGGESTION SEEMS FAR-FETCHED, AND THE FORMER INCONSISTENT WITH THE OPEN WAY IN WHICH THE LOOTING WAS CONDUCTED; THERE WAS SO MUCH EVIDENCE OBTAINABLE ON THIS HEAD THAT THE BURNING OF THE ARMENIAN QUARTER WOULD HAVE MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE.

See also:

"Burning of Izmir"

Who Set the Fire in Izmir ("Smyrna")?