Even Rhigas Pheraios, for all his European veneer, showed that deep in his soul he held a similar vision when he composed his famous war song, Thourios, in which he urged his fellow-Greeks to put all of the Ottoman empire to the torch, "from Bosnia to Arabia."

As the heady wine of religious passion mixed with the already intoxicating nectar of political nationalism, it became inevitable that the Greek War of Independence would turn into a religious crusade. In the words of Professor Skiotis,

With savage jubilance, [the Greeks] sang the words 'let no Turk remain in the Morea, nor in the whole world.' The Greeks were determined to achieve to Romaiko (that is, the Romaic restoration) in the only way they knew how: through a war of religious extermination.

In his book, That Greece Might Still be Free, William St. Clair described the ensuing carnage thus:

The Turks of Greece left few traces. They disappeared suddenly and finally in the spring of 1821 unmourned and unnoticed by the rest of the world... Upwards of twenty thousand Turkish men, women, and children were murdered by their Greek neighbours in a few weeks of slaughter.

In his monumental treatise on the Greek War of Independence, the Greek historian, Spyridon Trikoupis, described how the entire Muslim population of Tripolitsa, the capital of the Pelopponese, was annihilated by Greek forces after it had already surrendered.

He wrote: The day of the seizure of the Pelopponesian capital was a day of destruction, fire, pillage and blood. Men, women, children, all perished, some with their throats cut, some thrown into the flames which rose in the middle of the city, others crushed under the roofs and floors of houses which had been put to the torch... These scenes lasted three days. On the third, those who had fled the city before it had been captured were slaughtered in the countryside... The fury of the pillage was such that most of the houses were even stripped of all wood.

In the years following the Greek War of Independence, the deep-felt desire to achieve the Romaic restoration was raised by the Greek government to the status of a national ideology. This was the famous Megali Idea or "Great Idea," which was to figure so prominently in shaping the modern Greek nation.

Several times during the century following the Greek War of Independence, Greece attacked Turkey — in 1877, 1897, 1912, and 1919, and each time a wholesale slaughter of the Muslim population took place. For example, when Greece invaded Crete in February 1897, the 80 Muslim villages in the centre of the island were entirely destroyed, and when Aydin was occupied by the Greeks in June 1919, nearly ten thousand Muslims were killed in one day alone.

But Muslims were not the only victims of Greek nationalism. Jews were too. Under Ottoman rule, the important seaport of Salonica had become a largely Jewish city. When it was occupied by Greece in 1912, its character rapidly changed, for the Greeks' policy of forced Hellenization caused an exodus of Jews from the city. As the article "Salonika" in the Encyclopedia Judaica informs us, this anti-Semitic attitude reached its peak in the so-called "Campbell Riots," in which an entire Jewish neighbourhood was burned to the ground.

I am not saying that Greeks are a more cruel or violent people than any other. What I am saying is that their nationalism, because of its religious overtones, has promoted intolerance, aggressiveness and extreme ethnocentrism, and that it has, in areas occupied by Greece, inevitably led to what we today call "ethnic cleansing."

The Ottoman Empire found it difficult to deal with Greek nationalism. Its own policy toward ethnic minorities had always been one of inclusiveness, not exclusiveness. This had been institutionalised in the "Millet System," which had given all ethnic groups within the empire complete religious and cultural autonomy. When the various Christian minorities of the Balkans began to struggle for independence, the Ottoman reaction was in keeping with the empire's tradition of pluralism. It promoted an ideology which, in fact, was the very opposite of the Megali Idea — namely "Pan Ottomanism." It was a secular ideology that reaffirmed the inclusiveness, which had been the cornerstone of the Millet System. The civil liberties of all ethnic groups within the empire were guaranteed by means of two decrees, the "Rescript" of the Rose Chamber of 1839, and the "Rescript" of 1856. They were also guaranteed by the Constitution of 1876, which declared that "All subjects of the Empire are, without distinction, called 'Ottomans' whatever religion they profess" and that "All Ottomans are equal in the eyes of the law."

The Turkish Cypriots were fully satisfied with this arrangement, especially in as much as the Constitution of 1960 guaranteed their civil rights and gave them a veto power over legislation aimed at destroying the independence of Cyprus or altering their political status. The Turks were also satisfied, for the threat to their security in the Eastern Mediterranean had been eliminated and a Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot Partnership State had been established which, at least on paper, promised to bring about stability in the region. This would enable the Turks, who had no territorial ambitions in Cyprus, to direct their attention once more to domestic concerns.

But the Greek Cypriots, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, who had become the first president of Cyprus, regarded independence as but a stepping-stone toward union with Greece, and, from the very beginning of his mandate, Makarios sought the complete Hellenization of the island, in spite of the fact that he had signed the Zurich-London Accords and the Cypriot Constitution, which had officially renounced Enosis. As he put it: "Unless this small Turkish community forming a part of the Turkish race... is expelled, the duties of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated." Consequently, EOKA was reconstituted to bring about the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus and the annexation of the island by Greece.

For the purposes of establishing the legal framework for Enosis and neutralising all opposition to his scheme, Makarios first forced the resignation of the distinguished German jurist who was serving as president of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Then he implemented a plan, the so-called "Akritas Plan", with the aim of cowing the Turkish Cypriots into submission.

According to this plan, the Turkish Cypriots would be presented with a series of proposed amendments to the Constitution of 1960, which would deprive them of rights which were so fundamental that they were included in the unalterable "Basic Articles" of the Constitution, such as that of having veto power over governmental decisions, of having their own municipalities, and of being judged by their own peers. Should Turkish Cypriots reject these amendments, the Greek Cypriots would "show their strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully," with the result that the Turkish Cypriots would "probably be brought to their senses."

The amendments were submitted to the Turkish Cypriot leadership on November 30, 1963, but even before the Turkish, Cypriots had had time to complete their study of the projected constitutional changes, EOKA and other paramilitary organisations went into action, slaughtering Turkish Cypriots indiscriminately. At the same time, Makarios dismissed all of the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, cabinet ministers and members of parliament.

World reaction to these outrages was heartbreakingly disappointing. Even though the slaughter of Turkish Cypriot townspeople and villagers was so extensive that the U.S. under secretary of state, George W. Ball, accused Makarios of turning Cyprus into his "private abattoir," the United Nations did not issue any protests. Moreover, even though a coup was clearly in the making, the aim of which was to destroy the independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot Republic, world governments at once recognised the illegal and savagely repressive Greek Cypriot government, and Great Britain refused to intervene though it was mandated to do so by the Treaty of Guarantee. To top it all, when Turkey then signalled its intention of honouring the treaty, the U.S. President, Lyndon B. Johnson, sent Prime Minister Ismet Inonu a rebuke that was so harsh that it was called in Turkey "the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb."

In June 1964, the Greek government, encouraged by the world's indifference to Turkish Cypriot suffering, dispatched 20,000 troops to beef up Makarios's forces, which included the Greek-officered National Guard, which had been created in violation of the Treaty of Alliance. Although Makarios warned the Turkish government that "should Turkey intervene to save Turkish Cypriots, it would find no Turkish Cypriots to save," the Greek invasion finally provoked a Turkish military response, namely the strafing of some of Makarios's troops by Turkish military aircraft. This action, though extremely modest in scale, at last convinced Makarios that further acts of violence would be counterproductive. As a result, his campaign of terror against the Turkish Cypriot community gradually subsided.

But Makarios had not given up on his plan to get rid of the Turkish Cypriot community. He had merely changed tactics. During the period immediately following the massacres of 1963 and 1964, the Greek Cypriot leaders reaffirmed their goal of achieving Enosis, and they gradually dismantled every aspect of the Cypriot partnership state through a series of acts that were totally unconstitutional. At the same time, in the hope of encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to leave Cyprus, Makarios herded all of them into small, overcrowded enclaves which, in their totality, covered only 3 per cent of the territory of Cyprus and which were surrounded by fortifications. Each of these enclaves was allowed to import only enough food for bare subsistence, and was denied all government services, except for the issuance of exit visas - which once more demonstrates that Clerides's assertion that the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was "that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority" is completely unfounded.

In 1967, there was another wave of attacks against Turkish Cypriot villages. Once more, Turkey threatened punitive action, and the raids ceased. In November of that year an agreement was worked out between Greece and Turkey that provided for the withdrawal from Cyprus within 45 days of all Greek troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance, the dissolution of the illegal National Guard, and compensation by the Greek Cypriot government to the victims of Greek Cypriot savagery. Needless to say, however, Makarios never bothered to comply with the agreement.

Also in 1967, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives (which consisted only of the Greek Cypriot members of the former House and continued to legislate illegally) passed the following resolution:

Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that, despite any adverse circumstances, it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the Motherland, without any intermediate stages.

Nikos Sampson. You know how Peter Parker would take shots of Spider-Man because he was Spider-Man? Sampson would also be the first reporter at a terrorist killing... because he was the terrorist doing the killing!

In late 1973, General Dimitrios Ioannides who, in 1963, together with a Greek Cypriot journalist and well-known political assassin by the name of Nikos Sampson, had presented Makarios with a plan for the liquidation of the entire Turkish Cypriot community, became dictator of Greece. Needing an immediate triumph to compensate for the Greek junta's declining popularity, he decided to overthrow Makarios, whom he considered much too timid in the pursuit of Enosis, and to replace him with a more militant leader.

The Greek strongman was obviously encouraged by the reluctance of Turkey to resort to force in the crises of 1964 and 1967, and by its extremely limited military response to even the most blatant provocation in 1964. He calculated that the Turkish government would make no serious effort to prevent a swiftly and efficiently executed Enosist coup in Cyprus backed up by the full might of the Greek army. Once more, Greek troops were smuggled into Cyprus, and, in July 1974, these troops, along with the Greek-officered and illegal National Guard, carried out the planned coup. Makarios was put to flight and replaced by the notorious Nikos Sampson. A massacre of the adherents of Makarios, as well as of the Turkish Cypriot population, began at once.

The Turkish government appealed, but in vain, to the governments of the United States and Great Britain to put an end to the bloodshed and to prevent Greece from taking over Cyprus. Finally, the Turkish government decided to act on its own. The Turkish intervention, which resulted, was legal according to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. Its legality was even upheld by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in a resolution adopted on July 29, 1974, namely Resolution 532 (1974). In any case, the Turks had clearly been provoked beyond endurance. As Evangelos Yannopoulos, the Greek Minister of Maritime Affairs, put it in an article which was published in 1988: "How was it possible to topple Makarios, start slaughtering the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and impose a madman like Sampson to head the Cyprus Government and yet expect no reaction from Turkey?"

The Turkish intervention caused the collapse of the military dictatorship in Greece and of the brutal Sampson regime in Cyprus. It prevented the occupation of Cyprus by Greece, thus keeping alive the possibility of establishing a new partnership state on the island. Finally, it ended intercommunal strife and ushered in a period of peace, which has lasted to this day.

As Turkish troops landed in northern Cyprus, most of the Turkish Cypriots from the south of the island moved north, and most of the Greek Cypriots from the north of the island moved south. In August 1975, Rauf Denktas and Glafkos Clerides, negotiating on behalf of their respective communities, signed a formal agreement, which recognised the population exchanges that had taken place and sanctioned further such exchanges.

But all these dramatic events had little impact on Turkey's policy toward Cyprus. The Turkish government remained steadfastly faithful to Ataturk's non-expansive ideology of Turkism and claimed not a square inch of Cypriot territory. Instead, it promoted intercommunal negotiations for the purpose of establishing in Cyprus a federation in which the rights of both communities would be equally protected.

In any case, Vassiliou lost his credibility as a peacemaker that year when he applied for full Greek Cypriot membership in the European Union, for it was in direct violation of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Zurich-London Accords and the Constitution of 1960.

In February 1993, Vassiliou was, in turn, voted out of office by the Greek Cypriot electorate. He was succeeded by the veteran politician Glafkos Clerides. Like Vassiliou, Clerides has thus far not proposed repeal of the Enosist resolution of 1967, and he has echoed his predecessor's nationalist sentiments by describing Cyprus as "a small part of the Greek nation." Moreover, under his leadership, the Greek Cypriot government has once more opted for a confrontational policy toward the Turkish Cypriots. Encouraged by the indifference shown by the leaders of the European Union regarding the flaunting by the Greek Cypriot government of an international treaty in unilaterally applying for full membership in that body, Clerides has made the application the main thrust of his foreign policy.

For the Greek Cypriot government, as well as for the Greek government, Greek Cypriot membership in the European Union would be an enormous asset. It would automatically double Greek membership in the Council of Ministers and in the European Commission, and it would increase Greek membership in the European Parliament. Thus, Greek influence in the European Union would be substantially enhanced, and, because in the European Union there is no counterbalancing Turkish influence (as there is at the United Nations and in N.A.T.O.), Greece's interpretation of events in the Eastern Mediterranean would be unchallenged. This danger was duly noted in the "Daily Brief," published in the Oxford Analytica on December 22, 1994:

If Greek controlled Cyprus became a member, there would be two Greek votes and two potential Greek vetoes in the E. U. These votes might well be deployed against the wishes of the other members of the E.U. not only vis-à-vis Turkey, but also in Balkan affairs and other matters.

The most alarming aspect of this situation is that, because all the more fanatical exponents of Greek nationalism in both Greece and the Greek Cypriot state have come to realise that little more can be expected in the way of support from the United Nations and N.A.T.O., they have put all their hopes in the European Union. Membership in the European Union would, in fact, constitute their last chance to exert international pressure upon the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots to bend to their will, and their last opportunity to intimidate them in a show of force. Therefore, there is an edge of desperation to their quest for membership which might well lead to another catastrophic miscalculation, like the 1974 coup, for they expect much more from the European Union than that body is likely to deliver in a showdown with Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

There are already ominous signs in Cyprus of an impending conflict. Under Greek prodding, the Greek Cypriots have become engaged in a steadily escalating series of border violations and acts of provocation directed against the Turkish Cypriot State. These reached a new level of virulence in August and September 1996, resulting in casualties on both sides. For instance, on September 8, I996, a number of Greek Cypriot armed men penetrated into Turkish Cypriot territory in the vicinity of Guvercinlik and shot two Turkish Cypriot border guards, one fatally.

Meanwhile, the military integration of Southern Cyprus with Greece by means of the so-called "Joint Defence Doctrine" has been accelerated. A new Greek Air Force base is being constructed in Paphos, as well as a navy base, and the Greek Cypriot armed forces are being greatly strengthened. The Greek Cypriot administration spends approximately two million dollars per day on armaments, and with the introduction of the new five-year rearmament program this year (1997), this sum will increase. Already, the Greek Cypriots spend a higher percentage of their gross domestic product on defence than most other countries, including the United States.

The scale of arms purchasing by the Greek Cypriot administration has reached truly massive proportions. A large number of French-made anti-ship missiles and Italian-made Aspida anti- aircraft missiles, as well as a variety of anti-tank missiles, have been purchased. Initially, the Greek Cypriots had 52 AMX-30 B-2 French--made tanks. These were augmented by another 52 AMX-30 B-2's sent by Greece. 41 Russian T-80 tanks and numerous Russian BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers have also been purchased.

Finally, on January 4, 1997, the Greek Cypriot administration concluded a new multi-million dollar deal with the Russian Federation for the acquisition of sophisticated S-300 long-range missiles. As Nicholas Burns, the U.S. State Department spokesman, commented: "The Greek Cypriot decision introduces a new and destabilising element in this island and in the region... This new missile system threatens to take the arms build-up on Cyprus to a new and disturbing qualitative level."