As one can see from this simplified chronology, the British and their various allies (French and Greek) were in complete control of events in Constantinople and western Anatolia for about two years and eleven months- from the de-facto occupation of Constantinople until the Greek defeat at Sakarya. The British in particular, due to the pro Greek/ pro Armenian and anti Turkish leanings of Lloyd George were pursuing a vigorous policy to dismember the Turkish homeland of Anatolia while the French were striving to carve out their own share in Cilicia. The British were actively supporting the Greek invasion of western Anatolia and were fully behind the dream of setting up a new Greek empire in Asia Minor because it fitted in with their imperial world view at that time. The idea that the British were following a separate imperial agenda, or were thinking of exchanging Turkish detainees for British prisoners held by the Nationalists can not be a serious proposition prior to the battle of Sakarya. Up until the Greek defeat at Sakarya the British were still betting on their Greek clients as the best means of pursuing their strategic objectives.

It is true that the British were greatly concerned with what they perceived to have been neglect of, or crimes against British POWs, but they were also very concerned with prosecuting Turks for crimes against Christians. Up until this point the British, finding it impossible to find evidence against Turkish detainees that would stand up in court, were leaning more towards the concept of a collective punishment of all Turks that involved the dismemberment of the whole country- something that had been on the books since 1915 anyway. The allies, in spite of the fact that they had full access to Ottoman archives, were in control of Ottoman provinces to which Armenians were relocated and were in communication with the US State Department (which should have had masses of evidence provided by the diligent work of Morgenthau and his various employees) were unable to produce evidence that was viable in a British court. It was not until after the Greeks were soundly beaten, in retreat and had been exposed as mass murderers themselves that the Anatolia policy of the British government became untenable and the prospect of prisoner exchanges became possible, indeed desirable. In fact, the behaviour of Greek forces (supported by Armenian and Greek irregulars) was appalling and did considerable damage to the image of Greece in Britain and undermined British confidence in Greece’s ability to administer the territory it aspired to. In short, British prosecutors had nearly three years to produce evidence that would stand up in court and were unable to do so.
It was true that a legal technicality made it difficult to prosecute governments for actions taken against their own citizens, but Britain had gone some considerable way to circumventing this by devising the concept of a “crime against humanity” back in 1915 when the first accusations were made against the Ottoman government of crimes against Armenians. The legalistic framework should have been in place.

 It is observed that authors such as Stuermer provide considerable evidence of genocide- but this doubtful since the title of his book “Two War Years in Constantinople” gives the game away. He spent two years in Constantinople and did as much travelling and investigation as Morgenthau and Lepsius- none of whom left the Constantinople area during the years in question. The assumption that as a German (and an ally of Turkey), Stuermer would be pro Turkish is as erroneous as the suggestion that the British did not prosecute the Malta Turks because of the vestiges of 19th century pro-Ottoman sympathies. The simple facts are that once the war started all bets were off and everything was up for grabs- the Germans being as keen as anyone to make profit from the Turks. The Germans were not particularly pro Turkish and always had their own imperial, economic and strategic interests in Asia Minor and the Caucusus as a priority.

There is also the inevitable and predictable comparison with the Jews of Germany observing that they were, like the Armenians of Turkey, the financial and productive backbone of the economy- this simply isn’t true. Jews in Germany were relatively prosperous but they certainly were not the backbone of the economy and they certainly never enjoyed the favoured status that Armenians enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Jews of Germany, Armenian communities were in open revolt against the government and were providing aid and support to the enemy. Unlike the Jews of Germany, the Armenians were playing on the sympathies of outsiders to inflate their importance in political and cultural terms to achieve goals they could not otherwise have entertained. The Jews of Germany, for the most part, wanted to be integrated as German citizens; the Armenians of the Ottoman empire perceived the themselves to be superior to the Turks and deserving of special considerations……..There can be no comparison.

The constant use of republished and clearly racist and biased sources in support of mythology has little relation to reality and is merely testament to the dishonest basis for the genocide proposition.