This is truly an
invaluable source... coming from such
a high Armenian official, contradicting many of the manipulated Armenian
claims that are now widely accepted as the truth.
Followed by "A Neighbor's
Thoughts on a Katchaznouni Act "
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do any more.
The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, First Prime Minister of the Independant
Translated from the Original by Matthew A. Callender
Edited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian)
Published by the
Armenian Information Service
Suite 7D, 471 Park Ave.
New York 22
This is a summary of an important book, entitled « The Armenian Revolutionary Federation
(Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Any More ». The author is Hovhannes Katchaznouni (1),
the first Prime Minister of the independent Armenian Republic. It is actually a manifesto
which he had presented to the Convention of foreign branches of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation convened in April 1923 in Bucharest, Romania. Convinced that the questions
raised there would be subject to serious consideration of, not only the members of the
Dashnag (Dashnak) Party, but also of other Armenians as well, Hovhannes Katchaznouni
thought it was his duty to have the manifesto published and thereby made public
The Armenian version of the book was published in Vienna by the Mihitarian Press in the
year 1923. The English version appeared in New York in 1955 through the Armenian
Information Service. It was translated from the original by Matthew A Callender and edited
by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian).
One small detail worthy of remark is the fact that it is rather difficult, even
impossible, to find it nowadays in the libraries of the world. On account of what the
former Prime Minister says of the Dashnag experience, it is quite possible that certain
Armenian circles prefer it to be dropped from the list of acquisitions of libraries. In
some libraries it appears in the card catalogues, but cannot be found in the stacks.
In his « Introduction » to the English version, the editor states that « historical
truth cannot be subverted forever » and that « however hard Dashnag propagandists may
try to twist and bury the truth and glorify the failure of their Independent Armenian
Republic, truth must eventually prevail. » He rightfully presents the author as « a
pillar of the Dashnagtzoutiun.» He adds that « few were in a position to know more, nor
to express themselves with greater clarity, logic and foresight than Hovhannes
Katchaznouni. » (p. 3)
The English version is a condensation of Katchaznounis parting words to the Dashnags.
The first seven-and-a-half pages are « translated verbatim », but from there on, the
text is only « excerpts of his arguments. » (p. 8) Apparently, the Armenian version is
the complete text. As well expressed by the editor, « Katchaznounis work is a basic
source of Dashnag history. » (p. 3) Therefore, this booklet will mainly quote or restate
the arguments of the author and thus make available to the reader a publication now
difficult to find.
* * *
During its two-and-a-half years of existence, the
independent Armenian Republic had four prime ministers and seven cabinets. Hovhannes
Katchaznouni was the Premier of the First Cabinet, in which A. Manoogian served as
the Minister of the Interior, A. Khatissian the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.
Hakhverdian the Minister of War and K. Gardjigian the Minister of Finance.
Katchaznouni had given « deliberate and serious consideration » (p. 4) to the
matters that he discussed at the Convention. He asked the party members to «
approach the matters with an open mind. » In an attempt to give a concise
commentary from the beginning of the First World War to the Lausanne Conference, he
formulated the initial attitude of the Armenian bands in the following words :
« At the beginning of the Fall of 1914 when Turkey had not yet entered the war but
had already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionary bands began to be
formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm and, with especially, much uproar.
Contrary to the decision taken during their general meeting at Erzurum only a few
weeks before, the A.R.F. had [actively participated] in the formation of the bands
and their future military action against Turkey.
« In an undertaking of such gravity, fraught with most serious consequences,
individual agents of the Transcaucasian A.R.F. acted against the wiIl of our
superior authority, against the will of the General Meeting of the Party... In the
Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the
Turks because they could not refrain
from organizing and
fighting. This was
(in) [sic.] an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had
nourished itself during an entire generation : that mentality should have found its
expression, and did so. » (p. 5)
|...The Armenians had embraced Russia whole heartedly...
Katchaznouni believes that « the formation of bands was wrong » and that the Armenians
had participated in that movement to the greatest extent « contrary to the decision and
the will of the General Meeting of the Party. » He wrote that the Armenians « had
embraced Russia whole heartedly without any compunction. » (p. 6) He declares :
« We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We had implanted our own
desires into the minds of others ; we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away
with our dreams
Attention was called to some kind of a letter by Vorontzov-Dashkov to
the Catholicos... with... generalities which might be interpreted in any manner...
Katchaznouni says that they had « overestimated the ability of the Armenian people. »
This is, of course, in the sense of « political and military power... the extent and
importance of the services [the Armenians] rendered to the Russians. » He adds : « And
by overestimating our very modest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes
and expectations. » He admits that the cause of the Dashnags was « an incidental and
trivial phase for the Russians. » (p. 7) They had drawn such conclusions as though the
Armenian issue was « the center of gravity of the Great War, its cause and purpose. » He
declares : « When the Russians were advancing, we used to say from the depths of our
subconscious mind that they were coming to save us. »
Katchaznouni also asserts, however, that one of the main aspects of what he calls
Armenian « national psychology... [is] to seek external causes for [Armenian ] misfortune.
» He says : « One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the conviction that
the Russians behaved villainously towards us (later it would be the turn of the French,
the Americans, the British, the Georgians, Bolsheviks the whole world to be so
blamed.) » (p. 8)
The territory of the Armenian Republic was
formerly a part of one of the outlying provinces of the Tsarist Russian Empire,
namely Transcaucasia. Following the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in the Spring
of 1917, the then Provisional Government of Kerensky created there a special
administrative body called the Commissariat of Transcaucasia. When the Bolsheviks
overthrew the Kerensky government, the Commissariat declared itself on November 28,
1917 to be the supreme authority there. In February 1918, the Seim, or the
legislative assembly of Transcaucasia convened in Tiflis, accepted the resignation
of the Commissariat and created in its place a temporary government. On April 22,
1918, the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia was formed. The three
principal peoples of Transcaucasia were the Azerbaijanis, the Georgians and the
Armenians. The federal republic lasted about five weeks ; on May 26, 1918, it was
terminated. Georgia declared its independence the same day, and Azerbaijan and
Armenia followed, two days later. The Treaty of Batum was signed on June 4, 1918
between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Republics.
Armenia was based upon a republican form of government. It had a législative
branch, consisting of an elected Parliament and an executive branch, which was the
Cabinet. It did not have a President, whose powers were exercised in part by the
Parliament and in part by the Cabinet. Sovereignty resided in an 80 member
Parliament of one house, composed of representatives from the four political
parties. Voting was direct and secret, and the elections were based on the system of
proportional representation. The Cabinet was composed of eight ministers. The Prime
Minister, elected by the Parliament, was at the head of the government. He
designated the ministers, but presented them for the approval of the Parliament, to
which the Cabinet as a whole was responsible.
Katchaznouni says, in his book, however, that « this was the form. But the reality
was otherwise. » (p. 8) In a Memorandum, dated October 28, 1919, to the United
States Government, the same Katchaznouni had described the Armenian Republic as a
democracy. (2) Later in the book, he concludes :
« ln practice our Party tended to subject to itself, to control, the legislative
body and the government. We did not have the courage, nor the ability to declare an
open dictatorship...There was no Parliament ; it was an empty form without content
The problems of state were being discussed and solved behind closed doors... In
reality, there was not even a parliamentary faction, because this latter was under
the very strict supervision of the Dashnag Bureau and was obliged to carry out its
orders. There was not a government either. This, also, was subject to the Bureau ;
it was a kind of executive body for the Bureau in the state. » (pp. 8-9)
The Parliament of the independent Armenian Republic opened on August 1, 1919. It
looked like a body composed of the peoples representatives. Katchaznouni writes :
« ...It was strange and disheartening that 72 out of 80 members were Dashnags, with
only four members from the other parties. There was no opposition party to act as a
check... It was not a Parliament, but a caricature of a Parliament. » (p. 9) The
Party Bureau had « replaced the Parliament with its own dictatorial rule. »
The fifth Cabinet under A. Khadissian had resigned and the sixth under H.
Ohanchanian was formed on the orders of the Bureau. The latter presented the already
prepared list of ministers to the Parliament, which was indefinitely recessed.
Katchaznouni sums up : « The Armenian Parliament had given a dictatorial government
to the Dashnagtzoutiun - to the Bureau. »
The war between the Turks and the Armenians broke out in the Fall of 1920. The
crushed Turkey of 1918 was no more. Atatürks British biographer writes : «
[Mustafa Kemâls] foreign policy was based not on expansion but on retraction of
frontiers ; his home policy on the foundation of a political system which could
survive his own time. It was in this realistic spirit that he regenerated his
country, transforming the old sprawling Ottoman Empire into a compact new Turkish
Republic. » (3) The Turks formed a representative government in Ankara at the same
time the Dashnags were trying to do the same in the Caucasus. The Ankara experiment
was a novelty in many ways. The idea of representative government and republic was
ever present in Mustafa Kemâls mind. As early as the second constitutional
régime (1908), he believed in eradicating the Sultanate. Several Turkish memoirs
reveal his early statements while on duty in Salonica (his birthplace) and later
in Aleppo (Syria), on the dire necessity to establish a republican form of
Considering the conditions prevalent at the end of the First World War, an
independent Turkish state, based on national sovereignty, seemed to be the only
alternative to the newly-dismembered Ottoman Empire. The old capital was occupied,
the former members of the Union and Progress had fled and the Sultan was powerless.
A new government had to be formed; its task necessitated the active support of the
people at large ; and success depended upon the nations democratic participation
in the struggle. Apart from the theoretical considerations, republicanism seemed the
only practical alternative. The new Ankara government was based on the republican
régime even before the official proclamation on October 29, 1923.
In the newly-established government in Ankara, there was no higher authority than
the Grand National Assembly, any member of which could pose questions and
cross-examine, not only the government members, but Mustafa Kemâl himself even
on his tactical military moves. (5) This right of scrunity, this resolute
interrogation, this solemn convassing was not mere theory ; discussion and perusal
were the order of the day even in the most critical hours. Mustafa Kemâl, as
Speaker of the Grand National Assembly and as acting Commander-in-Chief, was
replying to questions even on minute details when the roar of enemy artillery could
be heard from the assembly hall.
two parties ... thus closed the doors forever for reparations.
On the war with Turkey , Katchaznouni says :
« The war with us was inevitable... We had not done all that was necessary for us
to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the
Turks...We had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on
ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought
we could win... When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and
confer. We did not do so and defied them. Our army was well fed and well armed and
[clothed] but it did not fight. The troops were constantly retreating and deserting
their positions; they threw away their arms and dispersed in the villages. Our army
was demoralized during the period of internal strife, the inane destruction and the
pillage that went [on] without punishment. It was demoralized and tired. The system
of roving bands, which was especially encouraged by the Bureau government, was
destroying the unity of the military organization... » (pp. 9-10)
In spite of the fact that the Armenians had better material and better support,
their armies lost. Although Armenian politicians and writers had, for years,
criticized the Ottoman Government for not making military service obligatory for the
Armenians, there were no Moslems in the army of the Armenian Republic. (6) And the advancing Turks fought only against the regular soldiers ; they did
not carry the battle to the civilian sector. Edward Fox, the American District
Commander at Kars, in a telegram, dated October 31, 1920, (7) to Admiral Bristol,
the U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbul, wrote that the Americans were continuing
their work of looking after the Armenian children as before, that the Turkish
soldiers were well-disciplined and that there had not been any massacres. Such
missionary and philantropic establishments protected only the children of Armenians,
and never the thousands of Turkish children, who had become orphans on account of
Armenian massacres of their parents and families. (8)
When on November 2, 1920, the armies of Kâzim Karabekir Pasha reached Gümrü (Alexandropol,
now Leninakan), the Bureau-government presented its resignation. Simultaneously,
within a few hours of each other, while one Dashnag delegation headed by the
retiring Prime Minister was negotiating with the Soviets, another Dashnag delegation
led by a former Prime Minister negotiated with the Turks It was decided that those
who negotiated should be new men. A government under Simon Vratzian was
Talks with the Turks led to the Treaty of Gümrü (9), signed on
December 2, 1920. It states that the Turkish and the Armenian Governments, « for
the purpose of putting an end to the hostilities and to find a basis of agreement,
have sat down for an examination of the facts. » Kâzim Karabekir Pasha (Commander
on the Eastern Front) on behalf of the Turks, and Alexander Khadissian (Prime
Minister) on behalf of the Armenians, participated.
The discussions resulted in the following agreement : The state of war between
Turkey and the Armenian Republic was to be ended. The frontier between Turkey and
Armenia was established. The territories designated for Turkey were to remain as
such « by irrefutable historical, ethnic and legal rights. » The two parties
agreed to the return of refugees across the old boundaries, with the exception of
those who, during the First World War, went over to the enemys army and those who
crossed occupied territories and participated in massacres. Those claims of the
refugees who do not return within one year after the ratification of the Treaty
would not be heard. The two parties agreed « to forego their rights to ask for
damages. » They had thus closed the doors forever for reparations. The
cancellation of damages also included the great expenses of Turkey incurred during
two years because of the urgency of the war it had to wage against Armenia. The
Erevan Government declared the Treaty of Sèvres null and void. It promised to
recall « delegations who have been tools in the hands of the imperialist countries
» and to keep away from such men « who are after imperialist aims. » Armenia
agreed to consider null and void all treaties signed by the Armenian Republic with
any country that related to Turkey or were harmful to Turkish interests.
In the meantime, the Armenian Bolsheviks entered Itchevan and Dilijan. « Was there
an understanding between the Bolsheviks and the Turks ? » asks Katchaznouni and
replies : « In our ranks that conviction was widespread. I think, however, that it
The plot of the Bolsheviks was not the reason of our defeat, nor the
power of the Turks... but our own [ineptitude] ! Of course the Bolsheviks benefited
from our defeat and that was very natural, but it was not essential that they should
have come to an understanding with the Turks for that purpose. » (p. 11 )
The day the Vratzian government signed an agreement with the Turks,
it resigned and relinquished power to the Bolsheviks. Katchaznouni says :
« The Bolsheviks entered Armenia without meeting any resistance. This was the decision of
our Party. There were two reasons for acting this way : first, we could not resist even if
we wanted to... ; second, we hoped that the Soviet authorities, backed by Russia, would be
able to introduce some order in the state a thing which we, all alone, had failed to
do, and it was very plain already that we would not be able to do. It was our desire to
let the Bolsheviks rule the country without any obstruction, to remain loyal to the new
government, to cooperate with their useful work. » (p. 11)
The decision was, of course, not unanimous. There were some who opposed the Bolsheviks, «
even though defeat was inevitable. » Their number was small and when their proposal was
refused, they left the country. There was another minority, a so-called « Leftist
Dashnags », whom the Bolsheviks distrusted and discarded. But in a final effort to
displace the Soviets, the Dashnags staged on February 18, 1921, a counter-revolt against
them. Simon Vratzian, the last Prime Minister, sent the following note, dated March 18,
1921, to Bahaeddin Bey, Turkeys representative in Erevan :
« Please forward the present request promptly to your high authorities... The Armenian
Government requests the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, that... it...
give the Armenian army some ammunition... [and] communicate with us, if the Government of
the Grand National Assembly finds it possible to send military aid to Armenia, and if able
to do so, to what extent and when ?... » (p.24)
The Treaty of Sevres was
obsolete even before it was ready for signature.
The Ankara Government did not help the Dashnags,
and the Soviets ejected them from Armenian soil in April 1921. Vratzian sought
asylum in Iran, where he set out for Europe via Istanbul, finally became a U.S.
citizen and died in Beirut. (10)
Katchaznouni implores : « What had been our diplomatic activity with the outer
world... and what were the results ? » (p. 12). In the Spring of 1919, the Paris
Delegation of the Armenian Republic, jointly with the Delegation of Turkish
Armenians, presented a Memorandum of Armenian demands to the Peace Conference.
According to that memorandum, the frontiers of the Armenian State would include :
the Caucasian Republic with enlarged territory, including Kars ; the seven Ottoman
provinces in Eastern and Southern Anatolia (namely, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Harput,
Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon) ; and the four sanjaks of Cilicia (Maras, Sis, Cebel-i
Bereket and Adana) plus Alexandretta. It is instructive to read Katchaznounis
evaluation of the Armenian demands in respect to frontiers :
« A vast state was being organized and demanded -a great Armenia from the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to the Arabian Desert, [From]
where did that imperial, amazing demand emanate ?
How did it happen that our
Delegation signed [the] from Sea to Sea demand ? It was told that they did not
demand those fascinating frontiers, the Turkish Armenians (through their National
Delegation) would sever their cause from that of the Republic of Ararat and
will apply to the powers accordingly. Our delegation was also told that America
would not accept a mandate over a small Armenia but would accept one over a from
Sea to Sea Armenia
The Paris Memorandum, of course, thrilled us. A kind of
mentality was created according to which the drawing of frontiers on paper actually
gave us those territories. To doubt it was a treachery
» (p, 12)
Then followed, in the words of Katchaznouni, « the rude awakening
». The Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, which could not have been
enforced on the Turks, had to be abandoned, Lord Kinross writes that it was « an
early product of that circus of Allied conferences which
signatures of the Treaty of Versailles. » (11) The Ottoman Empire was broken up
into a series of small states and foreign spheres of interest, Turkey was to lose,
not only Arab possessions (to which she was already resigned), but also the Greeks
were to receive the whole of Thrace, Smyrna and its hinterland as well as eight
Aegean islands (the Dodecanese going to Italy). Apart from an independent Armenia,
much of Anatolia was partitioned into French and Italian zones of influence. The
Turkish Straits being placed under international control, Istanbul had become a mere
enclave of European-occupied territory. The hated Capitulations were extended and
Turkeys finances were to be directed by the Allies. Turkey itself was to become
an inland state, with a shadow of a sovereignty. The Turkish army was to be a token
force under foreign supervision, and even the limited gendarmerie would be officered
by foreigners. When the Greeks advanced along the shores of the Sea of Marmara, the
enthusiastic British Prime Minister Lloyd George thought that the Turks were beaten
and « fleeing with their forces towards Mecca (sic). » When « Ankara » corrected
his Foreign Secretary, Lloyd George replied : « Lord Curzon is good enough to
admonish me on a triviality. » (12) The British Premier, who was ignorant of basic
knowledge in terms of Turkish geography, pretended to be a driving force in the
partition of the country.
The Treaty of Sevres was obsolete even before it was ready for signature. The Allied
Conferences, with continuous rounds of entertainment, had no way of reinforcing the
grant of an independent Armenian state by any form of military action. Nor could any
country under a Mandate. When President Wilson announced that he was ready to
arbitrate on its frontiers, the « award » had no relation whatsoever to realities.
The Treaty of Gümrü, the first international agreement to be contracted by the
Ankara Government, restored to Turkey its traditional eastern frontier along the
banks of the Rivers Aras and Arpacay. The Bolsheviks, who had defeated Wrangels
army, entered Erevan, without a shot fired. The Ankara Government and Soviet Russia
signed the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, 13 drawing a line across the map
which survives as the boundary between the two neighbours today. This is the
frontier that is here to stay. The Treaty of Kars, 14 dated October 13, 1921,
ratified generally the provisions of the Moscow Treaty. Repeating the territorial
clauses regarding the Northeastern boundary of Turkey, it reaffirmed the
establishment of the Nakhichevan under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Appendix 1 of
the Treaty of Kars describes the boundary line between Soviet Georgia, Soviet
Armenia, Nakhichevan and Turkey. On December 30, 1922, all three Transcaucasian
Soviet Republics merged into the Soviet Union.
Bolsheviks delayed their arrival, we ourselves would have asked them to come
What were the reactions of some Armenians to these inevitable developments ? Katchaznouni
writes : «... There were the usual complaints that the powers were unfair, did not
appreciate us and did not compensate us according to what we deserved. » (p. 13) It is
common knowledge that the Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923, replaced the Treaty
of Sevres. While the French signed with the Ankara Government an agreement on October 20,
1921 (which amounted to something like a separate peace between Turkey and France) and the
U.S. Senate turned down a Mandate (whose frontiers drawn by President Wilson had not
satisfied the Armenians), Chicherin (according to Katchaznouni) « offered in the name of
[the] Soviet Russia to locate the Armenians of Turkey in [the] Crimea, on the shores of
[the] Volga [and] in Siberia. » (p. 13)
Katchaznouni enquires at this point « Was the arrival of the Bolsheviks a calamity for
our country ? » He retorts : « The Bolsheviks are necessary in Armenia... There is no
other force that could take their place. This is the truth. » (p. 14) He adds :
« We had exhausted all our resources, had come to an impasse as government and as Party
in the Fall of 1920. Had the Bolsheviks delayed their arrival, we ourselves would have
asked them to come... »
* * *
Katchaznouni concludes that the « European cities are full of emigrant malcontents of all
kinds who publish newspapers, write books, call protest meetings... » He ends his book,
saying : « It is here that I shall state the very grave word, which I know will embarrass
you but which must be said at last and said simply, without concealment or attenuation :
« The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has nothing to do any more. » He proposed «
dissolution of the party », having nothing else to do anymore « neither at the present
time, nor in the future » (p. 16). After a trip to the United States of America,
Katchaznouni himself returned to Armenia and spent his last years there.
Kamuran Gürün adds in THE
ARMENIAN FILE, regarding Katchaznouni's book: "It is known that this book,
which was published in Armenia in 1923 by the Mekhitarian Printing Press in Vienna,
was translated into English. Its record has been found in investigations made in the
national libraries of various countries, but it has been determined that both the
English and Armenian versions of the book had been checked out and not
The Armenian Diaspora hard at
work, always attempting to obscure the truth.
(1) - Also spelled as Hovanness Kadjaznouni.
(2) - « A Memorandum on the Recognition of the Government of the Independent
Republic of Armenia », The Armenian Review, Boston. Vol. XXI. No 2-82 (Summer
1968), pp-10 11.
(3) - Lord Kinross Ataturk : the Rebirth of a Nation, Nicosia. Rustem, 1981, p. xvii.
(4) - Anil Cecen Ataturk ve Cumhuriyet, Ankara, Türkiye Is Bankasi. 1981.
(5) - Seref Gözübüyük and Zekâi Sezgin, 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis
Görüsmeleri, Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1957.
(6) - The Armenian Review, op. cit., p 11.
(7) - Kâzim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, Istanbul, Türkiye Yayinevi, 1960, pp.
(8) - Ibid. pp. 914-915;
(9) - T.C. Kültür Bakanligi, Atatürkün Milli Dis Politikasi. 1919- 1923, Vol
I, Ankara, Eroglu Matbaacilik, 1981, pp. 517-528.
(10) - Richard G. Hovannisian. « Simon Vratzian and Armenian Nationalism », The
Armenian Review, Boston. Vol. XXIII, No.1-89 (Spring 1970), pp. 3-35.
(11) - Kinross, op. cit., p. 231.
(12) - Ibid., p 234.
(13) - Atatürkün Milli Dis Politikasi, op. cit., pp 536-554.
(14) - Ibid., pp 555-579.
|A Neighbor's Thoughts on a Katchaznouni Act
"...On December 17, 1918...when the 'Armenian invasion' was well under way. Premier
Noizhordonia of Georgia spoke to his people: 'There has taken place that which should not
have taken place. Regretfully, Armenia had incited rebellion and then had brought up her
regular army. The present Armenian government, in instigating this shameful conflict, has
precipitated that which has never before occurred war between Georgia and Armenia: Who
had ever heard of war over a few incidents in a village or two? The real explanation could
be found in the character of Kachaznuni's government, which, like the wolf, eats the calf
because such is its nature. That government could not live in peace and was obsessed with
battling one or another of its neighbors, for like the wolf, it had to devour everything.
Should not the Armenians have realized that, in view of their hostile relations with the
Muslims, they must at least cling to the friendship of (Christian) Georgia? But instead
they had now burned this bridge as well...' "
As reported by Professor Richard Hovannisian in his book, The
Republic of Armenia, Vol. 1, on Armenian's aggression, when on December 14, 1918, by a
surprise and unprovoked attack on its neighbor, Georgia, Armenia attempted a land grab
Kachaznouni, Hovhannes (Roupen)
Born in Akhaltskha (Georgia), Kachaznouni was an architect in Baku,
where he joined the ARF. He was a member of the Armenian National Council in 1917. A
Dashnaktsakan deputy in the Transcaucasian Sefm (parliament) until 1918, he was a
member of the delegations in Trebizond and Batum for peace talks with the Turks.
Minister of Social Affairs in Chkhengeli's Transcaucasian government, he became the
first Prime Minister of independent Armenia (July 1918 to August 1919). Arrested by
the Bolsheviks after Sovietization, he was saved by the February 1921 uprising.
However, in Bucharest in 1923, he published a pamphlet expressing a change of heart:
"Dashnaktsutiun no longer has anything to do". He then returned to Soviet
Armenia, retired from political life and worked as an architect. He died in 1938,
probably a victim of Stalin's purges.
From legaman.com, which deals with A.R.F. (Dashnak) history. Go
there and learn about how the poor, innocent Armenians engaged in
And what's that about a "change of heart"?
In its entirety:
Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has nothing to do any more