"In the Armenian campaign, however, there is a considerable definitional frivolity."

Many actors – primarily, it seems, of Armenian origin – have been involved in efforts to increase the number of accusations. Needless to say, the Republic of Armenia is in favour of recognition of the genocide and has been so ever since it was founded. The issue is actually included in its Declaration of Independence, which states that: ‘The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia’.[11]

The Armenian lobby in the USA sees itself as an influential force, in fact as the second most powerful lobby in the country (after the Jewish lobby, which is beyond comparison more influential).[12] [hw3] Before Armenia achieved independence its main objective was to obtain recognition of the Armenian genocide. Following independence, the genocide has remained one of the main issues, but the activities of the US Congress concerning Azerbaijan and Turkey have been added. In spring 2000 the genocide issue became a hot topic for the Republican Party when the Armenian diaspora decided to make candidates for the US presidency recognise the genocide.[13] [hw4] Contributing to the success of the lobby is the fact that Armenian–Americans have reached high positions, mostly through the Republican Party. [14][hw5]

The Armenian lobby is also active in many other countries, including France and Italy, although less visibly so. The fact that the Armenian lobby was the driving force behind the French Senate’s recognition of the genocide in 2000 is acknowledged by the Armenian Foreign Ministry.[15] Likewise, the French Ambassador to Armenia has spoken of the role of many Armenian-French organisations and private individuals who contributed to the adoption of the resolution. [16] Armenia’s ambassador to Italy was reportedly very active in promoting the recognition by the Italian Parliament.[17]

Turkey does not deny the reality of the massacres, although it maintains that the campaign has seriously exaggerated the death toll. However, Ankara categorically refutes the accusation of genocide. It maintains that the Armenians were victims of inter-communal conflict during the Ottoman Empire’s dying years in the midst of the First World War and stresses that Turks as well died en masse in this internecine war. Moreover, it maintains that there is no proof that the killings were organised or financed by the state: on the contrary, it suggests that the lack of central organisation was to blame.[18]

The Definition of Genocide

In the 1948 convention on genocide[19] the contracting states confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law and undertake to prevent and to punish it. Article II defines genocide as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III stipulates that not only the act of genocide shall be punishable but also conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempts to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide.

A look at the role model for the genocide scholar, Raphael Lemkin

In the Armenian campaign, however, there is a considerable definitional frivolity. Some bodies unequivocally state that their resolutions are in accordance with the UN Convention, for instance, the Russian Duma (1995) and the European Parliament (1987). Others make oblique references or seem to use their own definition. The Belgian Senate resolution (1998) mentions in a listing of introductory considerations that the UN convention provides a concept of genocide and also talks of the ‘organized and systematic murder of the Armenians’, suggesting that these definitions were synonymous. In a resolution by the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives (2000), an Armenian genocide during the period 1915–23 was affirmed. A definition suggested by an international law scholar, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term ‘genocide’ and was one of the forces that inspired the development of the 1948 convention, was used, rather than the conventional definition.[20]

It certainly makes a difference if the definition given in the 1948 convention is strictly applied or not. As can be seen, the definition excludes political acts and mentions explicitly the existence of intent, not just any kind of destructive intent but the intent of destroying a group as such. If we apply, for instance, Belgium’s formulations, the set of properties or stipulations we have in mind will be much less restrictive and the number of potential situations that would merit the label ‘genocide’ will be considerably increased, and the matter of verification becomes much less complicated. Thus, if in scrutinising a horrendous situation it is not possible to establish whether a given group was (intentionally) massacred because of its ethnic characteristics or because of its political opposition, this is certainly a stumbling block in terms of the genocide convention, but not at all in terms of the Belgian formulation.

R. J. Rummel : "Fails to adopt the definition provided by the convention." (But of course; that is why he came up with his own fancy term, "democide." Dr. Rummel tells us every single Armenian who died was "murdered.")

In practice, it may turn out to be very difficult to ascertain intentions in the conventional meaning, and it is therefore no surprise that the problem involved is frequently dodged. The mass killings in the former Soviet Union, in particular during the Stalin years, provide an illustration. In the enormous population mosaic that this communist empire constituted, death and terror seem to have struck most socio-economic, cultural or political strata, the nomenklatura itself not excluded. In a work that is frequently consulted, R.J. Rummel sets out to quantify the killings and finds that the regime was probably responsible for the deaths of no less than 62 million people. He quotes from the convention on genocide to underscore the relevance of the concept in this connection (also using it in the title of the book) but fails to adopt the definition provided by the convention. He resorts to a prior resolution on genocide by the UN General Assembly in which the nature of the motive for the killings is declared irrelevant.[21]

The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre dodges the problem in a different way. In connection with the so-called International War Crimes Tribunal arranged by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to try the US warfare in Vietnam, Sartre maintains that the US government was guilty of genocide in the sense of the genocide convention. Sartre’s method is to unveil the USA’s ‘hidden intention’ by making a Marxist-inspired analysis of societal and military history and their interconnectedness. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, he says, Western nations have had to choose between peaceful approaches towards their opponents or total war – tertium non datur – and in Vietnam the USA obviously opted for the liquidation of an entire people (to establish a Pax Americana).[22] This method of identification of genocidal intent is more than questionable, and the flaws in his conclusion are striking.[23] [hw6]

"The principle of universalism is of the utmost importance for the modern human rights regime."

It is certainly a flaw in itself that the question of the identity of the respondent(s) tends to be obscured in the Armenian campaign. Moreover, since accusations which concern intent are generally not directed towards individuals they tend to become meaningless or at least non-logic. It is reasonable to guess that the perspective of individual responsibility has been neglected in the Armenian campaign because of the quality of the materials at hand.

Universalism

The principle of universalism is of the utmost importance for the modern human rights regime – in fact the key word ‘universal’ is to be found in the Human Rights Declaration of 1948. Universalism means that rules are the same everywhere and, ipso facto, that violations are uniformly assessed and addressed.

History is so full of horrors that the Armenians do not seem uniquely entitled to international campaigns on their behalf. Since the UN Sub-Commission report of 1985 has been so important in the Armenian campaign it is appropriate to mention other cases which it cites.[42] The report lists, besides the Armenian case and, of course, the Holocaust, the German massacre of Hereros in South-West Africa in 1904; the Ukrainian pogrom against the Jews in 1919; the Tutsi massacre of Hutus in Burundi in 1965 and 1972; the Paraguayan massacre of Ache Indians prior to 1974; the Khmer Rouge massacre in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978; and the Iranian killings of Baha’is.

More examples could be found in the serious/professional genocide literature. In his well-known and esteemed book on the political use of genocide during the twentieth century, up to 1981, when it was first published, Leo Kuper includes, among others, the following cases: actions against the Chechens, Kalmyks, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and others in the Soviet Union in the 1940s; the genocide against the Serbs during the Second World War; the genocide between Hindus and Muslims in India after the Second World War; the actions in Pakistan in 1970–71; and the actions in Burundi in 1972.[43] Whereas these are called genocide, others are being called genocidal massacres,[44] for instance, those in Sudan in 1955–72 and those during the decolonisation of Algeria in 1954–61.[45]

A case which deserves particular mention is the US decision to drop the atomic bomb on two Japanese cities at the end of the Second World War. Historians generally seem to accept the official US view that the bombs were dropped because the USA wanted a quick end to the war. However, so-called revisionist historians have maintained that there was an element of showing off the USA’s military potential. Irrespective of such military objectives, it seems difficult to deny that the actions must have included an intent to destroy Japanese populations precisely because they were Japanese.[46] It would therefore not be far-fetched to conclude that these actions deserve just as much consideration as any others that are mentioned here – perhaps even more.

The use of nuclear weapons was later discussed by the International Court of Justice, which is the United Nations’ chief advisory organ on matters of international law. The ICJ concluded in 1996 that the genocide convention certainly was relevant in this context:

The Court would point out in that regard that the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons did indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only be possible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account of the circumstances specific to each case.[47]

The list of possible cases of genocide can certainly be made far longer. In fact, Turkey could argue that genocide has also been directed against Turks.[48] [hw8]However, our purpose here is only to demonstrate that there are certainly many historical cases for which there is obviously or apparently no less reason for international castigation than in the Armenian case.

While the world takes much less interest in cases such as those mentioned above, the Armenian campaign seems to go against the principle of universality. Note that this is not to question that it is easier to exercise pressure on some, relatively weak, states than on others, and that the strength of the target and the power resources available have to be considered when the kind of action to take is decided upon.[49] Here, we are talking only of manifested interest, in terms of resolutions and statements, which is not a matter of strength and resources available.

Could the objection be raised that in some of these cases the underlying conflicts were resolved a long time ago and, in fact, no demands or campaigns have been initiated by victims or later generations? This would seem to be a dubious argument for selecting cases. It is difficult to determine the degree of resentment or potential demands, particularly among the populations in general, since the dismantling of conflicts is by and large a matter for the state powers to handle.

Moreover, as, for instance, Richard Falk has pointed out, the generation of international concern frequently depends on the existence of a powerful transnational constituency. As examples of indifference Falk mentions allegations of genocidal behaviour on the part of the Indian government in its counterinsurgency actions against the Naga and Mizo peoples in 1956–64 and genocidal campaigns in Latin America.[50]

A more recent illustration of these problems is provided by disclosures in 2001 by a former French general concerning the war in Algeria in 1954–62. Although the general revealed that torture and execution were routine, the reaction from the French government (which expelled the ageing officer from the military reserves) was weak, and that from the Algerian side even weaker – probably not for the same reasons. A spokesman for the Committee Against Torture and Disappearances during the National Liberation War suggested that the current Algerian government did not want this question to come up since it is itself accused of severely maltreating its own people.[51]

It would seem morally devastating and quite unacceptable from a human rights regime point of view for the world’s concern for cases of genocide (historical or present) to be contingent on factors such as the political clout of the victim or the willingness of governments.

Why is it that precisely the historical tragedy in Turkey has been so decisively brought to the fore? It is beyond our aim in this article to answer this question, and a proper answer may be beyond reach. However, some relevant factors may the following:

—By and large, Turkey is not a highly esteemed country, nor is its history highly regarded. This would tend to lend accusations a priori credence.[52]
—The Armenian lobby is relatively strong, with influential emigrant societies, whereas the Turkish counter-lobby, and particularly its emigrant societies, seem relatively weak.
—Turkey is not considered a very important country: thus, for instance, the positive contribution it could make to the European Union (EU) as a future member is not often spelled out.[53] Its strategic value is appreciated in the West considerably more by the USA than by the Europeans.
—Turkey is anxious for EU membership, and this has given the West Europeans a strong leverage for influencing it. EU demands on candidates for membership are generally motivated in terms of what are called the Copenhagen criteria, and pro-Armenian forces in West Europe are seeking to utilise this as leverage to get Turkey to acknowledge the genocide. The European Parliament, in its resolution in 1987, listed a number of conditions for Turkey’s joining the EU and believes that the ‘refusal by the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide against the Armenian people committed by the Young Turk government’ is an ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to consideration of Turkey’s accession.[54]

However, a link in the reverse direction should perhaps not be excluded, the Armenian question being an instrument rather than a goal. For instance, the president of the rightist Mouvement pour la France has stated that: ‘Le refus obstiné de la Turquie de reconnait les massacres de 1915 est un élément supplémentaire pour refuser l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union européenne.’[55] It can be assumed that for this organisation the more pressing question is to keep Turkey out of the EU and the Armenian question is an instrument to this end.

Implementation of the Universality Principle

The consistent use of the principle of universalism would seem to be potentially destabilising, making for an increased level of animosity in the international system. This is so first of all because attempts to bring up historical cases may become entangled with manifest or latent conflicts of interest of various kinds, as is well illustrated by the Armenian case. In October 2000 the International Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives passed a resolution which labelled the Armenian massacres as genocide. This resolution went to the House of Representatives for a full vote, which, however, never materialised, being cancelled by the Speaker of the House. It is generally understood that the genocide resolution came up in the first place because of politicking in the election race that was going on at the time and the endangered situation of a Republican in a district with a huge Armenian– American population.[56] The reason for the cancellation was no less politically coloured. The Speaker came under intense pressure from the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary for Defense as well as the military, who presented security policy arguments against the resolution (no doubt under the influence of Turkey, which had lobbied heavily against the resolution). Explaining his decision not to bring it to the floor, the Speaker said that he had little choice: ‘The President believes that passage of this resolution may adversely impact the situation in the Middle East and risk the lives of Americans’.[57]

To political concerns which were clearly manifest should be added suspicions about the role of political interests. In the Armenian case there are indeed suspicions in Turkey. It is widely thought that the campaign for recognition is intended to pave the way for certain demands on Turkey (which we will consider again below).

Can we demur that increasing animosity would perhaps be a reasonable price to be paid for truth and humanitarian principles?

Campaigns for the recognition of historical atrocities as genocide may risk upsetting sensitive processes of healing, which many would consider a much less reasonable price. As is well known, world history is full of lingering sensitivities, for instance, in East Asia, indicated by the strong reactions against Japan when its unwillingness to recognise historical misdeeds against its neighbours (such as the ‘Rape of Nanking’ in 1937) comes to the fore.[58] There is even the possibility that accusations of genocide would add fuel to live conflicts which are difficult to resolve. Cyprus has been a dangerous hot spot in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countless efforts by the parties themselves and the international community to resolve the conflict there (which started in 1963 according to the Turkish side, in 1974 according to the Greek side) [hw9] have been in vain. A number of intricate issues are involved, including security, popular representation and territory. Negotiations started again in early 2002 in what has been widely called a last-ditch effort. What consequences would a (possibly reciprocal) genocide recognition campaign concerning atrocities in the early 1960s have for peace in the region?

Tribunal Functions

The events in Ottoman Turkey have been discussed (by parliaments and other popular assemblies) in terms of crimes and culprits, not seldom with some reference to international law, and, of course, the resolutions passed are intended for international audience. Actions taken have, of course, no force in international law; nevertheless it seems accurate to say that parliaments and others de facto attribute themselves tribunal-like functions.

Is the global human rights regime well served by the fact that tribunal or quasi-tribunal functions are exercised with respect to historical events? Assuming that it is, although much could be said to the contrary, let me make some points on the appropriate way of meting out historical justice.

It follows from what has been said above that parliaments are less than suitable for the function because of the risk of inappropriate concerns intervening. The handling of the genocide bill in the US Congress is of course an example of political contamination. In the French parliamentary setting strong solidarity sentiments have manifested themselves. The point has been made that recognition of the genocide would be a way of honouring the French engagement for the Armenian community living in France and a way of strengthening the bond of friendship between France and Armenia.[59]

Moreover, because parliamentarians are elected on their political merits rather than for their competence in matters of international politics – much less international law – their knowledge of the subject can be questioned, or at least should not be taken for granted, the more so as legislatures, typically, are not given a major role in the making of foreign policy. It is important to realise that juridical competence includes the competence to make appeal to authority.[60]

It is common in Turkish milieus to refer to historians. President Ahmed Necdet Sezer, hailed abroad for his concern for the rule of law and respect for human rights, has stated that ‘the question of genocide should be left to historians’.[61] Professional Turkish historians agree, for instance, Halil Berktay [hw10]of Sabanci University in Istanbul, who, moreover, maintains that by leaving it to the academics the Turkey of today could wash its hands of the question: republican Turkey is not a continuation of the Ottoman state.[62]

Not only Turkish historians have made this point,[63] and not only Turkish statesmen. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is reported to have discussed the fate of Jews and Armenians during the Second and First World Wars, respectively, and maintained the following: ‘Genocide is a much wider term. It is not the business of a state to judge history. States create history, but should not judge (it). It should be left to the historians’.[64]

History on Trial

The global human rights regime is not equipped to deal with historical atrocities, and when engaged politicians want to take matters in their own hands it is clear that this alternative is problematical.

The Armenian campaign has addressed the questions involved in a simplistic way, both with respect to juridical points of departure such as definition of the crime and the status of the accused party, and with respect to the assessment of evidence. Moreover, this campaign is undermined by the apparent neglect of the universality principle which is fundamental in human rights thinking. On the other hand, a wider application of this principle would seem to open up a Pandora’s box, particularly since retrospective shaming can easily feed demands for compensation or retribution.

A laissez-faire approach may seem the best and most natural solution. Moreover, if proclamations which bear any similarity to juridical assessments are to be made at all, it seems evident that they should not be made by politicians. A much more palatable alternative would be the creation of an international body to deal with possible historical cases of genocide, composed by experts with solid expertise and reputation for their impartiality. Necessarily, both the history and the legal professions should be duly represented.

While it would seem natural to link such an organ to central UN structures, such as the General Assembly, any such attachment to the world organisation would also create risks of political contamination. Attachment to learned societies might be a better option. However, whatever affiliation is sought, funding would be a fundamental problem, given the need to heed the principle of universality.

Establishing the guidelines for this body to work may be no less problematical; can a generally-accepted time limit to the period its investigations are to cover be agreed on or established? If developments during the early years of the past century should be of concern, why not events at the end of the century before or even earlier?

Going backwards of course also raises the issue of nullum crimen sine lege. To what extent should court-like functions be performed for events which, at the time they happened, were not covered by international criminal law? The principle of non-retroactivity is a fundamental tenet in modern human rights thinking.[78]


Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Edward Deverell of the Swedish National Defence College for research assistance in the preparation of this article.

Correspondence Address: Bertil Dunér, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, PO Box 1253, S-111 82, Stockholm, Sweden. ISSN 1364-2987 print; ISSN 1744-053X online # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080=1364298042000240870



(Thanks to Hector for making the article available. Most of all, thank you, Mr. Bertil Dunér, for your honesty and integrity. King Charles XII would have been proud of you as an example of the finest Swedish nobility.)

^36. United Nations, ‘Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned’ (note 32 above), para. 24, note 13.

^37. Schabas (note 2), p.21.

^38. According to Justin McCarthy; see Turkish Daily News, 16 March 2001.

^39. For the evolution of the application of individual criminal responsibility, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2nd rev. edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), chapter 10. The Nuremberg Principles are reproduced on pp.538ff.

^40. One of the delegations stated that the UK proposal was superfluous since it gave ‘the impression that a State could be held guilty of the commission of a crime’. See Schabas (note 2), pp.419ff.

^41. The Swedish resolution speaks of massacres on Armenians ‘in the collapsing Ottoman Empire’ but no guilty party is identified. Utrikesutskottets Betänkande 1999/2000:UU11 (note 33).

^42. United Nations, ‘Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Comission has been Concerned’ (note 32), para. 2.

^43. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican Books, 1981).

^44. The line drawn between ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal massacre’ is obscure; by the latter concept Kuper probably intends massacres with fewer victims. Ibid., p.32.

^45. New revelations about French atrocities in Algeria in 1954–62 made in 2001 by a retired French general might lead to a more exact assessment of French behaviour during the conflict.

^46. It has been suggested that US President was not informed about the decision to drop the second bomb, which he did not want because of the consequences for innocent civilians. Stanley Goldberg, ‘What Did Truman Know, and When Did He Know It?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.54 (May/June 1998), p.3.

^47. International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

^48. Primarily in Cyprus in 1963. See, e.g., Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files (London: Charles Bravos, 1997).

^49. Cf. K. Anthony Appiah, ‘Grounding Human Rights’, in Michael Ignatieff et al., Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.101–16, pp.103ff.

^50. Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1981), pp.159ff.

^51. International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2001. In both countries, however, political parties and NGOs reacted vigorously: cf Le Monde, 8 May 2001.

^52. For an unusually clearcut example of this lack of estimation see a statement made in the Swedish Parliament by the chairperson of the Swedish Support Committee for Human Rights in Turkey (which includes members from all the political parties represented in the Parliament) on 1 Feb. 2001: ‘We should be aware that Turkey almost always speaks with a double tongue’.

^53. Cf. Bertil Dunér, ‘Why Let Turkey In?’, in Bertil Dunér (ed.), Turkey: The Road Ahead? (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002).

^54. European Parliament, ‘Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question’ (note 31), article 4.

^55. Philippe de Villiers, ‘Le Blocage au Sénat Est De Fait Imputable au Gouvernement Jospin’, Nouvelles d’Armenie En Ligne, http://www.armenews.com/nam/Sommaire.asp.

^56. The Republicans had hopes of keeping control of the House. ‘Were it not for Jim Rogan that resolution would never be coming up’, the head of the Republican campaign committee told reporters, adding that the resolution was ‘part of the process’. Reuters, ‘Political Fallout for US House Vote on Armenia’, 27 Sept. 2000.

^57. Reuters, 20 Oct. 2000, reporting from the Washington Post that same day.

^58. Relations with South Korea improved considerably after 1988, when Kim Dae Jung accepted Japan’s apology for its occupation of Korea (1910–45), but this did not stop the flaring up of passions in 2001 when a non-apologetic Japanese history textbook was published; South Korea recalled its ambassador to Tokyo and cancelled official visits. International Herald Tribune, 19 April 2001.

^59. Rouquet (note 7), Conclusion.

^60. Cf. above on the evaluation of the Sub-Commission report of 1985 made by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament. The full Parliament later confirmed the Committee’s evaluation.

^61. Time Europe, 11 June 2001.

^62. Neshe Düzel, ‘Ermenileri Ozel Orgüt Oldürdü’, Radikal, 9 Oct. 2000 (interview).

^63. Cf. Justin McCarthy, ‘Let Historians Decide on So-Called Genocide’, Turkish Daily News, 10 April 2001.

^64. ‘Holocaust Yes, Armenian Genocide No!’ Cyprus Weekly (Nicosia), posted on the Internet 27 April 100Cf. also interview with Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement: ‘I must say that I prefer leaving that to the historians’, Turkish Daily News, 7 Feb. 2001.

^65. Utrikesutskottets Betänkande 1999/2000:UU11 (note 29).

^66. BBC Monitoring Service, ‘Armenia Hails Setting Up of Turkish Genocide Commission, But Doubtful of Aim’, 31 Oct. 2000.

^67. Interview by Mehmet Ali Birand under the title ‘Armenia Has No Land Demand from Turkey’, Turkish Daily News, 1 Feb. 2001.

^68. See also Adriaan Bos, ‘The International Criminal Court: A Perspective’, in Roy S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), chapter 17, pp.463–70.

^69. World Congress against Racism (WCAR) NGO Forum Declaration, 3 Sept. 200This document is described as the outcome of an international process before and during the NGO forum of the WCAR held in Durban, South Africa, 28 Aug.–1 Sept. 2001.

^70. Philippe Douste-Blazy, ‘Pour Rejoindre l’Union, la Turquie Devra Reconnait le Génocide Arménien’, Nouvelles d’Arménie. En Ligne, http://www.armenews.com/nam/Sommaire.asp.

^71. Bertrand Delanoë, ‘Au Nom de l’Avenir’, Nouvelles d’Arménie En ligne, http://www.armenews.com/nam/ Sommaire.asp.

^72. European Parliament Resolution, 18 July 1987: European Parliament resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question, Doc. A2-33/87.

^73. Mozione del Cons. Massimo de Carolis ed altri: Genocidio del popolo armeno, Consiglio Communale Di Milano (submitted and accepted in November 1997).

^74. ‘Armenia Won’t Ask for Compensation If Turkey Recognizes “Genocide”’, CIS Online, 2 Feb. 2001.

^75. A considerable number of articles with references to the Armenian territorial claims have been published by the Turkish press (e.g., by Milliyet, Hürriyet and the Turkish Daily News). Cf. in particular ‘Two Ambassadors Discuss Armenian Question’, Turkish Daily News, 22 Oct. 2001.

^76. ‘Recognition of Armenian Genocide Is A Matter of Time’, interview with Ashot Melik-Shakhnazarian, from the home page of the SNARK news agency, Yerevan (as of 4 May 2000).

^77. The question of material compensation can also be brought up in civil society. An Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister has urged Armenians to take up the issue with American insurance companies and fight for compensation in courts worldwide. See Shoogharyan (note 12).

^78. There is no consensus on the legal status of the crime of genocide before the 1948 convention. The Charter of the Nurenberg trials (1945–46), included a provision on ‘crimes against humanity’ (article 6(c)), which is closely related, but not identical, to genocide. The legality of Article 6 has been very much discussed and it is frequently seen as innovative rather than a reflection of international law at the time. See, e.g., Bassiouni (note 39), Concluding Assessment; and Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, ‘The Road From Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.22 (2000), pp.335–403, at 344. Interestingly, in 1945, before the start of the trials, the US government recognised that the pre-war atrocities committed by the Nazis were not offences against international law. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace: A Documentary History and Analysis (London, Rome and New York: Oceana Publications, 1980), Volume I, document 12.

^hw1.: Will the day come when newspapers like "Le Monde" remind the honorable French people that if it wasn't for the support France, along with Britain and Russia, provided for their "seventh" WWI ally, the Armenians would have never suffered their fate of resettlement (i.e., what dishonorable genocide advocates call a "genocide")?


^hw2.: Wasn't it nice for the author, Mr. Dunér, to not underestimate the intelligence of his readership? For those of us whose French is not up to par, however, this roughly translates to the tired old bit about not recognizing the genocide amountng to the insult of the memory of the victims, killing them a second time... without analyzing how most became victims in the first place. The vast majority of Armenians who died, same as with the majority of the 2.5 million other Ottomans who died — the ones these hypocrites never consider — perished non-violently, mainly from famine, disease, and exposure. It's frightening how such mindless and bigoted politicians (from the French Parliament in this particular example) can take statements from a propaganda sheet and apply them wholesale.

^hw3.: For an analysis of the Armenian lobbies, see "Divided They Conquer".

^hw4.: Some media reports on this episode.

^hw5.: When one visits Internet forums dominated by extremist Republicans, it's striking how the tone can be similar to Armenian forums: rude, crude, loud, arrogant and, most importantly, with little concern for the facts. Not to say hyper-liberals can't be guilty of the same, particularly human rights activists, wrapped in a shroud of sanctimony. One reason why this honest article, published in a human rights journal, is so pulse-poundingly refreshing. For more on this "neo-conservative Republican"-Armenian parallel, read The Creationism of the Armenian Genocide.

^hw6.: This is why philosophers and writers of fiction generally cannot be relied upon to make judgments of history; the same as with "genocide scholars," whose backgrounds often have nothing to do with history.

^hw7.: For a detailed analysis, read 'The Truth About the ‘Whitaker Report.’

^hw8.: Naturally, even very fair articles as this one, and fair books such as Dr. Guenter Lewy's "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide," must always give the suffering of the Armenians the limelight. The fact of the matter is, it's not "Turkey" that can make the argument that Turks were victims of systematic genocidal campaigns, but any truth-seeker who can shed his or her prejudices and look at the facts objectively. Justin McCarthy's "Death and Exile" outlines how 5.5 million Turks/Muslims were killed and another 5 million exiled, in the century ending circa WWI. During WWI, one half million mostly Muslim Ottomans were directly slaughtered by the Armenians, with a little help from their Russian allies. Many more "Turks" were murdered by Armenians than the other way around (and usually in the most hideous of fashions), but the world is much too prejudiced to consider the equation in a fair manner. See here for examples.

^hw9.: We can understand that the writer, particularly since he has been brave to go against the mindlessly popular "Turks are evil" view, would have felt the need to tread carefully. However, as with the "Armenian genocide," what the "Turkish view" or the "Greek/Armenian view" says is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is the side of objective, factual history. Anyone who can put their anti-Turkish prejudices aside can see that the division of Cyprus did not start in 1974, nor for that matter did it start in 1963. Greek Cypriots were gaga for "enosis" (union) with Greece at least a decade earlier, and began their ruthless campaigns of oppression and ethnic cleansing accordingly. That is why the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was established, giving both Turkey and Greece the right to legally intervene if the existence of their respective populations on the island became threatened. It was clear that the Greek-backed coup in 1974 would have led to the extermination of Turkish Cypriots in little time, as the leader of the coup himself admitted years later. These events do not exist in a vacuum. For more, see TAT's Cyprus page.

^hw10.: If the definition for a historian, let alone a professional historian, is one who considers all relevant information before arriving at an objective conclusion, Mr. Dunér was being excessively gracious in classifying Halil Berktay (whose academic degree, I do not believe, was in history), as a "professional historian." Since Halil Berktay, in the case of the "Armenian genocide" at least, arrives first at his conclusion and then utilizes whatever selective "evidence" to prove his thesis, it would be more correct to classify Berktay as a "professional propagandist."

^hw11.: And what impartial person would argue that the only reason why President Kocharian prefers this slippery route is because he is deathly afraid of what the hoodwinked world will discover if they really paid close and objective attention? Since the "Armenian genocide" is such a hot button subject, regaardless of how deceptively pro-Armenians would like to declare it a done deal, if Kocharian were certain of his facts, he would have welcomed an honest committee getting to the bottom of the matter, once and for all... and teaching those filthy "denialists" the lesson they long had coming.

^hw12.: Such would entirely depend on the caliber of historian, particularly those involved in this highly politicized subject. As Prof. McCarthy put it, "so many have forgotten the rules of honest history."

^hw13.: Mr. Dunér's point is not entirely without merit; however, the expert on law cannot come into this discussion until the objective historical facts are first established. It's bad enough that enough historians can't be trusted, but the motives and/or ethics of lawyers can generally lend themselves to be far more suspicious. (Particularly if they are of the caliber of, say, Alfred de Zayas.) The parallel is as with any court case: the suspect is arrested, and then the lawyers are called in. In a criminal case, the facts are first gathered by police detectives. Lawyers are not consulted to make the arrest. The fact-gathering foundation must first be established before lawyers are invited to argue or manipulate the legalistic ins and outs. In short, if we start relying on jurists to make the case for genocide, then we're really asking for trouble, because practically any conflict — with selective evidence — can be made to look like a genocide. As an example, this body of lawyers was called in to determine whether there was an "Armenian genocide." Since they primarily consulted Armenian propaganda, and because they utilized absurd rules (such as only one person needing to be killed), naturally they found in the affirmative.

^hw14.: Some diasporan Armenians, of course, can't wait to get their hands on some of that nice cold cash.


^hw15.: Obviously this knucklehead was totally unaware that the Dashnaks who ruled Armenia "agreed 'to forego their rights to ask for damages . . . as a result of the general war,' thus closing the doors FOREVER to reparations for the enormous destruction of Armenian life and property"... as Arthur Derounian helpfully instructed us.

^hw16.: "West Armenia"? Isn't this the territory some would call "Kurdistan"? Isn't the vast region labeled as "Armenia" in ancient maps no more than a geographic expression, since the Haiks arrived there from other places, like the many other tribes inhabiting the region? That is, when did the people we know today as Armenians actually own this land, other than in the case of small and isolated kingdoms? Kingdoms that were subjugated by others for centuries, so that even if today's Armenians once owned what is called "Western Armenia," did they actually own it when the Turks came in? Weren't the Byzantines formerly in charge of some of these lands, doing a great job of oppressing the Armenians at the time? Just because someone (in this case the Armenians) says "we owned this land" does not necessarily make it so. It is a pity when even very intelligent and fair authors accept such claims at face value.


^hw17.: Prof. Rummel's "schtick" was in presenting possible figures from a range of different sources, but simply because he offered 300,000 as the lowest figure did not mean he believed in it. No, Rummel's "scholarly" conclusion was that 2.1 million Armenians were "murdered" between 1900-1923, 2 million of whom were "murdered" between 1914-1918. That's right, every single one of those 2 million Armenians, curiously more Armenians than existed in the entire empire, were all "murdered," according to "genocide scholar" Rudy Rummel. (Elsewhere, a contradictory Rummel conclusion: "Thus, given all these estimates, the Turks murdered most likely 300,000 to 2,686,000 Armenians, probably 1,404,000 of them.")