II. Literature on Ethnic Lobbies in the US

The end of the Cold War has sparked intense academic and policy debates on the direction and aims of US foreign policy. One aspect of that debate has centered on the role of ethnic groups in influencing foreign policy and determining the national interest. Two broad camps are visible in this debate: those that see ethnic lobbies as highly influential and a threat to US foreign policy and the national interest, and those that see these groups as moderately influential but largely good, promoting American interests abroad. This section argues that both of these camps offer hypotheses on ethnic lobbies but provide no in-depth case studies to test these claims. Therefore more rigorous case studies are needed in order to measure the degree to which ethnic lobbies influence US foreign policy and how that influence is attained.



The first camp on ethnic lobbies, headed by Samuel Huntington and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., argues that the rise of US ethnic groups in the foreign policy arena stems from diversity within America’s population and is a threat to the national interest. Huntington asserts that the Cold War united the American people under the threat from a common enemy, the Soviet Union. The passage of this foe has left American society and its government in a state of national “disintegration,” which, in turn, has thrown into question what our interests should be.[5] This state of disintegration has been reinforced by post Cold War immigration to the US and the rise of “the cult of multiculturalism,” whose proponents “deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.”[6] The rise of ethnic lobbies in the US is an outgrowth of these international and domestic changes. Although Huntington acknowledges that the interests of ethnic lobbies can coincide with the national interest, he also claims that they are “often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing allies.”[7] Ethnic lobbies, therefore, pose a threat to US foreign policy aims and articulation of the national interest. This viewpoint is echoed by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.[8]



Tony Smith offers a more nuanced yet equally as cautionary argument about ethnic lobbies in the US. Smith, like Huntington and Schlesinger Jr., posits that ethnic lobbies affect US foreign policy decision-making considerably and that their impact on the national interest may be more negative than positive.[9] However, Smith looks not only at the ethnic composition of the US but also the structure of its political system as an explanation for how ethnic lobbies gain influence in Washington. Smith argues that “the structure of the American political system, as much as the character of particularistic social forces, explains the importance of ethnic groups in the formulation of American foreign policy.”[10] Smith delineates three ways in which lobbies gain influence in Washington: through votes; campaign finance; and by creating an “organizational body” that articulates demands, mobilizes its constituents, and forms alliances with other groups.[11]



The second camp, headed by Yossi Shain, contends that the rise of ethnic lobbies in post-Cold War US foreign policy-making is a good thing; it is a sign that these groups have achieved “a respectable position in American life today” and that they want to acquire, “a meaningful voice in US foreign affairs.”[12] Shain argues that ethnic lobbies are useful for promoting US values back in the homeland: democracy, self-determination, human rights and other liberal values.[13] For proponents of the “democratic peace theory”—the argument that liberal democracies do not fight each other and therefore the spread of democracy will create a “zone of peace” among like-nations—ethnic lobbies serve US interests by spreading democracy and thus peace.



A slightly different variant of this argument is posited by Michael Clough.[14] He contends that US Cold War foreign policy was determined by a small group of elites but that the post-Cold war strategic environment, coupled with increases in immigration to the US and advances in communications, has opened foreign policy-making up to a wider body of the population, including ethnic groups. The rise of “grass roots” organizations in the foreign policy arena is not a threat to the national interest but rather the fulfillment of democratic participation in a nation’s destiny. These groups’ participation should be welcomed and accommodated by the US government, Clough argues.



Whether ethnic lobbies are “good” or “bad” for articulating the national interest is difficult to measure by any objective standards. This debate, therefore, will not be addressed in this paper. Measuring the impact of ethnic lobbies on determining US foreign policy is a more plausible endeavor. Although, as most scholars of ethnic lobbies will contend, foreign policy-making is an over-determined process, it is very difficult to say with certainty what domestic and international factors cause foreign policy decisions.[15] Nevertheless, the debate on ethnic lobbies and their impact on foreign policy can be advanced by delving into case studies on particular groups and by exploring the history and organization of specific ethnic lobbies, the agendas they set, and their strategies for realizing their objectives.



There are almost no in-depth case studies on particular ethnic lobby groups in the US.[16] The notable exception is research done on pro-Israel lobby groups, particularly the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).[17] Of particular importance to the debate on how ethnic lobbies organize and influence the foreign policy process is David Howard Goldberg’s Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups.[18] Goldberg’s research compares the rise of pro-Israel lobby groups in the US, particularly AIPAC, with the pro-Israel force in Canada, the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC). He considers the organization of the lobby groups, their ties to Israel and to pro-Israel constituencies in the US and Canada, leadership within the lobbies, the policy-making processes of the US and Canadian governments, the networks these groups created, and their successes and failures in implementing their goals.



This paper seeks to help fill the gap in the literature on ethnic lobbies by offering another case study, specifically by process-tracing the evolution of Armenian lobby groups in the US. Following on Goldberg’s methodology, this paper will process-trace the organization of these lobby groups; the leadership they have; their ties to their diasporic constituents and to the Armenian government; and their objectives, strategies, successes and limits in attaining their goals.



In addition, this paper will test the hypotheses of Smith and Shain on the impact of ethnic lobbies on US foreign policy. First, it will test Smith’s argument that ethnic lobbies gain influence through voting impact. Second, the paper will test Smith’s hypothesis on campaign finance by measuring the amount of Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions given by the Armenians relative to their adversaries. Third, it will test Smith’s hypothesis that ethnic groups gain influence by being organized, articulating clear demands, mobilizing their constituents, and forming alliances with other groups. Finally, this paper will test Shain’s hypothesis that there is a correlation between democratic practices and US aid.

 IV. The Rise of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies

The creation of Armenian ethnic lobbies in the US is another example of parallel organizations created by the ideological schism within the Armenian-American community. This section argues that competition between the two lobby groups—ANCA and the Assembly—has created hyper mobilization of resources within the Armenian-American diaspora. Competition has promoted the causes and successes of Armenian lobby efforts because, although the two lobbies have different approaches to influencing Washington, they mostly agree on policy objectives. This section outlines three dimensions of these two lobby groups: the organizational essence of each group;[58] their outreach projects; and their policy objectives.

 

ANCA and the Assembly are very different organizations in their histories and goals. ANCA traces its origins back to the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), the organization that lobbied on behalf of the ARF-governed Republic of Armenia, beginning in 1918.[59] As noted earlier, the Hunchags, the Progressive League, and those aligned with Noubar Pasha (the AGBU and, later, the Ramagavars) contested the ARF-run Armenian government. This contestation led to two delegations of Armenians at the post-World War I conferences of Versailles and Sèvres, and two delegations at the post-World War II conference in San Francisco. In the US, however, there was only one organized lobby group for Armenian issues, the ARF-backed ACIA and its successor ANCA. The presence of only one Armenian lobby group held until 1972.



In 1972, two Armenian-American professors at George Washington University hatched the idea of a new lobby group that would incorporate other already-existing Armenian organizations. These scholars, together with two Armenian attorneys from Boston, approached two prominent Armenian-American businessmen, Stephen Mugar and Hirair Hovnanian, who agreed to financially back the plan.[60] Their million-dollar donations were followed by numerous contributions from prominent Armenian-American professionals and business people.[61] Today they boast “investments” of $13,134,187.[62]



Although the Assembly named as one of its primary goals to create “an organization for all Armenian-Americans,” the founding of the Armenian Assembly of America is another chapter in the rivalry between pro- and anti-ARF groups in the United States. The key founding members were contributors to the AGBU, the largest remaining anti-ARF organization. Mugar, the creator of the Star Market chain in Massachusetts, was a prominent New England philanthropist who had donated large sums of money to Boston-area universities and the AGBU.[63] Richard Hovannisian, a prominent scholar of Armenian history and founding member of the Assembly, was also an active member of the AGBU.



The differing goals of ANCA and the Armenian Assembly reflect the ideological split between the two groups. ANCA and the ARF define their overarching goal as “a unified, free, and independent Armenia.”[64] This comes from the platform of the 1919 ARF-headed Armenian government, which called for territorial and ethnic unification of Armenians in the region.[65] They also speak in terms of “a just solution to the Armenian Cause” (Hai Tahd in Armenian) and call for “a resolution of all the political, moral, and legal implications associated with [a just resolution].”[66] From this imperative, ANCA delineates three main goals: “to foster public awareness in support of a free, united and independent Armenia; to influence and guide US policy on matters of interest to the Armenian-American community; and to represent the collective Armenian-American viewpoint on matters of public policy, while serving as liaison between the community and their elected officials.”[67]



The Assembly’s goals, although less clearly stated than ANCA's, tend to parallel US foreign policy ideals. The Assembly states a primary goal as the “commitment to prevent genocide and promote human rights…”[68] Another goal is “good governance” in Armenia, defined as “participatory democracy” and a market economy.[69] The Assembly also names as a goal that Armenians in the homeland “not only survive in Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh, but flourish.”[70] The AGBU shares in this last goal, emphasizing the prosperity of Armenians not just in the homeland but the worldwide diaspora.[71]



Another key difference between the two lobby groups is the way in which they are structured. Both organizations place their national headquarters in Washington, DC, and both organizations have offices in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno Karabakh. ANCA’s structure is dispersed; it has numerous offices and chapters throughout the United States. There are Western and Eastern regional offices, in Glendale, California and Watertown, Massachusetts, respectively. The Eastern Regional Office coordinates 31 local offices west of the Mississippi.[72] The Western Regional office coordinates 12 offices, mostly in California.[73] In addition, there are ANC offices in other countries including France, Italy, and Britain and a representative for the EU.[74]



The Armenian Assembly, on the other hand, is more centralized than ANCA. In addition to its national headquarters in Washington, DC, it has a regional office in Beverly Hills, California. These two offices are responsible for all major efforts of the Assembly: policy issues, relations with the Armenian government, public affairs, membership, fundraising, and other projects.[75] In addition to these main offices, there is a small office in Cambridge, Massachusetts that supports the Armenian Tree Project (ATP), a program aimed at planting agricultural and aesthetic trees in Armenia.[76] The Assembly also has an office in New York that works with UN-related issues.[77]



Furthermore, the two lobby groups’ approaches to mobilization are different. ANCA stresses its essence as a “bottom-up” organization. It claims to be “the largest and most influential Armenian-American grassroots political organization.”[78] ANCA stresses as one of its primary goals the mobilization of support at the local level:



The ANCA is convinced that a well-educated, motivated grassroots [sic] is the most valuable and powerful weapon we have…Each ANC is composed of community members…Each ANC is structured to meet the needs of its local community.[79]



ANCA boasts of “over 45 chapters in 25 states across the United States—each working to ensure that the Armenian American community’s collective voice is heard on the federal, state and local level.”[80]



Primarily, the Assembly attracts and targets prominent Armenian-American professionals and businesspeople who support the lobby group financially.[81] In addition to maintaining intense fundraising efforts, the Assembly launched a grassroots program, the Armenian-American Action Committee (ARAMAC). The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 cites “almost 8,000 Armenian-American activists across the country.”[82]



Lastly, ANCA and the Assembly have formed separate alliances with other organizations and interest groups. ANCA names “coalition building” as essential to its effectiveness. An ANCA representative states: “The ANCA has longstanding ties to the Greek, [Greek] Cypriot, Kurdish, and Lebanese communities. We also work with various labor and human rights organizations.”[83] These alliances have been particularly useful for ANCA’s bid to block military and economic aid to Turkey based on human rights violations of Armenians, Kurds, and Greek Cypriots. This will be further discussed below.



The Assembly boasts a strong and unique tie with the United Nations, with which it claims to have “the highest non-governmental organization status of any Armenian organization.”[84] In 1997, the Assembly’s NGO Training and Resource Center (NGOC) launched a new initiative with UNHCR to “build the capacity of NGO’s dealing with refugee problems…through a combination of training, technical assistance, assessments, and grants.”[85] In 1999, the Assembly was given special consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council.[86] In addition, the Assembly claims a unique relationship with the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and works closely with its staff to raise awareness on issues of genocide.[87]

C. Congress and Policy Objectives, Strategies and Tactics

 

Frank Pallone (rhymes with "Baloney")

Despite their differences in histories, goals, structure, and approaches to mobilization, the lobbying efforts of ANCA and the Assembly are united in Washington by two important factors: a bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, and similar policy objectives. The bipartisan Armenian Caucus, which has grown to 95 members in the 107th Congress, was initiated in January of 1995 by Democrat Frank Pallone of New Jersey and Republican Edward Porter of Illinois, now succeeded by Republican Joe Knollenberg of Michigan.[116] The Caucus works within the House of Representatives to encourage initiatives for Armenia and Armenian issues.[117] There is a tight correlation between members of the Caucus and votes to support issues pertaining to Armenia, particularly the maintenance of Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which blocks aid to Armenia’s rival Azerbaijan.[118] This will be discussed further below.



In addition to the Armenian Caucus in the Congress, there is the Armenian-American Democratic Leadership Council, which posts links to both ANCA and the Assembly on its website, and the Armenian-American Republican Council, founded in 1997 in Los Angeles.[119] Moreover, there have been a few key advocates of Armenian issues on Capital Hill, most notably former Senator Robert Dole, who was chair of the Senate Finance Committee and served as Senate majority leader. Dole, whose life was saved in World War II by an Armenian doctor, rallied the Armenian cause for decades. He consistently called for US official recognition of the Genocide, proposing resolutions in the Senate from 1982 until his retirement in 1996. In May of 2001, Dole was presented with the ANCA Lifetime Achievement Award for his dedication to the Armenian cause.[120]



These unifying lobbying bodies are further strengthened by the current policy objectives of ANCA and the Assembly, which are nearly identical. Their policy demands can be broken down into six objectives. First, both lobbies are working towards the US government’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1922. Second, both groups want US government recognition of Nagorno Karabakh’s independence and US aid to the exclave. Third, the lobbies have fought vigorously for the maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prevents the US from extending aid to Azerbaijan. Fourth, both groups lobby for continued US aid to Armenia. Two additional items, blockading arms sales to Turkey and challenging the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, appear to be more rigorously pursued by ANCA than by the Assembly.



1. US Recognition of the Armenian Genocide



Both ANCA and the Assembly name US recognition of the Genocide as one of their primary policy objectives.[121] ANCA is much more vocal on demands for territory and reparations from Turkey than is the Assembly, however.[122] Since 1982, both lobby groups have fought for the passage of legislation that would officially recognize the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1922 and honor its victims with a Day of Remembrance on April 24th. Each year the Resolution has been thwarted, usually with the claim that recognizing the Genocide will strain relations with Turkey and threaten strategic security interests of the US.[123] Although both lobby groups are rigorously campaigning for US recognition of the Genocide, each group employs different strategies and tactics for pressuring the resolution’s passage.



ANCA, in keeping with its grassroots approach to mobilization, employs a “bottom up” strategy towards attaining US recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In addition to lobbying for its official recognition on Capital Hill, ANCA also lobbies at the state and city level for recognition and the Day of Remembrance. Currently 30 states recognize the Genocide.[124] In addition, several cities, such as Boston, recognize the Genocide and hold April 24th as a Day of Remembrance.[125] ANCA also employs the tactic of gaining other countries’ recognition of the Genocide to pressure the US to follow suit. ANC chapters around the globe claim success in pressuring the governments of France, Italy, the EU, the European parliament, Great Britain, Greece, Belgium, Lebanon, Russia, the UN, Cyprus, Canada, and Argentina to recognize the Genocide.[126] Moreover, the ANC of the EU is trying to tie Turkey’s full inclusion in the EU to their recognition of the Genocide.[127] ANCA is also openly critical of the state of Israel for its alliance with Turkey and what it sees as lack of support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide.[128]



The Assembly, in addition to its lobbying efforts among members of Congress, concentrates its efforts on increasing documentation surrounding the Armenian Genocide. The Assembly sponsors the Armenian National Institute (ANI), a center dedicated to “achieving recognition and affirmation of the Genocide.”[129] In 2000, ANI held a conference in Washington titled “The American Response to the Armenian Genocide,” which included scholars and members of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.[130] ANI is also working on legal action that will require insurance companies to pay surviving members of genocide victims, similar to Jewish legal demands for Holocaust restitution.[131] In addition, ANI has developed a curriculum on the Armenian Genocide and the Assembly is lobbying for its inclusion in US public schools.[132] In 2000, the Assembly launched a project aimed at building an Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial. Through the donations of two prominent Armenian-Americans, the Assembly purchased a 1925 building on the corner of 14th and G Street in Washington, DC, two blocks from the White House.[133] The Assembly has made the Museum one of its top priorities.



2. Nagorno Karabakh



Beginning in February of 1988, Armenians in the Soviet Republic of Armenia took to the streets over toxic nuclear and chemical plants near the Soviet Republic’s capital of Yerevan.[134] This unrest quickly spread to include demands for the union of Nagorno Karabakh—a predominantly Armenian exclave given to neighboring Azerbaijan in 1921—with the Armenian republic.[135] On February 28th, after Armenians in Karabakh voted to separate from Azerbaijan, racial rioting in the Azeri city of Sumgait killed between 35 and 350 people, mostly Armenians.[136] This unleashed further violence between Armenians and Azeris in the region, prompting the flow of at least 600,000 refugees between the two republics.[137] The conflict escalated into all-out war after the two republics declared their independence in 1991. Armenian fighters succeeded in defending Nagorno Karabakh and seizing an additional ten percent of Azerbaijan, including the “Lachin Corridor,” which connects Karabakh to Armenia.[138] [138Holdwater] In 1994, Azeri and Karabakh officers agreed to a Russian-sponsored cease-fire.[139] Currently the conflict remains unresolved, with Armenia occupying Azeri land and Azerbaijan and Turkey imposing a blockade on landlocked Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. The most recent attempts to negotiate a solution were the Key West talks in April of 2001.



Both ANCA and the Assembly are lobbying for the US to recognize the independence of Nagorno Karabakh and for increased aid to the exclave. ANCA, however, appears much more invested in the struggle for Karabakh than is the Assembly. ANCA is actively pushing for recognition of Karabakh’s right to self-determination and claims success in gaining its recognition from the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island.[140] Sharistan Ardhaldjian, an ANCA chairperson, states:



Any power that would deny [Armenians in Karabakh] their right to self-determination—anyone who would like to see Karabagh remain a part of Azerbaijan—cannot be considered an honest broker in our view, because that would mean ignoring history, rewarding aggression and human rights violations, and denying the inalienable rights of individuals and collectives to be free.[141]



In addition to lobbying for Karabakh’s recognition, the ARF is highly invested in the government of Karabakh. Karabakh was an ARF stronghold in the early 1990s after the first elections in Armenia failed to bring the ARF back to power.[142] Moreover, Armenians in the diaspora, reportedly aligned with the ARF, actually returned to the region to fight for Karabakh’s liberation from Azeri control and reunification with Armenia.[143] It is also reported that Armenians in California and France helped fund arms transfers to Karabakh.[144] ANCA's and ARF’s efforts to attain independence for Karabakh, therefore, are considerable, including both official lobbying channels and unofficial support of men and materiel.



The Assembly lobbies for the Karabakh cause through other means. The Annual Report 2000 commits only two paragraphs specifically to Nagorno Karabakh, in which it calls its office in Stepanakert a “point of contact for senior government officials, leaders and local representatives of international organizations, visiting American lawmakers, and Armenian and foreign journalists.”[145] Elsewhere in its annual report, the Assembly stresses its commitment to “confidence building measures” between Armenia and Azerbaijan including “studies of energy routes, regional transportation routes, water management, and other collaborative and humanitarian initiatives.”[146] The Assembly’s approach to the Karabakh conflict, therefore, is far less direct than ANCA’s, adopting a cooperative and conciliatory tone towards the issue.



3. Section 907



The maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act is the strongest evidence of Armenian lobbying success. The Freedom Support Act was passed in 1992 to provide US financial and technical assistance to former Soviet states.[147] Section 907 was passed as an addendum of the Freedom Support Act; it specifically prohibits Azerbaijan from receiving US aid as long as Azeri hostilities towards Armenians continue and the Azeri blockade against Armenia persists.[148] Section 907 has remained in place, despite rigorous campaigning from opposition lobbies, most notably 14 oil companies, the Turkish Caucus, and pro-Israel lobbies.[149] [149Holdwater] These groups promote abolition of Section 907 and the full implementation of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which calls for support to Azerbaijan and neighboring central Asian states, particularly to develop their economies in order to balance against Iran, China, and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.[150] In 1999, Section 907 barely survived a vote in the Senate.[151] In October of 2001, in light of September 11, the Senate passed a bill with near unanimity that “allows the President to waive the restriction of assistance for Azerbaijan if the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.”[152] In particular, it is argued that countering the spread of militant Islam supercedes all other regional concerns. The Foreign Aid Bill for FY 2003 gave the President the ability to waive Section 907 indefinitely if he so chose.[153] In late January 2002, President Bush exercised this option and, despite intense Armenian resistance, opened the door to potential American aid for Azerbaijan.[154]



Both ANCA and the Assembly rigorously lobbied for the creation of Section 907 in 1992 and continue to lobby for its maintenance. Both lobby groups use similar strategies and tactics to ensure 907’s survival, namely bipartisan congressional backing and letter writing campaigns to encourage support of the Section. On March 28, 2001, ANCA representative Aram Sarafian testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in support of Section 907, stating:



The ANCA supports the law restricting US assistance to the government of Azerbaijan and actively opposes any effort to weaken, waive, or eliminate this prohibition. Any effort to circumvent the intent of this provision of law, particularly during the ongoing negotiations, will be viewed by the Azerbaijani government as a clear signal for renewed aggression.[155]



The Assembly also rigorously backs Section 907 stating: “Section 907 places reasonable restrictions on US assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan while it continues to blockade Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh…Despite various attempts to further weaken Section 907, the Assembly and our allies in Congress were able to maintain Section 907 in its current form.”[156]



There is a tight correlation between members of the Armenian Caucus and those voting to uphold Section 907. In particular, a September 1998 vote in the House to repeal Section 907, which was defeated, shows a close correlation between Caucus members and votes to defeat the amendment of Section 907.[157] Therefore alliances formed through the Caucus appear to provide strong support for legislation that supports Armenian causes. In contrast, financial contributions, such as Political Action Committee (PAC) donations to Congressional candidates, appear to have had little influence on voting behavior on Section 907. Oil PACs contributed, on average, $6,870,672 biennially to members of Congress, whereas Armenian PACs contributed only $26,681 biennially.[158] Therefore, the success of Armenian lobbies in maintaining Section 907 does not appear to be driven by financial contributions.



4. Aid to Armenia



Securing US financial and technical aid to the liberated Republic of Armenia has been a priority of both ANCA and the Armenian Assembly. The push for aid to the republic was prompted by the December 7, 1988 earthquake that killed over 25,000 Armenians, injured 19,000 and left more that 500,000 homeless.[159] In addition to raising money for the victims of the earthquake, both ANCA and the Assembly lobbied for federal aid to the fledgling republic, particularly as Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed blockades on Armenia, stunting the reconstruction process.[160] Both ANCA and the Assembly claim credit for securing a minimum of $90 million to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh annually, earning Armenia the nick-name the “Israel of the Caucuses.” In 1999, Congress attempted to reduce Armenian aid to $75 million. Through the efforts of the Caucus, the $90 million minimum was maintained.[161] In 2001, the lobby groups claimed victory in persuading the US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations to maintain the $90 million for Armenia. In fact, the FY 2003 Foreign Aid Bill kept the $90 million in economic aid while adding, for the first time, military aid totaling more than $4 million.[162]



ANCA, the Assembly, and their sibling organizations raise and secure aid for Armenia in similar ways. On March 28, 2001, an ANCA representative testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations regarding Armenian issues. He stated:

The ANCA supports at least the same percentages of funding for the southern Caucasus region and Armenia as in fiscal year 2000…This appropriation will help offset the devastating effects of the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades and help continue Armenia’s political and economic transition. Specifically…[US aid will support] the economy and infrastructure, further strengthen democratic institutions, and meet the country’s current development and humanitarian needs.[163]



ANCA claims credit for the maintenance of aid to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh through its efforts to “educate” the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and through its grassroots approach of encouraging Armenians nationwide to contact members of congress and encourage them to back aid legislation.[164]



The Assembly also claims success for the level and maintenance of aid to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition to the $90 million annually, the Assembly takes credit for securing an additional $15 million as a “start-up fund” for a Synchrotron Light Source Particle Accelerator (SESAME).[165] The AGBU has also received a federal grant of $9 million to go toward the endowment of the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.[166] In addition, the Assembly initiated an NGO Training and Resource Center (NGOC) in 1994, which seeks to “help Armenians and their recently established organizations shape positive social, political and economic transformation in Armenia.”[167] Since its inception, NGOC has provided 140 micro-grants to regional NGOs to implement projects.[168]



5. Block Arms Deals to Turkey and Caspian Pipeline Project



There are two principal policy objectives for which ANCA appears to be lobbying: blocking arms deals to Turkey and withholding US taxpayer funding for the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, which bypasses Armenia. As a NATO ally, Turkey is the recipient of considerable military aid from the US. ANCA, together with Kurdish and Greek lobby groups, have called for the suspension of US military and economic aid to Turkey under the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, designed to block aid to any country that obstructs US aid to a third country.[169] Turkey, together with Azerbaijan, is cited as imposing a blockade on Armenia that prevents humanitarian assistance from reaching people in these areas. ANCA further calls for withholding military aid to Turkey under the Code of Conduct legislation, which restricts arms sales based on human rights abuses. Specifically, ANCA names Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide, their treatment of Kurds, the blockade on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, their occupation of Northern Cyprus, and their treatment of Christians within their borders as grounds for prohibiting arms sales.[170]



More recently, ANCA has launched a campaign aimed at thwarting US aid to build a pipeline that would transport oil from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline has been a US prospect since the early 1990s, but the aims of the second Bush administration to develop new sources of energy have renewed interest in the project.[171] ANCA opposes the pipeline because it bypasses Armenian territory, thus denying the state revenue from transport fees. Four congressional members of the Armenian Caucus introduced House Resolution 162 in June of 2001. It calls for: not subsidizing any pipeline that would prevent integration of Armenia into the region; a feasibility study of cost and efficiency of routes including a trans-Armenian route; and an evaluation of the pipeline’s cost efficiency.[172] See Chart B for a summary of Armenian-American policy objectives.



In sum, despite their differences, ANCA and the Assembly present a unified front in Washington. Armenian lobbying efforts are strengthened by two factors. First, the groups have important congressional allies, most notably the bipartisan House Armenian Caucus, Democratic and Republican Armenian groups, and key members of Congress sympathetic to Armenian issues. Second, the presence of allies is strengthened by the Armenian lobbies’ unified policy objectives: recognition of the genocide, independence and aid for Nagorno Karabakh, maintenance of Section 907, and aid to Armenia. However, despite unity in objectives, the methods for attaining these policy goals do differ between ANCA and the Assembly. The result is varying means concentrated on similar ends, arguably increasing the exposure and effectiveness of Armenian lobbying on Capitol Hill.

 Appendix A: Votes to Uphold Section 907, 105th Congress

		Caucus Y	Other Y	Caucus N	Other N	Caucus Abstention	Other Abstention
	65	166	4	178	3	18

 


Appendix B: Armenian and PAC* Oil Contributions

	Year	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2001
	Armenian	29010	75	35525	43355	20250	57550	1000
	Oil	7564589	8969450	6674857	7892568	8222798	6977585	1792857

*Political Action Committee.
PAC statistics reflect only contributions to those in Congress.
PAC statistics taken from opensecrets.org and Political Money Line.






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Hovannisian, Richard G., “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide,” in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, edited by George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

“Nagorno-Karabakh: What We Have We Mostly Hold,” The Economist, September 21, 1996, p. 53.

The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan: Volume 1, Eyewitness Accounts, compiled and edited by Samvel Shahmuratian, translated by Steven Jones (New Rochelle and Cambridge: Aristide D. Cartzas and Zoryan Institute, 1990).

Tololyan, Khachig, “Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist,” in Journal of Strategic Studies 10:4 (December 1987) pp. 217-233.

__________, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 107-136.

“UnArmenian Activities,” The Economist, February 6, 1982, p. 20.

Armenians in the US

The AGBU Biennial Report: 1998-1999 (taken from webiste, www.agbu.org).

The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000 (taken from website,
www.aaainc.org).

The Armenian Assembly of America: Membership Spotlight 2000 (taken from website, www.aaainc.org).

Ashjian, Mesroh, The Armenian Church in America (New York: Armenian Prelacy, 1985).

The AYF Legacy: Portrait of a Movement in Historical Review, 1933-1993 (Watertown: Armenian Youth Federation, 1994).

Bakalian, Anny, Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993).

Mirak, Robert, Torn Between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

Paul, Rachel Anderson, “Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring, 2000), pp. 24-47.

Phillips, Jenny, Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population (New York: AMS Press, 1989).

“Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,” Armenian Assembly of America website, www.aaainc.org.



Armenians in Britain

Nassibian, Akaby, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984).



Regional

Barton, James L., The Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930): An Interpretation, (New York: The Macmilan Company, 1930).

Rahr, Alexander, “Caspian Oil,” in Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition (Vol. 2, Summer 2001) pp. 80-84.

Rieff, David, “Case Study in Ethnic Strife: Nagorno-Karabakh,” in Foreign Affairs, (March/April, 1997).

Trask, Roger, The United States’ Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971).



Congressional Records
“Congressional Record, Wednesday, June 30, 1999,” pp. 1-37, taken from the Armenian Assembly of America Webiste, www.aaainc.org.

“Final Vote Results for Roll Call 447: HR 4569,”September 17, 1998, Roll Calls for the House 105th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov.

“HR 2867: The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997, 105th Congress,” and “S.579, The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, 106th Congress,” (also called the Brownback Amendment), Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com.

McConnell Amendment, which keeps Section 907 in place, 53 in favor and 45 opposed, “Congressional Record,” p. 32.

PL 102-511, “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992,” taken from Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com.

“S. 1521 Bill Tracking Record,” Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com.

“Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,” Armenian Assembly of America Website, www.aaainc.org, (downloaded on 8/7/01).



Organizational theory and competition
Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1974).



Pro-Israel Lobbies
Goldberg, David Howard, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel (New York: Greewood Press, 1990).

Mittelberg, David, The Israel Connection and American Jews (Westport and London: Praeger, 1999).

Tivnan, Edward, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

Trice, Robert H., Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: US Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976).


Armenian-American Articles/Position Papers
Adanalian, Garo, “Pursuing the American Cause in the 21st Century: An Interview with Sharistan Ardhaldjian [of ANCA],” The Armenian Weekly Online (May 2001), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

“ANCA Issues Statement on Genocide Resolution,” The Armenian Weekly Online (February 2001), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

“ANCA Testifies Before Congressional Foreign Aid Committee,” The Armenian Weekly Online (April 2001), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

Auron, Yair, “Foreign Ministers Comments are Israeli Shift to Active Denial,” The Armenian Weekly Online (May 2001), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

“Bush Breaks Pledge to Recognize Armenian Genocide,” The Armenian Weekly Online (May 2001), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

“Chronology of Recent Events in Nagorno-Karabagh (1986-1996), Armenian Assembly of America Website, www.aaainc.org.

Cook, Mary C., “An Interview with ARAMAC’s Grassroots Director Nancy Yerian Hiteshue,” Via Dolorosa Magazine, www.via-dolorosa.org, pp. 1-3.

Dasnabedian, Hratch, “ARF History: The Realm of Ideas and the Evolution of Programmatic Objectives,” ARF Website, www.arf.am, (downloaded on 7/19/01).

Kasbarian, Antranig, “Planting Roots in Nagorno Karabagh,” The Armenian Weekly Online (June/July 2000), http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly.

Papas, Lisa Boghosian, “People and Programs: The New Generation Taking Cues from their Ancestors, Young Armenians Shaking the Scene,” pp. 1-8, The AGBU website, www.agbu.org.

“Position Papers: Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” ANCA website, www.anca.org.

“Position Papers: Cutting US Aid to Turkey,” ANCA website, www.anca.org.

“President of Armenia Bans Leading Opposition Party,” ARF website, www.arf.am.

“Reps ask congress to withhold US taxpayer funding for Caspian pipeline projects unless they include Armenia,” ANCA website, www.anca.org.

Sadar, Alex, “Year of Victories and Lessons for Hai Tahd,” The Armenian Weekly Online (April 2001), http://free.freesheech.org/armenian/weekly.

“Several US States Recognize the Armenian Genocide,” The Armenian Weekly Online (March 2001), http://free.freesheech.org/armenian/weekly.


Websites
AGBU website, www.agbu.org

ANCA website, www.anca.org

The ARF website, www.arf.am

The Armenian Relief Society (ARS) website, www.ars.org

The Armenian Assembly of America website, www.aaainc.org

The Armenian-American Democratic Leadership Council,  www.aadlc.org

The Armenian National Institute, www.armenian-genocide.org

The Armenian-American Republican Council, http://members.aol.com/aarc2000/info.html

Azbarez Armenian Daily Newspaper, www.asbarez.com

The Zoryan Institute, www.zoryan.org



Interviews
Email correspondence with Grace Kehetian Kulegian, Executive Director, ANCA Eastern Region Office, (5/18/01).

Interview with Khachig Tololyan, professor of English Literature at Wesleyan University, Connecticut, former ARF activist, (7/20/01).

Interview with Khatchik Der Ghoukassian, ARF activist, (7/20/01).

Interview with PR spokesperson from Congressman Knollberg’s Washington, DC office, (8/14/01).

Interview with Jon Lenicheck, point person for Armenian Affairs, Congressman Capuano’s Cambridge, MA office, (8/15/01).

Correspondence with the Armenian General Benevolence Union of New York, (8/20/010)—declined interview.

Correspondence with Dr. Charbazian of the Zoryan Institute, (09/01).

Correspondence with the Armenian Assembly of America, (11/01).

[1] The Rosemary Rogers Working Paper Series, and the research upon which they are based, are supported by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. 

[2] Heather S. Gregg is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at MIT, focusing on International Relations and Security Studies. Please address correspondence to Heather S. Gregg, The Center for International Studies, E38-600, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139; email: hsgregg@mit.edu. The author would like to thank the Mellon Foundation for its generous financial support of this research, the executive committee of the Mellon-MIT Program on NGO’s and Forced Migration for its encouragement on this project, and Sharon Stanton Russell for her comments throughout the research and drafting of this paper.

[3] Statistics on the number of Armenian in the US vary greatly. For example, Khachig Tololyan puts the number at 800,000, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 107-136. Robert H. Hewsen cites the 1980 US census as recording only 308,096, Armenia: A Historical Atlas, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) plate 270. Yossi Shain places the number at around 1 million, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: US Diasporas and Homelands, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 64. Statistics on other ethnic groups in the US show how small Armenians are in comparison. For example Shain outlines the rise of Mexican-American political activism in the US, an ethnic group that comprises a significant percentage of the US population (Shain: 1999, pp. 23-23 and chapter 5). Shain hypothesizes that the size of the diasporic community does contribute to its success in attaining its political objectives pp. 9-10. Tony Smith also makes this point in Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 95-101.

[4] David Rieff, “Case Study in Ethnic Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997), pp. 118-126.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1997) pp. 28-40.

[6] Huntington, pp. 31-32.

[7] Huntington, p. 35.

[8] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: WW Norton, 1992).

[9] Tony Smith, pp. 1-2.

[10] Smith, p. 86. Walker Connor also points to the structure of the US political system as important for explaining the influence of ethnic lobbies in “Diasporas and the Formation of Foreign Policy: The US in Comparative Perspective,” pp. 167-179, in Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective, edited by Dimitri C. Constas and Athanassios G. Platias (London: Macmillan in association with The Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, 1993).

[11] Smith, pp. 94-110.

[12] Shain, p. 25.

[13] Shain, chapters one and two.

[14] Michael Clough, “Grass-Roots Policymaking: Say Good-Bye to the ‘Wise Men,’” Foreign Affairs (January/February, 1994) pp. 2-8.

[15] Smith, p. 124.

[16] There is an edited volume on Greek diasporas throughout the world that touches on Greek lobbies, Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective, edited by Dimitri C. Constas and Athanassios G. Platias (London: Macmillan in association with The Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, 1993). In addition, both Yossi Shain and Tony Smith touch on numerous lobby groups in their books. But none of these works provides a rigorous case study of an ethnic lobby group.

[17] Works on the pro-Israel lobby include Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), David Mittelberg, The Israel Connection and American Jews (Westport and London: Praeger, 1999), and Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: US Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976), to name a few.

[18] David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

[19] Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984), p. 18, and Hratch Dasnabedian, “ARF History: The Realm of Ideas and the Evolution of Programmatic Objectives,” ARF website, http:/arf.am/English/history, downloaded (7/19/01).

[20] Also transliterated Tashnaksutiun.

[21] Nassibian, p. 18, and Dasnabedian, pp. 1-2.

[22] Jenny Phillips, Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population (New York: AMS Press, 1989), p. 119.

[23] Phillips, p. 120.

[24]Anny Bakalian, Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993). Both Bakalian and Phillips describe the split as “pro- and anti-ARF (Tashnag).” Bakalian, p. 94 and Phillips, p. 119.

[25] Phillips, p. 119 and Bakalian, pp. 94-95. Bakalian argues that there was also a silent majority of neutrals, or chezok, that, although not playing into the partisan politics, still fell under the anti-Tashnag [ARF] banner, p. 95.

[26] Armenians, while all Christian, do not all fall within the same Church. The Armenian Apostolic Church was formed in 301CE, with the conversion en mass of the Armenian kingdom to Christianity. As part of the Orthodox branch of Christianity, it is autocephalic and forms one of the independent heads of Orthodox Christianity. During the 19th century, Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries to the Near East converted Armenian communities to their denominations. There are no agreed upon percentages of each denomination, but Bakalian estimates the breakdown in the US at 64.2% Apostolic, 9.7% Protestant, and 3.8% Roman Catholic, with 22.3% either practicing “other” denominations or no religion. These estimates are taken from a large-n survey of Armenians in the New York/New Jersey area. Bakalian, pp. 64-65.

[27] Another version of why the Armenian Apostolics formed their own church is as follows: “One Sunday in 1888, the [Protestant] minister Asadour Antreasian spoke disrespectfully about the Armenian Church, whereupon the faithful of the Armenian Apostolic Church got up and walked out in protest.” Archbishop Mesroh Ashjian, The Armenian Church in America (New York: Armenian Prelacy, 1985) p. 16.

[28] Phillips, pp. 128-130.

[29] Phillips, pp. 143-154 and Bakalian, p. 97.

[30] Phillips, p. 131.

[31]There were a series of pogroms and massacres against the Armenians prior to the Genocide. The first massacre was ordered by the Ottoman authorities but carried out by Kurds in Sassun and Urfa from 1894-1896. This was followed by the massacre of more than 6,000 Armenians in Constantinople in 1896. In addition, there were pogroms in Cilicia in 1909, following the “Yong Turk” coup in 1908. Each of these massacres produced waves of immigrants seeking asylum. The Genocide is marked as beginning on April 24th, 1915, when “Armenian political, religious, educational, and intellectual leaders in Constantinople were arrested, deported to Anatolia, and put to death.” See Richard G. Hovannisian, “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide,” in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, edited by George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp. 111-140. See also Nassibian, Chapter 1, “Britain and the Armenian Question on the Eve of the First World War.” For a summary of Armenian charities in the US, see Robert Mirak, Armenians In America, 1890 to World War 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) p. 173-174.

^31Holdwater. Isn't it heartbreaking that such an intelligent author as Heather Gregg, who looked into the sneakiness of the Armenians firsthand, would rely exclusively on Armenian propaganda for this part of her story... and present massacre details as "fact"? ("Massacre of more than 6,000 Armenians in Constantinople in 1896"... for God's sake! Why can't responsible authors put their possible anti-Turkish prejudices aside and dare to scratch beneath the surface, when it comes to Armenian claims?)

[32] Today the AGBU is reported as having a $300 million endowment, see Tololyan, “Elites and Institutions, p. 127.

[33] Mirak, pp. 175-176. See also the AGBU website, www.agbu.org.

[34] Phillips states; “The AGBU is a charitable and educational institution. Its loyalties have always lain with Soviet Armenia and the Church at Etchmiadzin. Although AGBU’ers insist that Tashnaks [ARF members] join their organization, I have yet to find one,” pp. 142-143.

[35] Although in an interview with this author an ARF activist insisted that neither the Armenian Red Cross nor the ARS is political (Interview 7/20/01).

[36] The AYF Legacy: Portrait of a Movement in Historical Review, 1933-1993 (Watertown: Armenian Youth Federation, 1994).

^36Holdwater. If the racist AYF was set up shortly after the assassination of Archbishop Tourian, perhaps that was in celebration of the fact that the ARF served as the assassins.

[37] See the Armenian Assembly’s website, www.aainc.org, and AGBU’s website, www.agbu.org.

[38] There were numerous drives within churches throughout the US and Britain aimed at raising money for Armenian refugees and orphans. A few examples include the “International Golden Rule Sunday,” sponsored by Near Eastern Relief and held annually on December 7, beginning in 1923. The aim was to raise funds for Assyrian, Armenian, Greek, Syrian and Jewish orphans in the Near East. A similar effort, “Save the Starving in Bible Lands” was organized by the Sunday School War Council of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. Another example was the Churches of America and Near East Relief Ecumenical Cooperation, consisting of more than 20 denominations in the US and aimed at raising aid and awareness of refugees in the Near East, and drives within Sunday schools of several denominations. See “Armenian Pamphlets” Box, Widner Library, Harvard University, OTT 3453 02. For a description of British organizations that aided the Armenians, see Nassibian, chapters 4-6.

[39] James L. Barton, The Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930): An Interpretation, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), Chapter 1 “How and Why it Began.”

[40] Nassibian, pp. 40-50, 58-61 and Mirak, pp. 68-70.

[41] Mirak, p. 44.

[42] Mirak, pp. 66-68.

[43] Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971) pp. 37-38.

[44] Trask, pp. 49-51.

[45] Trask, pp. 54-60.

[46] Phillips, p. 104.

[47] ibid.

[48] Bakalian, p. 11.

[49] The quota system was liberalized in 1965. See Bakalian, p. 11.

[50] Khachig Tololyan, “Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist,” in The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10 no. 4 (Dec. 1987), pp. 217-233.

[51] Tololyan, “Terrorist,” pp. 226-229.

[52] “Armenian Terrorism: That Beirut Virus,” The Economist, August 14, 1982, p. 46, and “The dream and the terror,” The Economist, July 23, 1983, p. 51, respectively.

[53] Bakalian, pp. 153-154. See also “UnArmenian Activities,” The Economist, February 6, 1982, p. 20.

^53Holdwater. The above reference sounds to be the rare exception of an Armenian decrying the terrorism of 1973-87. In reality, if Armenians were ashamed of the murderous actions of terrorist groups, they mainly kept it to themselves. The ones who spoke publicly naturally condemned terrorism, but played both sides of the fence, revealing their not-so-secret support. (As, for example, with the statement of Kevork Donabedian.) Armenians generally make heroes of their terrorists, and have supported the few who got caught from this period with generously financed "defense funds" (in the mold of the "Soghoman Tehlirian Defense Fund," supporting the murderer of Talat Pasha). One reason why terrorism came to an end was that "Armenian" was becoming synonymous with "terrorist," and that was counter-productive to the sympathy-seeking "Hai Tahd." (Armenian Cause.)

[54] Interview with Dr. Khachig Tololyan and Khatchik Der Ghoukassian, 7/20/01.

[55] Garo Adanalian, “Pursing the Armenian Cause in the 21st Century: An Interview with Sharistan Ardhaldjian [of ANCA],” The Armenian Weekly Online, (May 2001), http:/free.freespeech.org/armnenian/weekly/may (downloaded 7/22/01).

[56] “About the Armenian Assembly,” Armenian Assembly of America website, http:/www.aainc.org/overview (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[57] Another article on Armenian lobby groups is: Rachel Anderson Paul, “Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring, 2000), pp. 24-47.

[58] The term “organizational essence” is taken from Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Chapter 3, “Organizational Interests” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1974).

[59] Adanalian, p. 1.

[60] Hovnanian remains the chairperson of the board of trustees to this day. Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, “Message from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees,” pp. 2, 25. The Armenian Assembly of America website, www.aaainc.org/overview (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[61] A list of the most generous benefactors to the endowment can be found in the Armenian Assembly of America: Membership Spotlight 2000, p. 17, www.aaa.inc.org (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[62] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, p. 26. “Investments” is not further detailed.

[63] Phillips, p. 111.

[64] Adanalian, p. 1 and Hratch Dasnabedian, “The Evolution of the National and Political Objectives of the ARF,” p. 3, www.arf.am (downloaded on 7/19/01).

[65] Dasnabedian, pp. 2-3.

[66] Adanalian, p. 1.

[67] “About the Armenian National Committee of America,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 3/11/01).

[68] Armenian Assembly of American Annual Report 2000, p. 3.

[69] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 2.

[70] ibid.

[71] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999.

[72] Adanalian, p. 2.

[73] “Chapter Contacts,” pp. 3-4, The ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded 7/2201).

[74] Alex Sadar, “A Year of Victories and Lessons for Hai Tahd,” in The Armenian Weekly Online (March, 2001) http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded 7/22/01).

[75] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000.

[76] This project alone boasts 6,000 donors, Armenian Assembly Annual Report 2000, pp. 22-23.

[77] Armenian Assembly of American Annual Report 2000, p. 3.

[78] “ANCA profile,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded 3/11/01).

[79] Adanalian, p. 2.

[80] “ANCA Offices and Chapters,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded on 3/11/01).

[81] Bakalian, p. 140.

[82] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 7.

[83] Adanalian, p. 1.

[84] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 3.

[85] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 20.

[86] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 21.

[87] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 24.

[88] ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded 3/11/01).

[89] Adanalian, p. 3.

[90] “About Azbarez Armenian Daily Newspaper,” p. 1, Azbarez website, www.asbarez.com, (downloaded on 7/18/01).

[91] “President of Armenia Bans Leading Opposition Party,” ARF website, www.arf.am/English/History, (downloaded on 7/18/01) p. 1.

[92] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 10. See also Mary C. Cook, “An Interview with ARAMAC’s Grassroots Director Nancy Yerian Hiteshue,” pp. 1-3, Via Dolorosa Magazine, www.via-dolorosa.net, (downloaded on 8/9/01).

[93] www.aaainc.org/links.htm (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[94] ibid. One other cross-link is the listing of the Zoryan Institute on the ANI’s website, www.armenian-genocide.org/links.htm (downloaded on 8/8/01).

[95] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 8.

[96] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, pp. 8-9.

[97] “About Us,” The Zoryan Institute website, pg. 1, www.zoryan.org, (downloaded on 7/24/01).

[98] ibid.

[99] “About Us: Services,” p. 3, Zoryan Institute website, www.zoryan.org, (downloaded on 7/24/01).

[100] Quote taken from Bakalian, p. 143.

[101] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, p. 24. See also ANI’s website, www.armenian-genocide.org.

[102] ibid.

^{102Holdwater. Set Momjian, the Armenian-American member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, established by President Jimmy Carter to oversee the erection of a National Holocaust Memorial Museum in the nation's capital (with the proviso that it be related strictly  to WWII events; Exec. Order 12169 of Oct. 26, 1979), pledged one million dollars to the memorial museum in exchange for including Armenian grievances against the Turks.Momjian was described as a "human rights activist who was a U.S. representative to the U.N. General Assembly in 1978-79 and White House representative to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1979. [ATA-USA, Vol. 1: 5-6, 1980.] It was reported elsewhere that Momjian (spelled "Seth Moomjian" here) was hesitant on making good on his pledge, following in the footsteps of Armenia, which still owes the USA payment on a $50 million loan made in 1919, with 5% interest.}

[103] The AYF Legacy, p. 5.

^{103Holdwater.} The name of the Dashnak youth group was later changed to Armenian Youth Federation, or the AYF, from Tzeghagrons, the singular for which literally means "to make a religion of one’s race." Patterned after the Nazi Youth, it was also called Racial Patriots. "The Racial Religious believes in his racial blood as a deity. Race above everything and before everything. Race comes first. Everything is for the race." See article of Arthur Derounian.

[104] The AYF Legacy, Chapter 1 “The AYF at 60: A pictorial history of the AYF,” pp. 3-23.

[105] Adanalian, p. 2.

[106] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 19.

[107] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, pp. 9, 19.

[108] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 6.

[109] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 7.

[110] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, pp. 7-8.

[111] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 8.

[112] Bakalian, p. 162.

[113] Lisa Boghosian Papas, “People and Programs: The New Generation Taking Cues from their Ancestors, Young Armenians are Shaking the Scene,” pp. 1-8, AGBU Website, www.agbu.org, (downloaded on 7/24/01).

[114] Bakalian, p. 141.

[115] “Eastern Europe’s Diasporas: The Homecoming,” The Economist, December 26, 1992, pp. 73-80.

[116] “Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues,” p. 1, The Armenian Assembly of America website, www.aaainc.org, (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[117] ibid and the Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 5.

[118] See appendix A.

[119] The AADLC website, www.aadlc.org, (downloaded on 7/22/01). The Armenian Republicans do not provide links to either lobby group. http://members.aol.com/aarc2000/info.html, (downloaded on 8/8/01).

[120] Correspondence with ANCA ER office, (5/18/01).

[121] Sadar, p. 1, and The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, pp.2-3.

[122] David B. Boyaijian, “Genocide Acknowledgement: Why Turkey and the State Department Fear It,” The Armenian Weekly Online, March 2001, pp. 1-2, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[123] “Position Papers: Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded on 3/11/01).

[124] “Bush Breaks Pledge to Recognize Armenian Genocide,” The Armenian Weekly Online, May 2001, p. 2, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[125] “ANCA Issues Statement on Genocide Resolution,” The Armenian Weekly Online, February 2001, p. 5, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[126] “Several US States Recognize the Armenian Genocide,” The Armenian Weekly Online, April 2001, p. 1, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[127] Sadar, p. 2.

[128] Yair Auron, “Foreign Minister’s Comments are Israeli Shift to Active Denial,” The Armenian Weekly Online, May 2001, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[129] The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 2.

[130] The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 24.

[131] ibid.

[132] ibid.

[133] The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 14.

[134] “Bang goes another republic,” The Economist, February 27, 1988, p. 39 and Bakalian, p. 100.

[135] The Armenian name for Karabakh is Artsakh.

[136] “As the sparks fly upward from Nagorno-Karabakh,” The Economist, March 5, 1988, p. 49. The Economist states that the wide range in estimates of those killed is due to discrepancies between official Soviet numbers and eyewitness accounts. See also The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan: Volume 1, Eyewitness Accounts, compiled and edited by Samvel Shahmuratian, translated by Steven Jones (New Rochelle and Cambridge: Aristide D. Caratzas and Zoryan Institute, 1990).

[137] “Enter the army,” The Economist, January 20, 1990, p. 47.

[138] Rieff, p. 118. Including Nagorno Karabakh, the Armenians hold 20% of Azerbaijan.

^{138Holdwater.} The author has her kid gloves on, attempting to present this as a "war" between equals. The Russians poured a billion dollars worth of arms and token manpower, and the Armenians benefited from the millions of dollars received from the USA; they pulled a sneak, cowardly, "Pearl Harbor" style attack in 1992. The Armenians committed ethnic cleansing and the worst atrocities in order to frighten what some report to be a million Azeris away from their homes, some still living in the squalor of refugee camps. The Armenians even killed Azeris who were partly Armenian, in an effort to "purify" the region, in the traditional Aryan-Armenian mold. The racist ideology may be seen here; see also media reports from the period. The West set up a phony committee in Minsk (chaired by pro-Armenian Russia, France and the USA) and determined Azerbaijan to be the aggressor.

[139] “Chronology of Recent Events in Nagorno-Karabagh (1988-1996), p. 5, www.aaainc.org, (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[140] “Pursuing the Armenian Cause,” The Armenian Weekly Online, p. 5, May 2001, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[141] ibid.

[142] Especially while the ARF was banned in Armenia from 1994 to 1998, see Rieff, p. 123. See also “Eastern Europe’s Diasporas: The Homecoming,” The Economist, pp. 73-80, December 26, 1992, pp. 77-79.

[143]Armenian-American Monte Melkanian fought for the liberation of Nagorno Karabakh and was eventually killed in the fighting. He is considered a modern-day hero in Karabakh and beyond, see Rieff, p. 123.

[144] “Nagorno-Karabakh: What we have we (mostly) hold,” The Economist, September 21, 1996, p. 53 and Antranig Kasbarian, “Planting Roots in Nagorno Karabakh,” pp. 1-8, The Armenian Weekly Online, p. 5, June/ July 2001, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 8/8/01).

[145] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 8.

[146] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 4.

[147] PL 102-511, “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992,” taken from Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com.

[148] “Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,” Armenian Assembly of America Website, www.aaainc.org, (downloaded on 8/7/01).

[149] Smith, p. 14 and “Armenian…and presidents go,” The Economist, February 7, 1998, p. 54.

^{149Holdwater.} "Turkish Caucus"? What Turkish Caucus? In order to get Congressional support, one needs determination, and wads and wads of cold cash... the reason why one-third of the Congress forms the "Armenian Caucus." Turks are clueless and apathetic when it comes to this sort of organization. The most the Turkish government is able to muster is the expensive hiring of ex-politicians to lobby for the Turks, whenever the umpteenth "genocide resolution" rears its head.

[150] Also called the Brownback Amendment. See “HR 2867: The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997, 105th Congress,” and “S.579, The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, 106th Congress,” Congressional Universe, Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com. Also available as “Congressional Record, Wednesday, June 30, 1999,” pp. 1-5, posted on the Assembly’s website, www.aainc.org (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[151] The vote was 53 in favor of the McConnell Amendment, which keeps Section 907 in place, and 45 opposed, “Congressional Record,” p. 32.

[152] “S. 1521 Bill Tracking Record,” Congressional Universe, http://web/lexis-nexis.com.

[153] “Lowey, Knollenberg, and Pallone, Call upon Congress to Revisit Presidential Section 907 Waiver Authority in FY 2003 Foreign Aid Bill,” Armenian National Committee of America website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 7/9/02).

[154] “President Bush Waives Section 907,” Armenian National Committee of America website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 7/9/02).

[155] “ANCA testifies before Congressional Foreign Aid Committee,” The Armenian Weekly Online, p. 2, April 2001, http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded on 7/22/01).

[156] The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 5.

[157] “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 447: HR 4569,”September 17, 1998, Roll Calls for the House 105th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov. See appendix A.

[158] See appendix B.

[159] Bakalian, p. 161.

[160] “Armenia lives,” The Economist, May 23, 1992, p. 54.

[161] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 4.

[162] “Lowey, Knollenberg, and Pallone, Call upon Congress to Revisit Presidential Section 907 Waiver Authority in FY 2003 Foreign Aid Bill,” Armenian National Committee of America website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 7/9/02).

[163] “ANCA Testifies before Congressional Foreign Aid Committee,” p. 1.

[164] “Lowey, Knollenberg, and Pallone, Call upon Congress to Revisit Presidential Section 907 Waiver Authority in FY 2003 Foreign Aid Bill,” Armenian National Committee of America website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 7/9/02).

[165] Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000, p. 4.

[166] AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 3.

[167] Armenian Assembly Annual Report 2000, p. 20.

[168] Armenian Assembly Annual Report 2000, p. 20.

[169] “Position Papers: Cutting US Aid to Turkey,” ANCA Website, www.anca.org, (downloaded on 3/11/01).

[170] ibid.

[171] “Reps ask congress to withhold US taxpayer funding for Caspian pipeline projects unless they include Armenia,” pp. 1-2, ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded 8/8/01). Alexander Rahr presents a counter argument, claiming that the new US strategy is to cooperate with Russia and eventually Iran for oil from the Caspian and that the Bush administration has dropped the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline as too costly, “Caspian Oil,” Transatlantic Internationale Politik, (2/20/01) pp. 80-84.

[172] “Caspian pipeline project,” ANCA website, p. 2.