From the Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 4. (Oct., 1973), pp. 121-164.


The origins of the 'Nationalist' group of officers in Turkey 1908-18

Gwynne Dyer

The nationalist movement in Anatolia in the years 1919-23 was created, sustained, and led by young staff officers of the Ottoman Army belonging to the same generation and group as that which had carried out the original 1908 Revolution from Salonika against the despotic and traditionalist regime of Abdülhamid. Under the brilliant leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha it succeeded in assuming the mantle and some of the genuine characteristics of a popular movement, but it owed its success to the disciplined organization of the Army. No doubt there would in any case have been popular disturbances and even isolated instances of mutiny within the Army in the face of Entente occupation of Turkish territory and the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919, and again against the Entente-imposed Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 which for practical purposes put an end to Turkish independence; some incidents of this sort occurred spontaneously, but such outbreaks had no hope of success. The coordinated and unanimous withdrawal of obedience from the collaborationist Istanbul government by all Turkish Army units in eastern and central Anatolia in the summer of 1919, and the smooth transfer of that obedience to Mustafa Kemal Pasha with an unbroken chain of command; the assumption of control over the civil administration in Anatolia by the Army wherever it did not get cooperation from the Istanbul appointees; the cautious husbanding of material and diplomatic resources and the gradual remobilization of an army capable of expelling the invaders; the suppression of internal revolts and the bringing under regular Army discipline and command of the erratic and ineffective guerrilla forces which had sprung up to oppose the Greeks in western Anatolia—these were the foundations of Turkish victory in the War of Independence.

These accomplishments were the work—with the willing cooperation of the bulk of the Army, to be sure—of a handful of senior Turkish officers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was the driving force and the overall head of the enterprise, with Rauf Bey (a naval officer) as his chief political assistant. Kazim Karabekir Pasha commanded the Eastern Front against the Armenians until its liquidation at the end of 1920, and by his influence in the area guaranteed the loyalty of eastern Anatolia to the Nationalists throughout the war. Ali Fuad Pasha was commander of the crucial Western Front against the Greeks and then the first Nationalist ambassador to Moscow. Ismet Bey was the Chief of the General Staff at Ankara and then Ali Fuad's successor on the Western Front. Refet Bey commanded the Southern Front against the French in Cilicia, and was Kemal's chief agent in suppressing internal revolts and in reducing the anarchic guerrilla bands to submission.

Kemal was Chief of Staff of the 11th Reserve Division commanded by Huseyin Husnu Pasha in Salonika when the counter-revolution broke out in Istanbul. The senior commanders in Salonika hesitated to commit the Army officially to the suppression of the revolt in the first few days, when the news arriving from Istanbul was confused and contradictory, and so Kemal's proposal to send to the capital an ad hoc force made up of volunteers from both the regular Army and the reserve was instantly accepted. It had the right popular flavour, and kept the skirts of more senior officers clear. The force was named the Hareket Ordusu (Action Army) as he suggested, and he and Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha were made its chief of staff and commander respectively. The Hareket Ordusu set out for Istanbul on 16 April, and Kemal remained effectively its moving spirit until it arrived outside the walls of Istanbul, to be joined there as he had proposed by another contingent of volunteers from Edirne.

By that time, however, it had become clear that the revolt was an outbreak confined to the capital. The CUP had regathered its forces and its leading Army members like Enver, Ali Fethi and Hafiz Hakki came racing back from the capitals of Europe, where they had been sent as attach& after the 1908 Revolution, to take up the key positions in the Hareket Ordusu. The Army's senior officers had recovered their nerve also, and on 22 April the Third Army (Salonika) commander Mahmud Shevket Pasha assumed command of the force outside Istanbul. Kemal was relegated to the background in the final suppression of the revolt amidst scattered street fighting in the next few days.[1]

After the Army had entered the city and put down the revolt, Icema1 for the first time met Hüssein Rauf Bey, a young naval officer prominent in the CUP who was attached to the Army for liaison duties. The two officers agreed that the counter-revolution was the direct consequence of the evil effects of soldiers participating in politics, a conclusion confirmed by the special court of inquiry into the causes of the uprising, of which Rauf was a member. Kemal and Rauf found other young officers in Istanbul at this time in whom the events of the past year had created strong opinions about the necessity of separating politics from the Army. There was Kazim Karabekir, Kemal's classmate at the Staff College and a friend of Rauf's since before the Revolution. He had participated in the founding of the CUP centres in Monastir and Edirne and was now Chief of St& of the Hareket Ordusu's Edirne contingent. There was Refet Bey, a young gendarmerie officer at Kemal's headquarters who had worked with Fethi and Keinal before the Revolution; and Ismet Bey, a youthful staff officer whom Fethi and Refet recruited to the CUP and who had later cooperated with Kizim in founding the Society's organization in Edirne; there was Rauf's friend since childhood, Selgnattin Adil Bey.

Together with Dr Nazim, a former exile and a major power behind the scenes in the CUP, Tevfik Rüshtü [Aras], and some others, Kemal, Kazim, Ali Fuad, [2] Ismet, Refet and Selahattin Adil now briefly became virtually an opposition faction within the CUP. They argued that it must give up its old ways of intrigue and assassination now that it had the responsibility of power, and that, though the Army's support continued to be vital to the Revolution, a clear line must be drawn between those active in politics and those on active service in the Army. Together the young staff officers signed a note condemning the intrusion of politics into the Army, and Ismet Bey presented it to the army commander Mahhud Shevket Pasha. He accepted it, and even instructed Ismet to write an order to the forces under his command laying down this principle. Furthermore he communicated the contents of the note to the other Ottoman Army commanders for their consideration, but it had no discernible effect in either his own army or the others.

Some four months later, at the annual congress of the CUP in Salonika in September 1909, Kemal forcefully presented his view that the Army and the Society must be separated for the good of both. He submitted a resolution proposing that army officers must decide whether to remain in the CUP and resign from the Army, or stay in the Army and resign from the Society. Kemal was fortunate in being one of the men selected to chair the sittings, and he had the wholehearted support of Tevfik Rüshtü, who was elected general secretary of the congress. He succeeded in gaining the conditional support of a majority of those present for his view, and it was decided to send a commission to the Second Army at Edirne (less well represented at the congress than the Third (Salonika) Army) to sound out opinion among the officers there. Refet Bey was chosen to head this commission; Ismet and Kazim marshalled the support of their fellow officers in Edirne behind Kemal, and the commission returned in a few days to report that the Second Army supported Kemal's thesis. His motion was passed by a large majority.

Although many officers did then make the choice between Army and Society, the most influential young officers like Enver and Cemal did not. Moreover the majority of the Society's leaders, now aware that the Revolution did not necessarily have the support of the masses, were unwilling to break their connexion with the Army. The resolution was never put into effect, and the CUP lost its one real chance to transform itself from a revolutionary cabal into a genuine political party. Indeed, Kemal was lucky to escape the attempts of the assassins who were now turned loose on him because of his dangerous views. Neither his ambitions and convictions, nor his contempt for the strutting figure of Enver, diminished, but he and his friends now saw their safest course of action as immersion in their military duties. Rauf Bey later noted: 'Having seen [the consequences of soldiers becoming involved in politics], we firmly resolved that from that day forward .. . our most important and sacred duty to the fatherland and people would be to use our influence and authority to prevent soldiers from mixing in politics. This course of action of ours—just as had been the case with Mustafa Kemal Bey previously—was ill-received. Right up to... the end of the CUP'S reign [in 1918] we remained under suspicion, and so encountered difficulties in carrying out our duties and were sometimes condemned to idleness.'[3] Referring decades later, when his own power was secure, to this same parting of the ways between the 'Nationalists' and the officers who then stayed in the CUP, Kemal Atatürk explained why it happened and why it had brought disaster in its wake. 'Those at the head of the CUP revolution who later entered the government were our close friends. In the first phase we were all together. After the Revolution we came out against them, arguing that the Army should not mix with politics-more precisely that we should not mix in politics as army officers. We quarrelled with them over this idea Ad parted company, unable to agree. We withdrew from politics and carried out our duties in the Army. Thenceforward be had no direct connexion with the government of the country. We passed through many stages and &any experiences, we made careers for ourselves and [gradually acquired our present abilities]. Whereas our friends who had made the Revolution with us and were on the same level as ourselves passed to the head of the country at that time. . .We are not the raw men we were then; we are different now. But they tried to govern the country and ward off all the dangers which threatened it . . . with no more experience than we ourselves had then. How could they have been expected to succeed?’ [4] LIKE ENVER, BOTH KEMAL AND FETHI SERVED in Libya in 1911-12 in the guerrilla war which the Ottomans launched there after the Italian seizure (Rauf was in charge of running guns and supplies into Libya). Relations between Kemal and Enver became severely strained, but an open break was narrowly avoided. While they were absent overseas, the CUP engineered an election to pack the Chamber of Deputies with its own supporters and so quell the rising opposition in the country to its policies. Following this 'Big Stick' election, the CUP was forced out of power in the summer of 1912 by the revolt of a group of 'Saviour Officers' in Istanbul and Macedonia. Besides the resignation of the Government, these officers successfully demanded what Kemal had failed to achieve in 1909, the imposition of an oath upon army officers not to meddle in politics. But later in the year the Balkan states, for once united, attacked Turkey and in scarcely a month seized the entire remaining territory of the Empire in the Balkans. When the officers hastily recalled from Libya reached Istanbul in November and December 1912, they found the Bulgarian Army only thirty miles west of the city facing the Chatalja lines, and the new Government seemingly about to agree to a peace which would cede not only Macedonia but all of Thrace to the enemy, including the old Ottoman capital of Edirne which was still withstanding a Bulgarian siege. A CUP coup organized by Talat, the most influential figure in the inner circle of the Society, overthrew the Government on 23 January 1913 and installed a new cabinet strongly influenced by the CUP. In organizing the coup Talat had to rely primarily upon the ambitious young army officer members of the CUP whom both their own superiors and the civilian leadership of the CUP had hitherto striven to keep in the background and away from the levers of power. Enver led the assault on the Cabinet Room in which the War Minister Nazim Pasha was killed, and became the hero of the coup just as he had earlier been the hero of the Revolution. Committed to continuing the war, the new Government felt the need for an immediate military success to consolidate its shaky political position. The Bulgarians anticipated the Turks by announcing that the armistice in effect since 3 December would expire on 3 February. The Government under CUP pressure overrode the commander-in-chief Ahmed Izzet Pasha [Furgach] and insisted on an offensive being launched at once. There ensued a clash between Enver on the one hand and Kemal and Fethi on the other which was to be the foundation of a close and long-lasting political cooperation between the latter two.

Mustafa Kemal (third from left, center) and Ahmed Izzet Pasha along with other officers pose in Aleppo, Feb. 2, 1917

 

Rauf Orbay (1936 oil painting, J.C. Mertan) commanded the Hamidiye ("Ghost Ship") during the Balkan War, breaking through a Greek blockade of the Dardanelles, and by hitting the Bulgarians and Montenegrins

At this time Fethi and Kemal were respectively Chief of Staff and Operations Officer of the force under General Fahri Pasha which was holding the neck of the Gallipoli peninsula at Bolayir against the Bulgars. (They were in close contact with Rauf Bey at the naval base opposite at Nara harbour, until Rauf took his cruiser Hamidiye on its famous raiding cruise.) Fethi was a much more important figure in the inner councils of the CUP than any of the Nationalist officers and had never given strong support to the idea that soldiers must stay out of politics—almost certainly he had no part in the note submitted by the Nationalists in 1909, and he had been elected the deputy from Monastir in the 1912 elections despite the fact that he was on active service in the Army. Remal too, due to his great ambition and conviction of his own worth, and the powerful sense of rivalry with Enver which had been one of his main motives for action in 1908-09, was able to abstain from politics only for short periods despite his theoretical beliefs—his patience was easily exhausted. Fethi had not fully accepted Kemal's criticisms and warnings about Enver in 1908, but by 1912 Enver's rapid march towards power had awakened the same fears in him as well. Both Fethi and Kemal had advised against the coup at least until an attempt had been made to force the Government out by constitutional means; indeed Fethi had managed to get this view accepted at the first of the Istanbul meetings in which the CUP considered the coup, only to have the decision reversed in a second meeting after he had returned to Gallipoli and Enver had reached Istanbul. On the morrow of the coup their worst fears seemed about to be realized: Enver now looked unstoppable.

They had scant resources with which to counter him. Though they knew quite well that the Army was in no shape to undertake an offensive, they knew also that political considerations demanded one. So, quite contrary to military practice, on 4 February 1913, they submitted a joint report to the War Minister and the Deputy C-in-C, bypassing their corps commander. In the report they condemned the coup, but stated that an offensive had to be launched immediately from both the Chatalja lines and the Gallipoli peninsula, to relieve Edirne before it fell and the Bulgarian army encircling it was freed to join the main Bulgarian army before Istanbul. If the offensive succeeded, they would at least share the credit with Enver for recommending it. If it failed, the responsibility would rest with those in the High Command who had done the planning.

As it turned out they were not to escape some of the blame for failure, for Enver chose to make his offensive wholly at Gallipoli. He secured the consent of the reluctant C-in-C for an entire army corps to be landed from the sea at Sharkoy above the base of the Gallipoli peninsula at the same time that Fahri's force at Bolayir launched an all-out attack, the object being to catch the Bulgars between two fires. Enver himself was Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps which was to carry out the landing, with responsibility for coordinating the actions of the two forces. Orders for the landing were given on 4 February, to be carried out four days later. Though there were no Bulgars at Sharkoy on 8 February, the landing attempt was an appalling shambles, and after thirty-six hours was abandoned. Meanwhile the force at Bolayir, which was not informed of this, made its frontal attack unsupported and was smashed with the loss of nearly half its men.

Enver Pasha

A bitter dispute broke out between Fethi and Kemal on the one hand, and Enver on the other, over the responsibility for this debacle, conducted both openly and by means of unsigned pamphlets. Fethi and Kemal's campaign against Enver rapidly made progress and came near to splitting the officer corps into pro- and anti-Enver factions; the new Prime Minister Mahrnud Shevket Pasha went to Gallipoli on 20 February in an unsuccessful effort to settle the dispute. Shevket saw more justice in the Fethi-Kemal side of the argument, but his attempt to defuse the dispute by bringing the 10th Army Corps, of which Enver was Chief of Staff and de facto commander, back to Istanbul quickly backfired. When the threat of an opposition counter-coup led by Prince Sabahattin frightened Shevket in early March, the forces he had to depend on for the preparation of possible military countermeasures in the capital were commanded by Enver and by Cemal Pasha, the military governor of the city and another army officer with a personal following and an urge for political power. Though the Fethi-Kemal campaign against Enver continued even past the end of hostilities, the latter's position, already greatly strengthened by his command of the force safeguarding the Government in Istanbul, was made virtually unshakable by his ostensibly heroic role in the recovery of Edirne at the end of the Second Balkan War on 23 July 1913. Furthermore, the assassination of Mahmud Shevket on 11 June had given the CUP the excuse to abolish in effect all political opposition. More than ever before, reckless young army officers controlled the CUP and the Empire, with Enver, the most powerful, the most reckless of all.

In any case, the destructive influence of politics on the Army was no longer a live issue after 1914, for once he came to the War Ministry Enver pulled the ladder up behind him. In a single industrious year he not only reorganized the structure of the Army on the contemporary European pattern and cleared out all the deadwood by a mass retirement of virtually all officers who had reached field rank before the Revolution; he eradicated politics from the Army root and branch. Even his own 'warriors' were not spared; they were found jobs in the new Special Organization or in various CUP posts, but they had to leave the Army.[8] But although Enver removed politics from the Army he did not remove the Army, under his direction, from politics; he was merely ensuring that no rival voice could speak for it. The Army constituted the power base which let him play the dominating role in the Empire's entry into and policies during the first world war.

One grievance against Enver and generally against the CUP was thus quickly replaced by another. It required no special insight to see that Enver's impulsiveness in the direction of Ottoman strategy, his subservience to German strategic needs in the direction of Ottoman forces, the arbitrary violence which the CUP Government sporadically employed against political opponents and minority groups, and the flagrant and large-scale corruption of many of the lesser members of the government, were leading the Empire to ruin. Even though the Nationalist officers had no such thing as an alternative programme, the blindingly obvious contrast between Enver's military policies and the real requirements of the Empire's situation, and the bitter resentment almost all of them felt at the dominating positions given to German officers in the Ottoman Army, provided them throughout the war with a permanent motive to disapprove of Enver's regime and to discuss their views with others of like mind.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

THE GROUP WHO HAD ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES with Kemal in 1909 were in close contact with each other during the war owing to the circumstance of postings. Just as important, from the middle of the war on most of them came by chance into contact with the man who was to be Turkey's Prime Minister at the time of the armistice and won his confidence. This man was General Ahmed Izzet Pasha, a successful soldier of the old school who had reluctantly let himself be made the Minister of War after the assassination of Nazim Pasha in January 1913, only to be pushed out of office again the next year by Enver. Some of Kemal's associates he already knew well—Ismet and Rauf had accompanied him to the Yemen in 1910 to suppress the revolt there, the former at Izzet's specific request—and most of the others including Kemal himself he served with during 1916-18. A man without a party, when he was called upon to form a successor government to the CUP and make peace in October 1918, it was to the members of this group of officers that he turned for support, thus giving them a priceless opportunity.

From his semi-exile in Sofia Kemal had become partially reconciled to Enver upon seeing the excellent work in Army reform which he set in progress as Minister of War in 1914, and even made known to the CUP leadership through a well-connected friend his willingness to serve under Enver as Chief of the General Staff—an idea which Enver rejected out of hand. However, on the outbreak of war Kemal realized that the Government intended to join Germany, and urgently sought through both official and private channels to persuade the Government to remain neutral and await the development of events, fearing all too accurately that it would be a long war and that the Germans were by no means certain of victory.[9] When war came anyway, he sought to return to Turkey and take his part in it, but for some months Enver insisted that he remain in Sofia. Finally on 20 January 1915 Enver appointed Kenal to command a reserve division forming near Gallipoli.[10] In the next ten months his brilliant work in the Peninsula, where he twice saved the Turks from irremediable defeat, was the making of his reputation within the Army. Enver used the military censorship to ensure that Kemal's reputation did not grow correspondingly in civilian circles (though in the Anafarta battles Kemal commanded a force of eleven divisions, the largest under a single Turkish commander in the entire war), and contrived to delay his promotion to General and Pasha for more than a year. After Gallipoli however there was no longer any possibility of Kemal's being left to languish in exile or in some harmless administrative post, whatever doubts Enver might have about his trustworthiness.[11]

In the first years of the war Kemal eschewed political intrigue entirely. His attitude at the beginning is summed up in his response to a questioner who asked him why Turkey had entered the war: 'Never mind that now; it's done. Now we must do our duty.'[12] As time went on and Turkey's military situation became more grave, he could not refrain from uttering protests and warnings, but now he had the position and authority—Colonel and Corps Commander in 1915, General, Pasha, and Army Commander by 1916—which enabled him to do so openly and receive a hearing. From the end of 1915 to the end of the war he issued a steady stream of messages and memoranda to the High Command, always inveighing against the erratic and irrational conduct of Ottoman strategy and the undue influence of German officers in the Army.[13] Sheer frustration at his inability to get his views accepted was responsible for the fact that three times before mid-1918 he offered his resignation from important commands (twice having it accepted) and three times refused similar appointments. But not until late 1917 did he again engage in any political activity.

Refet Pasha

During this last war year the Nationalist officers were mostly either on the Palestine front or in Istanbul, with Kemal as usual serving as the vital link among them. A few weeks after his departure from Syria Ismet's 3rd Army Corps was transferred to the Palestine front and took its place in the line next to Ali Fuad's 20th Corps, and the two men served side by side through the next year in Palestine as the military situation moved steadily towards collapse, until at the very end of the war they came again under Kemal's command when he was reappointed commander of the 7th Army. Besides Ali Fuad and Ismet, Refet was on the Palestine front as a corps commander; he had been there since the outbreak of the war and had already played a distinguished role in the Suez Canal attacks and in the battles around Gaza in early 1917. Kazim Karabekir remained on the Caucasus front until the end of the war, out of contact with the rest for the most part. The remainder of the Nationalist officers were in Istanbul and in increasingly frequent contact with Ahrnet Izzet Pasha during this year.

After his resignation in October 1917 Kemal was not offered a command again until the last few months of the war, which suited him very well, for he now launched himself into political intrigue aimed at displacing Enver, if possible taking his place himself. Benefiting from the loose rein which Enver as always allowed him, he obtained three months leave and set about politicking. He saw a great deal of his close friend Rauf, now Chief of the Naval Staff, and they discussed the country's difficulties at great length: but Rauf was serious about the military not mixing in politics and refused to have anything to do with Kemal's intrigues while he remained in office—indeed he made a practice of delivering Kemal homilies on the subject. Kemal's main collaborator was Ali Fethi, now back from Sofia and at the head of an opposition movement in favour of a separate peace which was emerging among the parliamentary members of the CUP. For the next sixteen months all Kemal's efforts were focused on obtaining the War Ministry for himself, at first in order to conclude a separate peace, later in the hope of being able to deal more effectively with the victorious Allies.

During their earlier period of close collaboration in 1913 Kemal had unquestionably been subordinate to Fethi, who had then occupied a position of power in the CUP, whereas Kemal had been a relatively junior officer with neither political nor military success to his credit. To many in the CUP and the Army, and to the austere Enver in particular, his constant open criticism of the actions of those in responsible positions had been merely the reprehensible consequence of his great ambition, his arrogance, and his fondness for drink. But now there could be no question, at least among his contemporaries in the Society and the Army, of his genuine abilities, and his status and influence in this circle were at least as great as Fethi's. He was still not very well known outside this circle, as his leading role in the Gallipoli campaign had been deliberately played down by Enver; but shortly after his return to Istanbul he took steps to remedy this. In a series of interviews with Rushen Eshref [Unaydin], a writer for Zia Gokalp's Yeni Mecmua, he described his own part in that campaign; the account Unaydin wrote, appearing fast in a special issue of Yeni Mecmua to commemorate the third anniversary of the naval assaults on the Dardanelles in March 1915, and subsequently as a separate pamphlet, helped to make him known to the wider audience of educated Turks outside the Army.[16]

Meanwhile Fethi and Kemal sought a way to bring Enver down, and in November or early December 1917an opportunity of sorts presented itself. Shortly after Talat Pasha had become Prime Minister in a reconstructed Government in early 1917, a serious division had begun to appear in the Cabinet between the supporters of Enver and Talat on the issues of Army control over civil affairs (the whole country was under martial law) and the desirability of trying for a separate peace. It was in essence a recrudescence of the old split between the civilian and military wings of the CUP, with the addition of a personality clash; by the spring of 1918 this division had become so deep that Talat was to engage in at least one abortive scheme to remove Enver and his followers from the Cabinet,[17] but at this time he was still trying to preserve a common front. Enver's supporters, on the other hand, were already taking precautions against such an eventuality. According to Kemal, Ismail Hakki Pasha, one of Enver's closest associates at the War Ministry, approached him shortly after his arrival in Istanbul and revealed to him in confidence that the Government's will to continue the war was weakening; if it appeared likely that it was going to seek a separate peace it would be necessary to overthrow it and install a military cabinet. Would Kemal accept a position in that cabinet? Ismail Hakki added that he had under his personal control a force of 10,000 men distributed around the capital and various places on the Anatolian coast of the Marmara, its purpose known only to Enver and himself, which was being held in readiness to carry out this coup if necessary.

While such a force did indeed exist,[18] it is difficult to believe that Enver and Ismail Hakki would have tried to enlist Kemal's aid in this way—they knew his attitude to the war and to themselves. The real source of Kemal and Fethi's knowledge may well have been Ali [Chetinkaya], the commander of these secret 'assault battalions', who had known them both in Salonika in 1908 and had served with them in Libya. In either case they seized on the existence of this force as a weapon to use against Enver. Fethi went at once to see Talat and warned him of its existence, first getting his word not to reveal the source of his knowledge. Talat was greatly alarmed at first and consulted immediately with his close friends and members of the Central Committee Mithat Shükrü [Bleda] and Kara Kemal Beys. But on further discussion they found it difficult to believe that Enver would consider such an action, and Talat despite his promise to Fethi decided to demand an explanation from the War Minister. Enver freely admitted the existence of the force, but denied that it was directed against the Cabinet; it was he said merely a precaution against another attempt at a coup such as that Yakub Cemil had tried the previous year. Talat had to give the appearance of accepting this assurance, [19] and did indeed conclude that Fethi's revelation had had the purpose of creating suspicion and distrust of Enver in the Cabinet, which would lead to his exit from it.

Talat's conclusion about Fethi and Kemal's motive was certainly correct. This was entirely clear to Enver, but once again he did not take strong action; he contented himself with giving a strong warning to Rauf to relay to Kemal that this was the last time he would overlook his 'political intrigues'. 'There is no question,' he said, 'that Mustafa Kemal Pasha is a person who can be of the greatest service to the country. And I will continue to employ him in the positions he is entitled to. But I am certainly excused from consenting to a continuation of these political enterprises.'

Vahideddin (a.k.a., Mehmet IV, Vahdettin)

When Kemal and the Crown Prince met again on the train taking them to Germany, he thought he had his answer. He found Vahideddin a different man—still withdrawn and nervous, given to long silences, but able at least to carry on a conversation now that he was in a less formal situation. He knew little of the world beyond Palace circles, and almost everything he knew gave him cause to be fearful for his future, but Kemal's hope grew. He explained the change to himself: 'The Heir Apparent, who the first time we had met in Istanbul had behaved so strangely under the influence uf conditions easily understood by those who know that period, saw no harm in showing his personality as it really was after leaving Istanbul and seeing himself really free, especially after he realized that his hearers were trustworthy men.' Every day for the next three weeks he worked on him carefully, enlisting the aid of Naci and some other trusted members of the entourage, attempting gradually to instruct Vahideddin in their view of the Empire's situation and needs.

It was one of the few times that the man who would soon be Sultan had completely escaped the stifling influence of the Palace; the first time probably in all his 57 years that he had extended conversations on matters of gravity with men important in the world outside the Palace, and been taken seriously by them as a man with a responsibility for making decisions. He expanded visibly under the effect of this. He revealed to Kemal his disgust with Talat and Enver and his conviction that they were doing the country harm, encouraging the General to talk even more freely. Kemal did all in his power to enlighten the Prince on the state of the Empire, the exhaustion of its people, and above all on the impossibility of the war's ending in victory for the Central Powers, a fact he became unshakably convinced of after his interviews with Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and especially after their visit to the Western Front. Vahideddin, though still not very forthcoming, gave every sign that he agreed with Kemal's views, and raised his hopes even higher by asking Naci to become his aide. Naci was not at all pleased with the idea of serving at the Palace, but Kemal persuaded him to accept with the argument that 'There must be someone at his side who will explain the realities to him'.

Finally, on the last day before they were to return to Turkey, when the two of them were left alone in the Crown Prince's Berlin hotel room after a press conference, Vahideddin committed himself. He turned to Kemal and asked: 'What must I do ?'

'We know Ottoman history,' Kemal replied. 'There are some [precedents] that make you afraid and suspicious. You are right to be so. I am going to propose something to you, and if you accept I will link my life to yours. May I ?'

'Speak.'

'You are not yet Sultan, but you have seen how in Germany the Emperor, the Crown Prince and the other Princes all have jobs to do. Why do you stand aside from public affairs ?'

'What am I to do ?'

'As soon as you get back to Istanbul ask for command of an army, and I will be your chief of staff.'

'The command of what army ?'

'The Fifth.' It was the army which defended the Straits and hence commanded Istanbul.

'They will not give me this command.'

'Ask for it anyway.'

Vahideddin replied: 'I will think about it when we get back to Istanbul.'

It was not the reply Kemal had hoped for. Once back in Istanbul and exposed again to the old influences and fears, the hesitant Vahideddin would be much more difficult to move to action, but he had, he reckoned, accomplished at least something. He was now the confidant of the man who would soon be Sultan.

Kemal had no early opportunity to test the strength of his influence over the Crown Prince, as he fell seriously ill in the train on the way back to Turkey. For the next six months, as the Empire moved steadily towards military collapse, he was much of the time unable to rise from his bed, undergoing treatment first in Istanbul and then in Vienna. While he was there in June Enver offered him the command of the 9th Army, then forming in eastern Anatolia in accordance with Enver's ambition to occupy the Caucasus and north-west Iran and to retake Iraq, but Kemal refused it.[24] He was in Karlsbad, still not fully recovered, when he heard on 5 July 1918 of the death of the Sultan and of Vahideddin's accession to the throne. Greatly annoyed at being absent from Istanbul at such a time, but still too ill to travel, he contented himself with sending a telegram of congratulations to the new Sultan Mehmed Vahideddin VI which was duly acknowledged. Shortly afterwards he heard that General Ahmed Izzet Pasha had been confirmed as the Sultan's chief military aide.

Probably not much had resulted from Kemal and Izzet's joint service on the Caucasus front in 1916-17 beyond a mutual appreciation of the other's potential value as an ally against the dominance of Enver; the characters of the two men were diametrically opposed, and Izzet did not share many of the ideas of the younger generation of state officers to which Kemal belonged. Nevertheless the latter was pleased at the news; he was certain that Izzet would convert his largely honorary post into one of active military adviser, chief of staff almost, to the Sultan, and he had great hopes that the latter could be persuaded to move against Enver. In a letter of 19 July to the new Chief Chamberlain Lutfi Simavi Bey he remarked: 'The Sultan's ascent to the throne has given birth to extraordinary hopes in me from the point of view of the prosperity and safety of our fatherland. . .I am completely convinced that the fatherland, the nation and the Army will be rescued from being a plaything of Enver's.' [25] A few days later Kemal received a telegram from his own aide in Istanbul, Cevat Abbas, advising him to return there. Kemal replied that he was not yet recovered, but Cevat Abbas immediately sent him a second telegram begging him to come quickly, and on 27 July he left Karlsbad, arriving in Istanbul on 2 August.

 

Enver solved this problem neatly by disregarding protocol. Instead of offering Kemal the post himself, he had the Sultan do so personally at an audience where German generals were also present. The surprise was sprung on Kemal on 16 August 1918, and he had to accept the appointment as he could not refuse the Sultan's direct order before foreign witnesses. Emerging from the audience chamber, he met a smiling Enver. In response to Kemal's tightly controlled but angry protest, Enver laughed out loud. It was the last time they saw each other.[28]

KEMAL WAS CERTAINLY IN CONTACT with Fethi during his time in Istanbul in the summer of 1918, but there is no record of what passed between them. Rauf was among those who saw Kemal off to Palestine; just before the train left Kemal drew him aside and asked him to stay in touch with Fethi and follow events closely. Rauf replied almost stiffly: 'I have made a definite decision not to mix in political affairs so long as I am performing military duties, and I repeat: though I have known Fethi Bey since the [1918] Revolution, I find it wrong to become involved in his political dealings.' [29] There is not much doubt that what Kemal was expecting at this time, and what may have been decided already between him and Fethi, was that the latter would soon make his move against Talat's Cabinet. If it succeeded Kemal would become War Minister, perhaps even Prime Minister.[30]

Liman von Sanders

Kemal reached Aleppo on 26 August after an exhausting journey on the collapsing Turkish railway system and left for the Palestine front the next day to take over command of the 7th Army. His two corps commanders were his old comrades and collaborators Ismet and A!i Fuad; commanding the 22nd Army Corps to the west was another former associate, Refet. The situation was far worse than it had been when he had resigned the previous year; in the interval Jerusalem had fallen, and only the stubborn resistance of Ali Fuad had prevented the rot from spreading farther north. None of the three so-called armies on the front could muster the strength of a well found division, and the troops were in the last extremity of deprivation and despair. Though the army group commander was the competent Liman von Sanders, British superiority on the front was about two to one, even leaving aside questions of fitness, morale and supplies, and there was no reasonable prospect of being able to stop the impending British attack. Allenby struck on 19 September, less than a month after Kemal's arrival, and immediately broke through the 8th Army on Kemal's right.

The Turkish front crumbled, and the 8th Army was almost entirely destroyed in the fighting of the next three days. Under continual air attack and with major British forces already completely round his flank and joining from the north in the assaults being made on him from the south, Kemal nevertheless succeeded in withdrawing most of his 7th Army to the east bank of the Jordan on 24 September. From there, together with a few odds and ends from the 8th who had escaped the British, they continued the retreat north to Damascus, joined by what forces could be retrieved in time from the 4th Army. Liman von Sanders still hoped to be able to hold Damascus, but the city had to be abandoned on 30 September, and on 2 October he ordered Kemal to withdraw his forces and break contact with the enemy. Kemal's troops were not pursued by the British, and so the next day von Sanders ordered him and his staff to go farther north to Aleppo and reorganize the 7th Army. Horns was occupied on 14 October and shortly afterwards the 4th Army was dissolved and all its units placed under Kemal's 7th Army, which thus became the only Ottoman army left in Syria except the very weak 2nd Army guarding the Gulf of Alexandretta against landings from the sea. Hama was evacuated by Kemal on the 17th, but it was not until 25 October that British advanced forces reached Aleppo.

Kemal and Ali Fuad reached Aleppo on 5 October 1918. (Ismet arrived there about the same date, but he had fallen ill and after some days spent semi-conscious in a hospital he was recalled to Istanbul). By their long leap backwards the 7th Army commanders had gained twenty days in which to recreate a military force capable of defending the hills north of the city, the gateway to Anatolia itself. Kemal's mind was only half on the problems of Syria, however; his major concern was the possibility of getting a position in Istanbul from which to influence Turkey's political course.

At Aleppo he was in constant contact with what was happening in the capital; Ali Fuad, who was with him every day, remarked admiringly: 'He had a wide circle of friends in Istanbul, and got news of what was going on in the capital with amazing speed.' (Kemal's informant in Istanbul, and presumably his link with Fethi as well, was his close friend Dr Rasim Ferit Talay, then Director of Health there. Talay communicated with Kemal by private cipher through the 7th Army's Reinforcement Officer in the capital, Lt Ahmed.) Kemal was certainly aware by this time of the parliamentary assault Fethi was preparing on the Cabinet, and was quite clear on what would follow if it were successful. He told Fuad: 'We must try for peace immediately. But Talat Pasha's government cannot do it, it's too worn out. A government must be formed under Ahmed Izzet Pasha. I could undertake the War Ministry in that sort of cabinet.' [31] A few days after arriving in Aleppo Kemal received the news that Talat's government had declared its intention to resign and that Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, the aged Ottoman politician whom Vahideddin had nominated in his place, was having difficulty in putting a new cabinet together. He heard on 10 October from Talay that Fethi's attempt to supplant Talat in the Chamber had failed. Kemal still felt he had enough influence on the Sultan to move him now that the CUP threat had diminished so greatly, and Izzet was well known at the Palace, so between 11 and 13 October he sent the following cipher telegram to Naci, the man whom he had persuaded to become Vahideddin's aide, for submission to the Sultan:

Kazim Karabekir

Thus even before the armistice negotiations began most of the Nationalist officers were either in positions of power in Istanbul or on their way to assume them. Within a matter of two weeks all the levers of power appeared to have fallen into their hands. An ally, Izzet Pasha, was Prime Minister and for the moment War Minister. As soon as the Syria front stabilized Kemal would become Minister of War, and under him would be Ismet as Permanent Undersecretary and Kazim as Chief of the General Staff. Ali Fethi controlled the other key post of the Interior, with Refet destined to be his executive arm as commander of the gendarmerie. Rauf was Minister of Marine and in control of the Navy, and the Finance Minister Cavid Bey, who had been one of Talat's closest allies and an enemy of Enver's, could be relied upon to support them within fairly wide limits. Only Ali Fuad was not yet destined for a post in Istanbul; on I December he took sick leave and set out for the capital independently.[38] Their position seemed unassailable.

It was nothing of the sort, and the main reason it was not was Ahmed Izzet Pasha himself. He was a highly emotional man given to bursting into tears at the slightest provocation, with a history of resignations rivalling Kemal's, but generally given in his case from anger, injured feelings, or a desire to avoid doing unpleasant but necessary jobs. He lacked consistency and determination: his most common reaction when faced with a personal affront or a political danger was to fly into a rage; then, unless he had taken some hasty and irrevocable action, quickly to forget all about it. Thus when he was confronted with a request by the Sultan to remove the two Unionist members from his Cabinet in the days immediately following the armistice, his reaction—possibly exacerbated by the fact that since 31 October he had been in bed with influenza—was to seek to resign. Rauf was not a great political fighter by temperament either, and Fethi probably believed he would have an opportunity to form a government himself in the near future, so the Cabinet unanimously decided to resign just nine days after the armistice was signed.[39] When Kemal arrived in Istanbul five days later he was furious at the advantage that had been thrown away.

Besides Izzet's temperament, there was a more specific difficulty which made it improbable that he would be more than merely a means of getting the Nationalist officers to Istanbul as quickly as possible. He was a man without a political party, and with the memory of 1913 clear in his mind he was concerned at the possibility of a CUP coup if the armistice terms he negotiated were seen by the Unionists as unsatisfactory;[40] so he had need of the support and cooperation of this influential group of officers. But he was a full generation older than they were (54 in 1918) and in many ways his ideas were more those of an old Ottoman than of the revolutionary generation these young officers represented. In particular he was suspicious of the ambitious and in his view reckless leader of this group, Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Kemal's message to the Sultan proposing Izzet as the Prime Minister had had no practical effect—it arrived at the Palace only on 14 October when Izzet was actually in the process of being installed as Prime Minister, having completed his Cabinet—but it made him (and perhaps the Sultan) even more wary of this presumptuous general. On hearing of it he commented to his aide: 'What's the world coming to? Mustafa Kemal is advising the Sultan to make me Prime Minister.' [41]

Nevertheless he retained his temper sufficiently to send a message saying he hoped Kemal would join him in the Cabinet after peace had been made. Kemal snapped back in reply that peace would not come quickly, and it was precisely in the critical period preceding it that he would be useful; there were many better people than himself for the War Ministry in peacetime. In the following days Kemal pressed the Cabinet hard, reporting on 21 October that he had already entered into negotiations on his own initiative with Prince Faisal, the leader of the Arabs fighting the Turkish army in Syria, with a view to reaching a Turkish-Arab understanding. The Cabinet hastily ordered him to go no further with them. Nor did Kemal abandon his attempts to enter the Cabinet; on 16 October he instructed Rasim Ferit Talay to get in touch with Fethi and Rauf and find out why he had not been made War Minister and Chief of the General Staff, and to give his personal cipher to Rauf so they could communicate directly. [42]

KEMAL'S BEHAVIOUR IN THE NEXT two weeks was without question openly mutinous, but it is hard not to sympathize with him. On 25 October he had removed himself and his forces from Aleppo after a day of heavy street fighting with Arab irregulars, and the following day he had administered a bruising repulse to British and Arab advanced troops on his chosen line a few miles north of the city. Though skirmishes continued and his line was withdrawn some miles over the next few days, the new front was basically safe for some time, until the British main body should toil up to the north of Syria and re-establish lines of communication, [43] but he was in an agony of anxiety about what was going on in Istanbul. He was convinced that his absence from the Cabinet at this vital time could result in irremediable mistakes being committed. He was probably right.

Rauf had been chosen as chief Ottoman armistice delegate, and had arrived at the British battleship Agamemnon at Moudros harbour on Lemnos on [27] October to begin talks. The armistice that was signed three days later, to take effect on the 31st, granted the Entente virtually unlimited rights over the whole Empire, including the right to occupy any or all points in it, and it teemed with obscurities and imprecisions which gave the Entente ample scope to interpret its meaning entirely as it chose. The tragedy of this armistice for the Turks, though of course they did not know it, was that for reasons of their own the British had been prepared to grant very generous terms indeed, and their negotiator was under instructions to try only for such further provisions as would not imperil the swift conclusion of the armistice. He had been given four compulsory but quite reasonable terms and twenty optional terms, some of them extremely harsh; with minor and meaningless modifications he extracted the full twenty-four terms from the Turks. The fault lay not only in the Turkish negotiators, but in the Cabinet which approved the terms—they were so deep in despair at the Turkish situation that they could only think to cast themselves at the feet of the Entente and would have accepted any terms whatever to get an armistice quickly.[44] It is inconceivable that such a total loss of nerve would have occurred had a man as determined and dominant as Kemal been in a strong position in the Cabinet. The danger then would have been quite the opposite.

^1. Celal Erikan, Komutan Atatürk (Ankara 1972), 86-93.

^2. Ali Fuad was not in Istanbul at this time, having been sent to Rome as military attache after the 1908 Revolution. But he and Kemal had previously agreed on these principles in Salonika, and Ali Fuad had also become friends with Rauf in the winter of 1908 and had discussed Kemal's ideas with him. Both Rauf and Kemal stayed in touch with Fuad by letters during the Hareket Ordusu episode. Ali Fuad Cebesoy, [Siwif Arkadasint] Atatürk (Istanbul 1967), 134-52.

^3. ‘Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari', Yakin Tarihimiz ( Y T ), II (Istanbul 1962), 305. References for early origins of Nationalist group: Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam (Mustafa Kemal'in Hayati) I (4th ed. Istanbul 1969), 133-35, 14-43; Celil Bayar, Atatürk'ten Hatiralar (Istanbul 1955), 14-20; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Atatürk, Hayati ve Eseri, I (Ankara 1963), 9-24, 30-49; Behic Erkin, 'Atatiirk'un Selinik'teki Askerlik Hayatina Ait Hatiralar', Belleten, 1956, 599ff; A. F. Miller, 'Premieres Pages de la Biographie d'Ataturk', Etudes Balkaniques, 1971, 27-56; Fethi Tevetoglu, Atatürk'le .Samsun'a Cikanlar (Ankara 1971), 24-26; S. S. Aydemir, Ikinci Adam: Ismet Inonü, I (and ed. Istanbul 1968), 44-50, 59-61; Ismet Inonu, Inonu'niin Hatirlari', I (Istanbul 1969), 51-81, 90; Cebesoy, Sinif, 13-30, 61-63, 134-37, 141-43; 'Rauf', YT, 11, 304-5; Kazim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul 1960), v; Feridun Kandemir, Kazim Karabekir (Istanbul 1948), 14, 57-58, 103-5; S. S. Aydemir, Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Pasa, I1 (Istanbul, 1971), 176-78.

^4. Inonu, Hatiralari, I , 211-12.

^5. After his exile to Sofia Ali Fethi published his criticisms of Enver at Bolayir under his own name: Bolayir Muharebesinde adem-i muvaffakiyetin esbabi (Istanbul 1331 [1913]). Arabic script.

References for Libyan campaign, Balkan Wars, and political activities in Istanbul: Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 156-62, 169-84; Aydemir, Enver, 11, 366, 38-82, 388-91, 410-27; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 49-61; Cebesoy, Sinif, 136-37; Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 116-18; 'Rauf', YT, 11, 305-07; Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks (Oxford 1969), 106-25, 129-32, 141-43, 163-64, 168; Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim. Milli Miicadele'ye Gidis, IV (Istanbul 1967), 1088-91; Ibnülemin Mahmud Kemal Inal, Osmanli Devrir~de Son Sadriazamlar, XI11 (Istanbul 1951) , 1977-78; [Mahmud Sevket], 'Sadrazam Mahmut Sevket Pasa'nin Günlük Not Defteri', Hayat Dergisi, I4 January 1965, 14-15, and 28 January 1965, 14, notes of 6/19, 7/20, 8/21 February and 17 February/2 March 1913; Glen W. Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasa and the Defence of the Ottoman Empire (unpublished PhD thesis Indiana University 1965), 205-06, 281-82; T.C. M.S.B. Genelkurmay Baskanligi. Harb Tarihi Dairesi. Balkan Harbi Tarihi, VII. Osmanli Deniz Harekati 1912-1913 (Istanbul 1965), 204-09.

^6. Ismet Inonu commented that 'Amongst the influential members of the CUP, Ataturk and Fethi Bey together constituted a separate group'. Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 223.

^7. Ismet Inonu, Inonü Atatürk'ü AnIatiyor (Istanbul 1968), 40.

^8. Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 219-20.

^9. Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, I (Istanbul 1965), 117-20; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 193-94; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 61-62,65-67.

^10. Bayar, Ben, I, 120; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 216, 224; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 69-70.

^11. The best account of Kemal's actions at Gallipoli is Bayur, Atatürk, I, 70-102. See also his own accounts in Mustafa Kemal, Ariburnu Muharebeleri Raporu (Ankara 1968), and Anafartalar Muharebatina ait Tarihce (Ankara 1962).

^12. Bayar, Ben, I, 120-21

^13. His bitter dissatisfaction came to the attention of the Entente quite early on. A French intelligence report of 28 May 1916, in describing discontent with Enver amongst officers serving at the Dardanelles, lays particular stress on an authentic-seeming account of Kemal's heated criticisms at the time of his arrival in Istanbul from Suvla, and describes an open clash at that time with Enver which almost led to an accusation of treason against Kemal. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris), Archives diplomatiques. Sèrie A- Guerre 1914-1918. Dossier 976,148-49.

^14. References for the Eastern Front: Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 281, 289-90; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, I, 99-111; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 106-09, 11.2; Cebesoy, Sinif, 154, 158-59; Erikan, Komutan, 185-205; Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 123-28, 138, 150-52,1~4-61,222; Karabekir, Harbimiz, vi.

^15. Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 289-95; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, I, 102, 109-13; Aydemir, Enver, III (Istanbul 1972), 329-41; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 116-35; Erikan, Komutan, 211-18;Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 163-66; Ali Fuad Cebescy, Moskova Hatiralari (Istanbul 1955), 175. Ismet wrote the first draft of this report after lengthy discussions with Kemal. The complete text of the report of 20 September 1917 is published in Atarürk'ün Soylev ve Demecleri, IV, Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri: 1917-1938, ed. Nimet Arsan Unan (Ankara 1964), 1-8. Much later, on 29 June 1918, Kazim was to submit a similar though much less detailed warning of impending disaster to the Prime Minister with an equal disregard for official channels. Like Kemal, he laid the blame at Enver's door. Kazim Karabekir, Istiklil Harbimizin Esaslari (Istanbul 1951) 28.

^16. Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 110-13,268-69, 298-99; 'Rauf', YT,11,336,368; Falih Rifki Atay, Atatiirk'iin Bana Anlattiklari (Istanbul 1955), 16-18.

^17. Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu Ihtilali (Istanbul 1968), 19.

^18. 'Rauf', YT, I, 177-78; Bayar, Ben, I, 124.

^19. The real purpose of the force Enver had gathered was certainly to ensure against his eviction from the Cabinet, and in reassuring Talat he took care to stress that he would never make a coup 'against a cabinet of which he was a member'. Talat got the message, and he and his close ally Kara Kemal created a counter-force by collecting together a group of gunmen and by arming certain of the tradesmen's guilds in Istanbul. Bayur, Atatürk, I, 146-47.

^20. Kemal, Talat, and the secret military force in Istanbul: 'Rauf', YT, 11, 337-38, 368; Rauf heard the details of this story from Ismail Canbulat. Further details in 'Rauf', YT, I, 147, 177-78, and in Cavid Bey's notes for this period, quoted in extenso in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk Inkilabi Tarihi (TIT),111, Km 4 (Ankara 1963), 159-63. Cavid had the story from both Talat and Ismail Hakki.

^21. Cemal Kutay, Atatürk-Enver Pasa Hadiseleri (Istanbul 1956), 11-12; cf. Cebesoy, Sinif, 145-46.

^22. Public Record Office (London), F.O. 371/4363/116/140.

^23. Auswartiges Amt (Bonn), Politisches Archiv (PA), Türkei 159, Nr. 2, Bd. 19, A42378, Bernstorff to AA, 9 Octobcr 1918; cf. 'Rauf', YT, I, 42; 11, 338, 368; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 288; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, I, 113; Bayur, TIT, III,4, 712, and note 21; Samet Agaoglu, Babamin Arkadaslari (3rd ed. Istanbul 1969), 85.

^24. Letter from Kemal to Behic [Erkin] dated 28 June 1919, published in Vatan (Istanbul), 22 December 1956.

^25. Lutfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Resat Han'in ve halefinin sarayinda gordüklerim, II (Istanbul 1340 [1924]),138. Arabic script.

^26. Kemal's relations with Vahideddin: Atay, Anlattiklari, 25-49; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 300-04; Bayur, Atatürk, 1, 136-44, 150-53; Bayur, TIT, I I I , 4 ,

^27. 354; Erikan, Komutan, 231-32. For an explanatory comment on Vahideddin's character by an intimate, see Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Gorüp Isittiklerim (Ankara 1951), 274-75. 27 PA, Tiirkei 159, Nr. I, Bd. 15, A33652, Von Seeckt to Hindenburg, 3 August 1918; Gwynne Dyer, 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918', I, Middle Eastern Studies, May 1972, 147-48.

^28. Atay, Anlattiklari, 50-52; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 301-05; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 145-55.

^29. 'Rauf', YT, 11, 369.

^30. Fethi's strength lay in the parliamentary group of the CUP. The Chamber was to reopen on 10 October 1918,and Fethi launched his attack in the preparatory meeting of the CUP deputies on 7 October. He and his supporters criticized the Government bitterly on its foreign policy at this meeting and sought to introduce a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet. The CUP leaders succeeded in having the matter left over to the official opening of the Chamber of Deputies three days later, when the election of its President-Fethi was standing against the official CUP candidate Halil [Mentesel-would allow a formal confidence vote. Meanwhile Talat and his ministers lobbied vigorously to gain support, and on the 10th Halil won the election, though only narrowly. Ali Haydar Mithat confirms that Fethi's supporters had fixed their hopes on Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Bayur, TIT, 111, 4, 702-04; Ali Haydar Mithat, Hatiralarim 1872-1946 (Istanbul 1946), 322. Talat had already decided to resign and was to leave office only three days later on the 13th. His vigorous resistance to Fethi's assault was probably aimed at holding together enough of the CUP majority in the Chamber to retain a veto on the successor cabinet, and later over the peace terms which that cabinet would negotiate.

^31. Quotation from Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Milli Miicadele Hatiralari (Istanbul 1953), 12-13. References for Kemal's activities in Palestine and Syria August- October 1918: ibid., 11-14; Atay, Anlattiklari, 53-63; Falih Rifki Atay, Atatürk'iin Hatiralari 1914-1919 (Ankara 1965), 63-81; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 306-09; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, I, 115-17; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 135, note 69; 156-59; Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 192-203; Otto Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey (Annapolis 1927), 275-3 16.

^32. Photocopy in 'Rauf', YT, I, 145. The telegram was sent through Dr Rasim Ferit Talay in Kemal's private cipher. Bayur, Atatürk, I, 164-65.

3^3. Falih Rifki Atay, 'Büyük Gazi'nin Hatiralarindan Sayfalar', Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 5 April 1926; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 167; Bayur, TIT, 111, 4, 710-11.

^34.  On political developments in Istanbul in this period see Dyer, loc. cit., 150-53.

^35. On the negotiations leading to the formation of Izzet's Cabinet and the decisions of the following fortnight in Istanbul, see ibid., 156-69.

^36.  'Rauf', YT, I, 52; PA, Türkei 159, Nr. 2, Bd. 19, A42378. Ismet received this summons in hospital in Aleppo, but was sufficiently recovered by the time he reached Istanbul on 24 October to take up his duties at once. Inonü, Hatiralari, I, 203.

^37. 'Rauf', YT, I, 146-47; Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, 2-3, 7. Karabekir, whose army corps was at Tabriz in Iran, did not reach Istanbul until 28 November.

^38. Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele, 31.

^39. For the events surrounding the resignation of the cabinet, see Inal, op. cit. XIII, 1954-65, 1989-91, 2008-09; 'Rauf'; YT, 11,176-78, 208-10,210-42, 272-73; 'Cavid Bey'ia Notlari', Tanin (Istanbul), 27-28 August 1945.

^40. 'Rauf', YT, I, 52.

^41. Bayur, TIT, 111, 4, 710. See also Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 325, for a telegram Izzet sent to Mersinli Cemal Pesha at this time criticizing Kemal's ambition and his endless demands.

^42. Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 308; Bayur, Atatürk, I, 165; Atay, Anlattiklari, 63; 'Cavid Bey'in Notlari', Tanin, 1945, note of 21 October 1918; Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele, 28-29; Liman von Sanders, Five Years, 262; 'Rauf", YT, I, 147, 179.

^43. Atay, Anlattiklari, 59-61; Liman von Sanders, Five Years, 317-19.

^44. For a full discussion of the armistice negotiations, see Gwynne Dyer, 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918', 11, Middle Eastern Studies, October 1972.

^45. Atay, Anlattiklari, 64-65 ;Liman von Sanders, Five Years, 3 16, 3 19-20.

^46. Atay, Anlattiklari, 63-64,68-69.

^47.  Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele, 28-30.

^48. Harb Tarihi Baskanligi (Ankara). Arsiv 415280, Dolab 4, Goz 4, Dosya 14, Klasor 242.

^49. Ibid.Arsiv 1/3, Dolab I , Goz I , Dosya 16, Klasor 4.

^50. Atay, Anlattiklari, 83-84; Aydemir, Tek Adam, I, 331; Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele, 30.