Katchaznouni’s report is extremely valuable not only because it discloses an indisputable truth but also because it teaches invaluable lessons even in the present day world. The present USA strategy bestows special missions on small ethnic and religious groups in dividing certain countries. The bloody outcomes of these missions are apparent in the examples of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. What is more, the world public opinion is aware that new examples will ensue. However, there is always a final scene in these plots and contrivances. Katchaznouni’s report provides an opportunity to see the tragedies that fill those last scenes, with all their sadness. Those who allowed themselves to be pushed against the peoples they had been living together with, for hundreds, even thousands of years, had not only their neighbours but their own people pay the price for it, most gravely. Katchaznouni, like all the other Armenian writers state that the Tsarist Russian regime, the British and the French imperialism used them and when, finally, they were left alone, they had nothing else to do but bemoan that they had been betrayed. Those who can interpret the developments in history can certainly see that the regrets and the cries which will follow the present historical period will not be in a different tone.

Other Documents in the Dashnag Archives Confirm Katchaznouni

Katchaznouni’s observations stated in his report are confirmed by other documents in the Dashnag archives. These Dashnag documents, some of which can be found in the Armenian archives, expose the “Genocide” lie in the same dramatic way seen in Katchaznouni’s report. The Dashnag documents themselves show how they were used by the Tsarist Russia and the Western imperialism against Turkey and what massacres they were responsible for, during the occupation and how rightful was the fight the Turkish army waged against all this.

Fight against Turkey in the Tsarist Armies

The imperialist centres accuse the Ottoman state and Mustafa Kemal’s Revolutionary government with subjecting the Armenians to massacre and genocide during 1915-23. However, the eight years which comprise the period of the Turkish War of Independence, are at the same time years of fight for the Dashnag forces, under the leadership of the Tsarist regime of Russia, the British and the French armies. This historical fact has been reflected in thousands of Armenian documents. I would like to give a few examples. The declaration sent by the Armenian National Bureau to Tsar Nicholas II at the very beginning of World War I shows how deeply attached the Dashnag leaders feel towards imperialism:

“As the glorious Russian Armies are fighting against Turkey who, with German support has dared to raise its hand against mighty Russia, on the lands in its own hegemony, in the snowy Armenian mountains and the vast Alashkert valley, the Armenians, taking the advice of their forefathers (…) have risen to sacrifice their lives and their assets to Great Russia and the magnificence of its throne. “The good news of war with Turkey has aroused enthusiasm among all the Armenian people. The Armenians from all the countries are in haste to take their place in the glorious Russian armies and to serve the achievement of the Russian arms with their blood. We are praying God to be victorious over the enemy. We owe it to our nation to turn into new Russian arms and to fulfill Russia’s historical duty in the East. Our hearts are burning with this desire.

“The Russian flag will freely flutter in the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles.

Your will, my magnificent lord, bestow freedom to the peoples under Turkish yoke”. [6]

 

[6] Mşak, No. 271, 1914: cited by ibid p. 89

In the dinner party following the march of the volunteer unit, commanded by Vardan, on April 15, 1915, in Echmiadzin , the first toast was proposed to glorious Russia and its heroic army. All Armenian (katoliko/Catholicos), after having sung ceremonial prayers, declared the gratitude of the Armenian people to the Russian armies and their readiness to emancipate the Armenian lands from the hegemony of foreigners, together with Russia. [13]

Similarly, Georg V, the all Armenian (katoliko/Catholicos), after the occupation of Van, states in the congratulatory telegrams he sent to Vorontsov, the Caucasian Governor of Russia and to P.I. Oganovsky, the Commander of the 4th Caucasian Army that he is praying for new victories of the Russian armies [14]

Hatisian, one of the important leaders of Dashnagsutiun, in his memoirs published in the 5th issue of Ayrenik in 1933, states that “with the defeat of the Russian army, all our hopes pinned on this army were exhausted” [15] and declares his position in World War I.

Fighting Against Turkey in the service of the British and French Armies

Following the collapse of the Tsarist Russia, Dashnags went under the control of the Western imperialists and fought against Turkey for the regional interests of Britain, France and USA.

Katchasznouni, as the Prime-Minister of the Dashnag government, on February 1919 , in a meeting with General F. Wocker, the commander of the occupational British forces, stated that he was sure the conditions of Armenians would improve with the victories of the Allies and with their movement into Caucasia. The report on this meeting is in the archives of the Interior Ministry of Armenia. [16]

Similarly, another document in the Armenian State Archives relates that the Armenians in Adana were armed by the French occupational forces under the command of General Diffe, and were organized in ”revenge units” and fought in French uniforms. [17]

Obeying British and French imperialism resulted in a commitment in Greek invasion. The Foreign Minister of the Dashnag Government states, in the telegram he sent to his representative in Tbilisi:

“The situation on the front is very grave. It is essential that you see Luck and Corbeille [18] and have them send telegrams to their governments informing them of how the Turkish troops are advancing and demand that they take all the necessary precautions(…) See the Greek representative too and demand that he too send a telegram to his government to inform them of the situation and to ask them if it is possible for the Greek forces to start an assault and break the strength of the Turkish forces” [19]

[13] Ararat No. 5, 1915, p.288 vd cited in: A.O.Arutiunian, Kavkazski Front 1914-1917 gg., İzdatelstvo “Ayastan”, Yerevan, 1971, p.305
[14] Ararat No. 5, 1915, s. 415 vd cited in: ibid, p.307
[15] Ayrenik, No. 5, 1933, cited in: a.A. Lalaian, “Kontrevolyutsionnaya Rol Partii Dashnagsoutiun”, İstoriçeskie Zapiski, No.2, 1928, p.83
[16] See Armenian SSR Interior Ministery Central October Revolution Archives (TsAOR MVD SSRA)f.114, d. 23, y.48 cited in: D. Yenukidze, Krah İmperialistiçeskoy İnterventsii V Zakavkazye, Gospolizdat Gruzinskoy SSR, Tbilisi, 1954, p. 188
[17] Armenian SSR State History Archives (GİA Arm. SSR) f. 200 d. 132. y. 338 cited in: N.Z.Efendiyeva, Borba Turetskogo Naroda Protiv Frantsuzkih Okkupantov Na Yege Anatolii (1919-1921) gg.)İzdatelsvo AN Azerbaycanskoy SSR, Baku, 1966, p. 116
[18] The representatives of the Allies in Tbilisi
[19] D.S. Zavriev, K. Noveyşey, İstorii Severo-Vostoçnıh Vilayetov Turtsii, Tbilisi, 1947, s. 85

 Dashnag Policy of Plunder

The Dashnag units practiced methods of torture of the Middle Ages and plundered the villages. In this way, they tried to overcome the financial crisis that the Armenian State was in. In the letter written by a Dashnag official to the head of the Dashnag government, A. Oganjanian, dated June 21, 1920, the official complains that the wealth that should be handed over to the Armenian state is being plundered by Armenians:

“Zanki-Basar was occupied by our troops. This country is so rich that it can pay our debts many times over. There has been an unconceivable plunder here. They have collected all the wheat, the barley, the rice, all the samovars, the carpets, all the money and gold. The Ministry of Finance could only send here yesterday, two officials, not accompanied by an organized force. A wealth of gigantic proportions is sliding away from our hands.” [23]

This report by the Dashnag official who wanted the property belonging to Turks should be collected in the hands of the government is in the Armenian State Archives. Another important document in this direction is the report sent by the Armenian Governor of Kars, to the central authority. The Governor, as he is reporting how the Turkish-Kurdish population is exterminated and their assets plundered, complains that they are not always successful in collecting all the wealth in their hands in the occupied villages. The Governor adds that “the region comprising Turks and Kurds is really like a treasure. But unfortunately we cannot fully control this place.” [24]

We come across the evidence of another instance of plunder in the 105th issue of 1920 of daily Jogovurd. The writer named G. Muradian recounts from the Azerbaijani villages of the North bank of Lake Gorchy his impressions of the Dashnag policy of plunder, with admiration:

“As a result of the work carried out by our government, the population of these villages have been expelled outside the borders of Armenia. I have seen abandoned villages with only a few cats and dogs who were meowing or barking strangely with surprise at the death silence. The population of these villages have left behind a considerable amount of potatoes, wheat and barley and seeds. The government can collect from these villages, over two million puds of wheat and half a million pud of potatoes.” [25]

[23] Gosarhiv Armenii f. 65, d. 116, y. 96 cited in: A.A. Lalaian, “ Kontrevolyutsionnaya Rol Partii Dashnagzoutiun”, p. 100.
[24] Gosarhiv Armenii f. 67, d. 1769, y. 25, cited in: ibid
[25] Jogovur, No. 105, 1920 cited in op.cit p. 100 vd

Dashnag documents also document how Armenian peasants suffered under the unbelievable torture and cruelty of the Armenian government itself. For example, it was reflected in the documents how the Dashnag Government Commissar, V. Agamian punished people and had them shot without trying them or carrying out an investigation on them, in order to prevent escapes from the army. Agamian gathered the wives, mothers and sisters of the people charged with deserting the army and stripped them naked and forced them to duck-walk in the village square. The Dashnag official then beat the naked women and kept them in water for hours. Agamian, who later ordered the women to be arrested, raped the young girls and women during the night. Agamian stayed in office for a long time without ever been punished. The Dashnag government called him back, only when they learned from a peasant named M. Azaparetov that the peasants were going to attempt at assassinating Agamian. [26]

A one time member of the Dashnag government, Jagetian, in his article published in Iran, makes the following statements concerning the Dashnag rule which he was a part of:

“The government armies, the pseudo-volunteer units (humbas), plundered the villages around the town of Ichevan (old Delican) and raped the women. The volunteer execution team put the peasants in such a state that the ‘humbapeta’ (the head of the team), ‘Arch-Mard’ (the bear-man) surrounded the village with 50 volunteers and pulled it down. Almost one thousand Armenian peasants were pushed to Azerbaijan territory.”

Jagetian says that no official was punished for special treatment of friends and relatives and adds:

“The Armenian Interior Ministry had become the shelter for all the criminals. The Minister Krmonian himself embezzled 50 million rubles from the state treasury one day before he left office.” [27]

Years later, another representative of the Dashnags, the publisher Chalhushian calls the government police “plunder troops” and tells how it became impossible to walk unarmed in the centre of the Armenian capital after sunset. [28]

In fact, the system of Armenian volunteer units called “humbapeta” systemized anarchy and plunder in Armenia and the neighbouring countries. The following song sung all together is actually a musical confession so far as it reflects the psychology of the volunteer units: “Come, pull down, pillage, kill and lay your jacket on your shoulder, walk about freely!” [29]

These circumstances gave rise to a situation where everyone who so wished founded a volunteer unit and turned these units into criminal organizations. The directive given out by the “humbapeta” (head of the unit) named Deli-Qazar expresses this situation very well:

“Announcement to the Armenians of the Yerevan region and the town of Yerevan: I am going to the front today with the boys. If some people, after I have left, introduce themselves as Deli-Qazar’s boys and misuse my name as a blackmailer, they will be punished severely by the nation and the military authority.” [30]

By 1918, The Dashnag Government had recruited all its citizens below 35 to the army and had reestablished “volunteer” units for the war to be fought against Turkey. In their publications, they made announcements threatening those who would go against this decision with death and proclaimed that “those who were wise” would not act against them. The issue dated March 1, 1918 of the Dashnag organ, Arev contains such information. [31] In another document kept in the Armenian State Archives it is stated that special troops have been dispatched to punish the villages of Berd, Verhniy, Karmir, Ahbyur and the Shamshadinsk region. [32]

The Dashnag organ, Martik, published in Gumru states that two cannons, one machine gun and a team of soldiers will be dispatched to the villages of those who have not participated in the military mobilization and that those who resist will be bombarded. [33] The Dashnag authority had even formed troops named “Terror Organ” in order to fight the deserters and posted such announcements on the village walls:

“To all the deserters and the Armenian people: On the night of March 1, somebody stealing a horse and two others deserting the regiment betrayed our country and the Armenian people and the three Armenian soldiers were executed by shooting. All the deserters should report to their troops and do their military service before it is too late. Otherwise they will be punished in the same way. Death to the traitors who will give Turks the opportunity of raiding Shiraq (Şirak). Terror Organ. Gumru, March 2, 1918” [34]

[26] See A. Karinian, “K. Harakteristike Armyianskih Nationalisticheskih Techeniy”, bolshevik Zakavkatzia, No. 9-10, 1928, p. 70
[27] See A Karinian, “K Harakteristike Armianskih Nationalisticheskih Techeniy”, Bolshevik Zakavkazia, No. 9-10, 1928. p. 70
[28] See İbid p. 70 vd.
[29] T. Hachikoglian, 10 Let Armyanskoy Strelkovoy Divizii, İzdatelstvo Polit. Uprav. KKA, Tiflis, 1930, p. 5
[30] İbid, p.5 vd.
[31] Arev, No. 46, March 1, 1918 cited in: A. Lalaian, “Kontrrevolyutsiyonnıy ‘Dashnagsutyutiun’ İ İmperialistcheskaia Voina 1914-1918 gg.”, p. 96.
[32] Armenian SSR Central State Archive (TsGA Arm. SSR) f. 67/199, d. 139, y. 230 cited in: A.M.Elchibekian, Ustanovlenie Sovyetskoy Vlasti V. Armenii, İzdatelstvo AN Armyanskoy SSR, Yerevan, 1954, p. 76
[33] Martik, No. 2, 1918 cited in: T.P. Agaian, Veliki Oktyahr i Borba Trudyashihsia Armenii Za Pobedu Sovyekskoy Vlasti, İzdatelstvo AN Aramianskoy SSR, Yerevan, 1962, p. 134
[34] T. Hachikoglian, op.cit., p. 7

The first man who led the Republic of Armenia. His name is sometimes spelled "Kachazouni."

Comrades:

These matters have had my deliberate and serious consideration. I do not know whether you, too, have arrived at the same conclusions. Allow me to say more: I am afraid that my final conclusion — those very difficult words which I shall here state with all singleness of heart — will cause general embarrassment, perhaps resentment, in the Convention.

I am prepared for that.

I only ask that you believe: a) that it is more difficult for me to write and sign those words than for you to listen to them from my own lips; b) that those words are not the result of thoughtless or petty, transient dispositions or hasty resolve. They are the result of deep-rooted convictions and a clear awareness, for I am capable of thinking and understanding, considering and determining a stand point.

I beg of you, therefore, that you be patient and approach the matters with an open mind, unhampered — something which is not easy for men who have lived a Party life and have thought from a Party angle.

Let me now proceed with my subject.

In order to present my conclusions in proper sequence I feel it is necessary for me to refresh your memory with the various phases of the Armenian Cause — from the Great War to the Lausanne Conference [42] — and the role played by the Dashnagtzoutiun during that period. So that I may not abuse your attention, I shall curtail my speech and present to you a concise yet accurate commentary.

Following 1914, what stages did the Armenian question pass through, what development did the events show, how did they come about, what sequence did they follow and and where did they lead to and in the meantime, what did our party do and what will it have to do in the future?

When I recall the recent past, with these considerations in mind, and when I distinguish the important points from the secondary and the arbitrary ones, and arrange them in chronological order, this is the picture that arises:

At the beginning of the Fall of 1914 when Turkey had not yet entered the war but had already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionary bands began to be formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm and, especially, with much uproar. Contrary to the decision taken during their general meeting at Erzurum only a few weeks before, the A.R.F. had active participation in the formation of the bands and their future military action against Turkey.

In an undertaking of such gravity, fraught with most serious consequences, individual agents of the Transcaucasian A.R.F. acted against the will of our superior authority, against the will of the General Meeting of the Party.

Why?

Because they were also suffering from the syndrome of following the masses, and were flowing in the direction that the current was taking them.

This example urges us to recall that the A.R.F. in Transcaucasia in the past had been a follower rather than an originator of movements that had their inception beyond their control. Thus it was in 1903 (rebellions and demonstrations on the occasion of the seizure of Church properties); thus it was in the year 1905-1906 (bloody encounters between Tatars and Armenians); and thus it was also during the first big movements of the laboring classes (1903-1906) when the A.R.F. was being led at Baku, Tiflis (Tblisi) and Batoum by the policies of foreign socialistic parties.

The same characteristic line of action appears, as we see a little later, in the conduct we pursued afterwards generally.

It would be useless to argue today whether our bands of volunteers should have entered the field or not. Historical events have their irrefutable logic. In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression, and did so.

And it was not the A.R.F. that would stop the movement even if it wished to do so. It was able to utilize the existing conditions, give effect and issue to the accumulated desires, hopes and frenzy, organize the ready forces — it had that much ability and authority. But to go against the current and push forward its own plan — it was unfit, especially unfit for one particular reason: the A.R.F. is a people’s mass, strong in instinct but weak in comprehension.

^42. In the Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923 between the Allies and Turkey, reference was no longer made to Armenia or Armenians. Both had ceased to exist in the eyes of both Turkey and the Allies. Thus the “Armenian Question” and the question of Armenians was buried in the grave of diplomatic silence.

It is also useless, today, to question who is responsible for the wrongs (if the issue of responsibily does ever come up). If it had not been Bishop Mesrop, A. Hatisov, Dr. Zhavriev, S. Arutniov, Dro and Andranic, there would have been others to do the same things in their place. If the formation of bands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further and more deeply. At the present time it is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the Party.

The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 were the periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in the Caucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt that the war would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be defeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last be liberated.

We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzarist government would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, our efforts and assistance.

We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We had implanted our own desires into the minds of others; we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams. From mouth to mouth, from ear to ear passed mysterious words purported to have been spoken in the palace of the Viceroy; attention was called to some kind of a letter by Vorontzov-Dashkov to the Catholicos as an important document in our hands to use in the presentation of our rights and claims —a cleverly composed letter with very indefinite sentences and generalities which might be interpreted in any manner, according to one’s desire.

We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes and expectations.

The deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the Armenian Cause. Half of historical Armenia —“ the same half where the foundations of our independence would be laid according to the traditions inherited by European diplomacy —“ that half was denuded of Armenians: the Armenian provinces of Turkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what they were doing and have no reason to regret today. It was the most decisive method of extirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey.

Again, it would be useless to ask today to what extent the participation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of the Armenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions would not have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different, as not one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been the same even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks.

This is a matter about which it is possible to have many different opinions.

The proof is, however — and this is essential —“ that the struggle began decades ago against which the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia.

This was the terrible fact!

Civilized humanity might very well be shaken with rage in the face of this unspeakable crime. Statesmen might utter menacing words against criminal Turkey. “Blue”, “yellow”, “orange” books and papers might be published condemning them. Divine punishment against the criminals might be invoked in churches by clergymen of all denominations. The press of all countries might be filled with horrible descriptions and details and the testimony of eye-witnesses. . . Let them say this or that, but the work was already done and words would not revive the corpses fallen in the Arabian deserts, rebuild the ruined hearths, repopulate the country now become desolate. The Turks knew what they ought to do and did it.

The second half of 1915 and the entire year of 1916 were periods of hopelessness, desperation and mourning for us. The refugees, all those who had survived the holocaust, were filling Russian provinces by tens and hundreds of thousands. They were famished, naked, sick, horrified and desperate floods of humanity, flooding our villages and cities. They had come to a country which was itself ruined and famished. They piled upon each other, before our own eyes, on our threshold dying of famine and sickness. . .

And we were unable to save those precious lives. Angered and terrified, we sought the culprits and quickly found them: the deceitful politics of the Russian government. With the politically immature mind peculiar to inconsequential men, we fell from one extreme to another. Just as unfounded was our faith in the Russian government yesterday, our condemnation of them today was equally blind and groundless.

It was claimed that the Russians were intentionally slow to act, showed uncertainty and provided the grounds and the means for the Turks to slaughter the local Armenians. It was professed that the reason behind this attitude on the part of the Russians was to vacate Armenia and later settle the Kossacs there and that Count Lobanov-Rostovsky’s widely known project “Armenia without Armenians” was in progress.

It was not only people, but our party and many of our citizens with common sense who also shared this idea.

We were reluctant to understand that there did not have to be such a project as “Armenia without Armenians” to explain the Russian stand and that the Russian plans did not necessarily have to involve such an item as unconditionally taking on the defence of the Turkish Armenians. Such a plan definitely did not exist. We were only projecting our own wishes on the Russian government and accusing them of disloyalty.

Our volunteer units were naturally trying to capture Van and Muş without any waste of time. They headed for these places to save the Armenians. However, Russians did not only consist of Armenians and they had other intentions. Their sluggishness and uncertainty to act which we evaluated as disloyalty is explainable by the customary ineffectiveness of the Russian command ( which was witnessed many times on other fronts as well) or other general military conditions unknown to us now.

This incident being very much original and interesting, demands to be taken up individually. By an extraordinary mental aberration, we, a political party, were forgetting that our Cause was an incidental and trivial phase for the Russians, so trivial that if necessary, they would trample on our corpses without a moment’s hesitation.

I am not saying that we did not know the circumstances. Of course we knew and understood and so we started when it was necessary to explain the situation. Deep down in our hearts, however, we did not grasp the full meaning of that word-formula; we forgot what we already knew and we drew such conclusions as though our Cause was the center of gravity of the Great War, its cause and its purpose. When the Russians were advancing, we used to say from the depths of our subconscious minds that they were coming to save us; and when they were withdrawing, we said they are retreating so that they allow us to be massacred. . .

In both cases we misinterpreted the consequence with the purpose and intention. We sought proofs of Russian treachery and of course we found them — exactly as we sought and found proofs of the same Russians— undeniable benevolence six months before. To complain bitterly about our bad luck and to seek external causes for our misfortune— that is one of the main aspects of our national psychology from which, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun is not free.

The Georgians used the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Tatar conflicts cleverly (in other, stronger words, opportunistically), in order to consolidate their privileged situation. Relying on Turks and Tatars and threatening us with moving the borders in this or that way, they complicated matters for us and forced us to accept their conditions. Whenever they needed to ally with us, they started threatening the Azerbaijanis. This kind of behaviour was politically an absolute blackmail and it provided a superiority for the Georgians over their neighbours and established their hegemony over others.

I have digressed a little but in order to make the political situation clear in that period in Southern Caucasia, it was necessary.

Our party must understand and keep in mind that the party was under the hegemony of the Georgian Social Democratic Party in the most difficult days, and it acted abominably.

In September 1917, the Armenian Convention met in Tiflis (Tbilisi). A national board was established as its executive organ and was named the Central National Council. This National Council later acted on behalf of the Armenian people of Southern Caucasia and became the fully authorized representative of the nation.

Dashnagtzoutiun played the leading role both at the Convention and on the board and the council.

Towards the end of the same year, elections were held in Southern Caucasia for the members of All Russia Provisional Assembly.

Out of the parties which participated in the election campaigns, the Menshevik Social Democrats won 12, the Musavat won 10 and the Dashnagtzoutiun won 9 seats. The number of seats won by the other parties was negligible.

These three parties represented three great peoples who could be listed, according to their political weight, as the Georgians, the Tatars and the Armenians. These elections showed that the strongest, or rather the only organized party was Dashnagtzoutiun.

The All Russia Provisional Assembly. could not meet. The Bolshevik Revolution broke out in October and was triumphant in Moscow and Petrograd. The Soviet order was proclaimed and the meeting of the All Russia Provisional Assembly was not permitted, as this assembly was considered to have bourgeois tendencies.

Southern Caucasia, loyal to the February Revolution did not recognize the Soviet sovereignty and system

Why?

Because in this corner region the dominant parties preferred a democratic platform based on a broad mass membership and for this reason would not accept especially a party dictatorship. On the other hand, they thought that the country was not mature enough for a fully socialist, let alone a communist regime (besides, the Musavat Party possessed nothing in the name of socialism). The socialism of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnagtzoutiun was only on the surface and had no deep roots among the masses of people within the party. Among the Georgian Mensheviks, on the other hand, the nationalistic anti-Russian trend was strong.

Secondly, the Georgian Mensheviks which determined the atmosphere in the political life of Southern Caucasia, had broken away from the Bolsheviks and were openly opposing them.

The Mensheviks who were loyal to their party regulations and the general political line of their party, were pursuing here, exactly the same policy their Russian comrades were pursuing in Russia. The Musavat which had enthusiastic desires about capturing Baku and had Panturkist ideals, wanted an immediate separation from Russia.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnagtzoutiun had formed close relations with the local Bolsheviks and was assisting them, in case the Tatars would capture Baku. In Tiflis (Tbilisi), on the other hand, they could not close their eyes to the reality of the Georgians and Tatars and so could not put in practice Bolshevik policies. They would not have been able to do so even if they had wanted. Anyway, they had no desire to do so, because the Bolshevik ideology and tactics did not appeal to them.

Our Party stood in the anti-Bolshevik camp partly due to certain convictions within the Party and partly because of being under the pressure of outside factors.

I have to remind you here of the neutral and reluctant stand our comrades took in Baku.

Baku, the industrial city which bore a proletariat of tens of thousands and strong workers’ organizations offered very favorable conditions for the development of Bolshevism. That city had been the only region where the Bolsheviks could find a reliable sanctuary and a sound support in the whole Southern Caucasia since the first days of the Revolution. Baku did not refuse, in form, the sovereignty of the Southern Caucasian Commissariat even after the October Revolution. In reality, however, the power was in the hands of two local organs: the Social Organizations Soviet and the Workers’ Representatives Soviet.

In the first one, anti-Bolshevik groups, and in the second one the Bolsheviks dominated. Our Party was represented on both the organs. Inside these organs which were independent of each other and were of different nature, an open struggle for domination was going on.

In the first period, the Social Organizations Soviet was stronger (here, the mild socialists and the liberal bourgeoisie had formed a silent alliance against the Bolsheviks). The Workers’ Representatives Soviet was gradually gaining strength and by January 1918 it had gained control over the entire situation.

This Soviet was led by the Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks were not an important force then; their accomplishments were essentially due to the insecurity prevailing in the other camp.

Only two parties, Dashnagtzoutiun and Musavat could demonstrate any strength against the Bolsheviks. However, though these two parties needed to act in alliance if they wanted to accomplish anything in the struggle against Bolshevism, this was unimaginable, for there was no mutual trust. Dashnagtzoutiun was aware that its support for Musavat was required only because of the Bolshevik threat. Musavat had to erase Dashnagtzoutiun from the political scene, after having eliminated the Bolsheviks. No doubt, the Bolsheviks would do the same to Dashnagtzoutiun after having destroyed the Musavat with the help of armed Dashnag troops. For the Armenian community, the Bolshevik dictatorship was more acceptable in comparison to the Musavat dictatorship.

The fact that our people got more and more involved in the Bolshevik movement in Baku and that they provided a kind of sustenance to them is explainable only with this.

Just as we unintentionally came under the domination of the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis (Tbilisi), we were under the influence of the Bolsheviks in Baku. In both cases the motivating force was the Turkish-Tatar threat. Bolsheviks wiped out Musavat in Baku with our support (March 1918); we, on the other hand were able to protect Baku against the Turkish-Tatar assault with the help of the Russian elements among the Bolsheviks.

Later, again with our initiative, British forces were invited over from Iran. This happened in the last moments when the Bolsheviks were getting ready to escape to Russia and had got on the ships.

If the British had been able to settle down firmly in Baku, the outcome of the events would probably have been different. However, the few numbers of the British troops did not promote trust among the people and they got on their ships and went back to Iran.

Because the Georgians were primarily concerned with the issues of Batoum and Ajaria , in order to be able to secure all this region, they were inclined to leave Kars and Ardahan to Turks.

However, Armenians needed Kars. We were ready to give Ajaria big concessions in order to get Kars in return. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, as the fourth (or if Dagestan is taken into consideration, the fifth) republic of the Southern Caucasian Federation, wanted a Southwestern Muslim Republic to be established in Ajaria. If not, they thought, Ajaria ought to be attached to Turkey. They did not want it to be attached to Georgia.

The Azerbaijanis defended completely the same view with the Turks concerning Kars and Ardahan. They considered Kars and Ardahan Turkish territory and therefore regarded it quite natural that they should be attached to Turkey.

Turks were very closely informed about our inner conflicts and therefore insisted on their views.

There was another issue which invoked a big discussion: Turks wanted Southern Caucasia to be declared independent of Russia and thought that an agreement with us would only then be possible.

The Southern Caucasian delegates insistently stated that Southern Caucasia was physically separated from Russia and was in fact independent. Turks, on the other hand, quite rightly declared that in order for an international agreement to be signed, a de facto situation was not sufficient and that a legal foundation was needed and that to bring this about, certain formalities had to be carried out.

These unproductive talks went on for about a month. It was to Turks’ advantage that the talks went on for so long (otherwise, they would have ended them any moment). Time was passing, our military force and defense potential was continuously getting weaker whereas those of the Turks were getting stronger. While we were busy with holding meetings and with correspondence in Trabzon, the Turkish Army was advancing without meeting any obstruction. They captured Erzurum at the end of March and Batoum at the beginning of April.

Nevertheless, the Seym would not admit defeat.

When it was clear that Turks would not make any compromises on anything that was included in the Brest Agreement, the Seym withdrew its delegation and the Trabzon talks broke up (this was called “a break”).

Internal discord within the Seym and inside the government of the Federation which had been going on since the first days was more clearly prominent now.

Turkish success encouraged the Azerbaijanis; their delegation had a better chance to sit down with the Turks and talk in Trabzon (and they certainly did use it). In the Seym the Azerbaijanis did not hide that they sided with the Turks. Defending and developing the Turkish view, they demanded that Southern Caucasia be speedily separated from Russia, Turkey be given considerable concessions and also the war be ended, having come to an agreement with Turkey; for they stated that as Muslim democrats, their religious sentiments prevented them from getting actively involved in a fight with the Turks.

These words, expressed by a Musavat speaker in the Seym should have been understood as a possibility that the Southern Caucasian Tatars would fight against us, let alone fighting on our side, (they had never actually been on our ranks and had never fought on the Turkish front) if the war with Turkey was continued.

The Georgians hesitated, as if they were the Menshevik fraction of the Seym.

They harboured two trends, two different tendencies (the Russian tendency and the German-Turkish tendency). Those that were inclined towards Russia did not definitely want a separation from Russia, but because they evaluated the Brest Agreement as unacceptable, thought that instead of a peace with such conditions, a war was more acceptable. The representatives of the second trend were against Russia; They thought the Russian threat against Georgia was more important than the Turkish threat. Therefore, they were ready to give very big concessions to Turkey, to be able to compromise (to speak openly, they were trying to give concessions in the name of Armenia, to be able to save at least Batoum and the harbour there, if not the whole Ajaria).

The Armenians (Dashnagtzoutiun fraction in the Seym) did not want to separate from Russia nor did they have positive expectations from Turkey. The Armenians would rather stop Turkish attacks with armed force, because they believed that it was going to be them, rather than anybody else (or perhaps only them) who would suffer losses and they still hoped they were capable of future military victories.

The Armenian National Assembly met in Alexandropol (Gumru) in April and took up this issue. Despite the presentation made there, by the author of these lines, it was agreed that the Brest Agreement should be refused and the war should be continued. However, this decision could never be put into practice, because we were not in a position to assert our ideas, we could not even determine our own fate.

The indecision of the Georgians did not last long. The German-Turkish trend was victorious in the Seym and as a result of this victory, the Seym announced boisterously on April 22 that Southern Caucasia parted from Russia. On this occasion, the Georgian and the Tatar leaders made very emotional speeches at the Seym meeting. The Dashnag fraction supported the proposal of separation but did not make any speeches.

It was not easy for us to accept this separation, but there was no other way. If we had opposed, the Southern Caucasian Federation would have broken down; the Georgians and the Tatars would have agreed to reconcile with the Turks and we would have been left alone; and we would have been standing against the Turkish Army. Russia (neither the Bolshevik one nor the anti-Bolshevik one) could not have helped us even if they had wanted to. We were not only alone, but behind our lines it was also not secure; for it was clear that the Azerbaijanis and (perhaps the Georgians too in order to capture Akhalkalaki [Ahılkelek], Lori and Pembek) would come against us. We needed the Southern Caucasian Confederation more than anybody else and did not want it to break down. This was why we acted in the same direction as our neighbours did.

On April 25, Kars fell; and with almost no fighting, for directives were received from Tiflis (Tbilisi) to surrender the fortress to the Turks. This treacherous directive had been sent without our knowledge and it aroused great reaction among our people. That day the fate of the Federation looked very critical.

However, what was done was done. The Kars fortress which was our most strategic area was now in the hands of the Turks; there was no room for hesitation and neglect. The Seym accepted the Brest Agreement as the reference and decided to continue the talks which broke up in Trabzon.

The new phase of the talks started in Batoum on the first days of May (where the Turks had quite comfortably settled for some time). This time the Turks had a different approach. The Brest Agreement was no longer satisfactory for them. They were saying that following the Trabzon talks there was more bloodshed and that this had to be compensated. They mainly demanded more land compensations from Armenia. Long and useless talks started again. The Brest Agreement which we did not want to hear about a few months ago in Trabzon, became our sole wish now. However, it was impossible to persuade the Turks. They had gripped our throat tightly and did not want to let go.

On May 15, the Turkish troops crossed Arpaçay (Arpatchai) which was the border according to the Brest agreement, and invaded Alexandropol (Gumru ) in a few hours and moved towards Karakilise.

The situation was unacceptable.

Tiflis (Tbilisi) which was the capital of Georgia and Southern Caucasia was also under threat. No further advance was made in the talks going on in Batoum.

The discord in the Seym could not be settled with any compromise. An explosion was inevitable.

The Georgians were able to see that we were a useless burden on their shoulders and they could very easily solve their own problems without us. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, had one wish: Joining the Turks to invade Baku right away. Following the Turkish victory, the Azerbaijanis had no longer any need for the Southern Caucasian Federation. They did not need the Georgians and they saw the Armenians as their enemy.

The moment of breaking down had come.

On May 26, the Seym abolished itself and abandoned its rights, taking into consideration that there were fundamental disagreements concerning war and peace issues .

On the same day and in the same building, Georgian National Council bombastically declared the sovereignty of Georgia.

One day later Armenia took the same step.

Now it was Armenia’s turn.

Was it right to declare our sovereignty; did we have the means to establish our own state and maintain it?

These questions were absurdly unnecessary. We had neither the place nor the time to organize elections. History had brought us to a certain point. We had to gather courage and solve this problem, for we did not want to disappear. We had to own our country, otherwise, we were going to lose it forever. A small hesitation and neglect would create a situation of res nullius (nobody’s property) and in such a situation we would become a war booty for our neighbours, the Turks, the Georgians and the Tatars.

On May 28, late at night, the Central National Council declared Armenia a sovereign state and itself the highest sovereign organ of this state.

The Council had not received any such authority from the National Board, but nevertheless they did not hesitate in the face of such a formal obstacle and in the following years nobody thought of accusing the Council of transgressing their authority. Everybody was aware that there was no other way.

On May 22-26 the battle of Serdarabat and on May 25-28 the battle of Karakilise were fought.

The Armenian people had gathered all their strength to defend their existence. No doubt these fierce battles, the brave resistance that the people (there was no longer an army) showed (especially around Karakilise) significantly raised our standing in the eyes of the Turks and provided the opportunity for a settlement.

The Armenian delegates who were now acting on behalf of the Armenian Republic and who had been authorized by the National Council returned to Batoum and a treaty was signed on June 4. It was a new phase in the life of the Armenian people; a phase of the revival of a state organization which had been lost long ago.

On August 1, The Armenian Parliament began to work in Yerevan (Erivan) and the first government was formed.

The parliament had been formed by tripling the present number of the National Council members. 6 Muslims, 1 Russian and 1 Yezid member was added to the other members. The majority belonged to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnagtzoutiun. Because our fraction held 18 votes out of the 47 and because we could not form a bloc with any other fraction, the Parliament had no stable center and a definite political identity.

The government was not stable either. The cabinet changed four times during the first 10 months, but the head of the government was always the same person.

The first governments that were formed were all coalitions (the Dashnags, the Cadets and an independent war Minister). The coalition government was not founded on a sound basis, because it did not have a safe majority in the parliament (the Cadets often took a different course from the Dashnags). What was more important was that there was no common agreement among the parties forming the government, on the basis of the program. The attitude our party had towards the government was also an obstacle in this context.

Now I would like to take up a mistake which I find very important and explain it below.

Armenia was a Democratic Republic. It had the proper organs of a democratic-parliamentarian government: a legislative body composed of the people’s representatives and a responsible administration. The Parliament was composed of representatives from the four existing Parties and minorities with the widest true democratic principles. The government received its authority from the legislative body and was responsible to it. This was the form. But the reality was otherwise. In practice our Party tended to subject to itself, to control, the legislative body and the government. We did not have the courage, nor the ability to declare an open dictatorship, but did not wish to remain within parliamentarian limits either and tried to establish in Armenia the “Ittihad” [44] system —a party dictatorship disguised as a democracy. An intolerable dualism resulted from it — on the surface the Parliament and the government; behind the scenes, invisible, the Party and its organs.

Naturally, these two types of authority which were practiced officially and unofficially were only obstructing one another. The official rules prevented the party from acting freely and fast and exposing its own will; the manipulations of the party also prevented the government from acting with its own initiative. This factor made it extremely difficult to form coalitions. Actually, the foreign elements of the coalition government had to practice the policies which had been decided outside the government, in party offices which did not belong to them and they had no control over.

Last summer, I prepared a report on this sensitive issue and presented it to the Party Congress, as I was instructed by the related party organ. My report was read at the regional meeting which met in Constantinopolis.

^44.The Ittihad (The Committee of Union and Progress) represented the resurgence of the Young Turk movement in 1909 against the oppressions of Sultan Hamid. It started as a revolutionary movement friendly to the Dashnags and Dashnag aspirations, but it soon followed, the established pattern of massacre, bloodshed and rabid Turkish fanaticism.

It was later seen that the hopes the people who prepared this declaration cherished to increase the political significance of Armenia and to facilitate the diplomatic work done in Europe were in vain. No change had been brought about in the situation, in the eyes of the European diplomacy. A single declaration of our parliament, this meager record which had not been supported with the necessary activities could not have changed the effect of realities. It could have been expected that our national delegation in Paris would be abolished, but it was not. Even following May 28, two diplomatic missions in Europe (The Delegation of the Republic and the National Delegation) continued to function side by side ; they were assigned to advocate the same issues in the same places to the same people. However, it proved difficult to compromise the activities of these two organs who were competing for authority. In this way, our undivided front in Europe was divided. In Armenia, on the other hand, it became difficult to find an opportunity to have a coalition with liberal elements and for this reason our party was more isolated.

The psychological demands which led us to announce the Federal Armenia Declaration are explicable.

The political considerations which led us and which justified the declaration are also understandable. However, it is a fact that this declaration did not lead to any favorable results; its unfavorable results (domestic strife and conflicts) are, on the other hand, very clear.

The Armenian Parliament opened on August 1, 1919. The elections took place in accordance with the democratic procedure — general, equal, direct and secret balloting — but it was strange and disheartening that 72 out of 80 members were Dashnaks, with only four members from the other parties. There was no opposition party to act as a check. We Dashnaks seemed to be victorious but did not understand that it was not a Parliament but the caricature of a Parliament.

We could not understand that elections proved that our people were not yet ready for an independent political life. We were not aware that our parliamentary victory was not actually a victory but a defeat and that by sending 72 members into the parliament we had lost the ground we trod on, the democratic foundation.

We did not understand that as we assumed authority, at the same time, we were also assuming all the responsibility. We lacked the necessary provisions and elements. We could not understand that a strong opposition was needed simply to discipline us and to prevent us from transgressing the present law and order. We also did not understand that by carrying our party meetings into the parliament we were actually bringing the existence of our party to an end.

There was no Parliament; it was an empty form without content. The problems of state were being discussed and solved behind closed doors, in the rooms of the Dashnag faction, and then declared from the rostrum of the Parliament.

In reality, there was not even a parliamentary faction, because this latter was under the very strict supervision of the Dashnag Bureau, and was obliged to carry out its orders. There was not a government either. This, also, was subject to the Bureau; it was a kind of executive body for the Bureau in the state. This was the Bolshevistic system. But what the Bolsheviks were doing openly and consistently, we were attempting to veil under democratic forms.

On the first days of May 1920 there were Bolshevik demonstrations and attempts at uprising. These were suppressed without much effort, because they had no basis; Bolshevism was strange to us. There was also no outside support.

Nevertheless, there was also an interesting situation. A group of young Bolsheviks (even in Yerevan (Erivan) in front of the eyes of the government) were making noisy demonstrations and propaganda among the military toops, occupying the train station in Gumru and capturing an armoured train

This proves that the government was irresponsible, weak and ignorant.

Following the Bolshevik rebellious efforts of May 1920, there was a “coup d’etat” and the A.R.F. Bureau (the so-called “Bureau Government”) replaced the Parliament with its own dictatorial rule. By order of the Bureau the resignation of prime minister A. Khadissian was accepted on May 5, and by order of the Bureau Dr. H. Ohanchanian was ordered to form a new cabinet; the latter presented the already-prepared list of ministers in the same meeting in which he was ordered to form a new cabinet. That was the Bureau itself. Parliament was ordered indefinitely recessed. The Armenian Parliament had given a dictatorial government to the Dashnagzoutuin — to the Bureau.

This was against the decision of the 9th General Meeting of the A.R.F. and had many disadvantages, but it also had the advantage of coming out in the open in its true form and color.

The Armenian-Turkish war which broke our back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not. The crushed Turkey of 1918 had recovered during the two years. There came forward patriotic, young officers who formed a new army in Asia Minor. They saw the necessity of attacking in the Northeast, and also in the Southwest against the Greeks which they could not do without first crushing their flank on the Armenian front. One cannot say that the Turks really had such a plan, but it is possible that they did and it was also probable that the war with us was inevitable.

Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do it. We did not do it for the simple reason — no less culpable — that we had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought we would win. With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them. [*]

I should point out that in the autumn of 1920 we were not a quantitie negligable in the eyes of Turks. The terrible incidents of the past years were forgotten. Our people were well rested and our army was well armed with British arms. We had sufficient ammunition. We were holding a very important fortress called Kars in our hands. Finally there was the Sèvres Treaty and it was not simply a piece of paper in those days, it was an important gain against Turks. We were not in a similar position to what we were in May 1918 in Batoum. We could easily believe we could be heard, because Turks were considered the defeated party.

We did not make an attempt.

If we had accepted their offer what would they have proposed to us? They would probably have started from where we had left at Batoum and Brest and then they would have given further concessions and receded behind the 1814 border lines. They could possibly have withdrawn further and could have handed over Beyazıt and Eleşkirt too.

Turks would never have given any further concessions than these in September 1920 and in return, they were going to demand from the Armenian government that they give up the rights advanced by the Sèvres Treaty.

How would the Armenian government have reacted to this?

They would certainly have refused the offer. The government would never have agreed to these conditions; they would have preferred fighting.

Not only the Dashnag Bureau-Government but any Armenian government would have acted in the same way. I am calling attention to this fact. And this quite significantly alleviates the crime committed by our party. The government could never have accepted these conditions; because all the political parties and groups, all our diplomats, all the appointed and voluntary patriots… all would have revolted, rejected the government and accused it of treason. The Sèvres Treaty had blinded everyone’s eyes.

We now see that if we had agreed on a settlement with the Turks directly (in spite of the Sèvres Treaty) we might have gained a lot. But we could not see this at that point.


^* Uras' translation:

It cannot be denied that we made no effort to avoid the war. There was a simple but inexcusable reason for this. We had no idea of the strength of the Turks, and we were too sure of our own strength. This was the main error. We were not afraid of the war because we were sure that we would win. Just as, with the insensitivity peculiar to ignorant and inexperienced people, we had no idea of the strength of the Turks,no defensive measures were taken at the border. On the contrary, we invaded Oltu, as if we were engaged in a duel. It was as if we actually wanted war. When confrontations at the border began, the Turks offered peace negotiations. We haughtily refused. This proved to be a great error. Not only were we sure of victory, but we believed that reconciliation was impossible...

The February revolt is solely their own doing; it was the result of their pressures, their autocratic behavior and their endless confiscations which used up the last remains of the economy and deprived the people who already had nothing to eat, of their last morsels.

Dashnagtzoutiun not only did not take part in the organization of this revolt, it was also opposed to it.

I know that some Dashnags somehow had some connections with the preparations in some villages, before the actual revolt. However, it was not the doing of our party but of individual members. However, after the revolt broke out, our party became active; it followed the masses and then led an action which it had no part in the preparations of.

At the end of the revolt, the Bolsheviks were pushed out of central Armenia towards the peripheral regions (Sharur and Qazax regions). An “Armenian Salvation Committee” was immediately founded, came to power and led the struggle.

The civil war lasted for 1,5 months.

In our circles, the tendency to explain the defeat of the revolting people by the supremacy of the Bolshevik forces is commonplace. However, I do not share this view. Some people really struggled well and were really courageous; but those were not our people but the Bolsheviks. If our people had fought well, they could have suppressed the enemy on the Gemerli and Yelenov fronts (anti-Bolshevik Georgia was still resisting and the Bolsheviks were not able to get any outside help and their own forces were not numerous). The reason for this bad fighting on our part was not due to reluctance (if it were, we would not have rebelled and shown the enthusiasm witnessed in Yerevan in the first days of the revolt); we did not have faith in our own strength and did not believe in success.

The revolt was a spontaneous and casual action. It broke out at an unexpected moment, flared and soon died down. I am not trying to say that if the insurgents had fought well, the Soviet government could have been brought down; no, defeat was inevitable (especially after the fall of Georgia). We could have slain all the Bolsheviks in Armenia (it would not have been difficult if the revolt had been more organized), but behind them was Russia with its Red Army. The Armenian peasants or the Dashnagtzoutiun Party was not going to resist that. However, what I would like to point out is that the revolt was destined to be defeated, because it cherished no faith in victory.

When the Bolsheviks reached Kanakir and occupied Yerevan (Erivan), we left Yerevan(Erivan) for Dereleğez through Baş-Garni.

A large mass of people who did not know where and why they were going, were also on the move, along with the insurgents and the party members.

The inevitable defeat was brought about. In the following two or three months, what happened in Dereleğez and Zengezour was no longer a fight but death throes.

After the fall of Yerevan, it was time to sovietize the mountainous part of Armenia. Our presence there might even have speeded up the flow of events.

We had thought that by moving into the mountainous Armenia, we would add to the strength of the native people and increase their capacity to resist. We had not taken into consideration that a defeated militia who were on retreat could increase the demoralization and helplessness of frightened masses of people. The native people did not favour and welcome us. We would rather not be seen by them. On top of everything, we had to share their last bits of food. We had, unintentionally, invited confusion to their lives. A firm contradiction arose between the native and outside Armenian authorities.

The military forces were dissolving day by day. Some of the soldiers who had accompanied us and who did not like the way they were treated by the native people, were now thinking about going back home. The groups who consisted of the Turkish Armenians (both armed and unarmed ones) were trying to reach Aras (Araxe) and then pass to Iran. The native people now saw that the army was breaking up and there was disorganization. They started to doubt their own strength.

At the end of the summer, Zangezour which was the last headquarters of the Democratic Republic, was wiped out.

Armenia was completely sovietized.

In the meanwhile, what had been our diplomatic activity with the outer world during our liberty as an independent nation — Constantinople, Europe and America — and what were the results? In the Spring of 1919, the Paris Delegation of our Republic presented a Memorandum of our demands to the Peace Conference in Paris jointly with the National Delegation of the Armenians in Turkey. According to that Memorandum the frontiers of the Armenian State would include:

A. The Caucasian Republic with enlarged territory (the entire district of Yerevan, the districts of Kars without the northern part of Ardahan, the southern section of the Tiflis territory, the south-western part of Kantzag);

B. The seven vilayets of Turkish Armenia (Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Harput, Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon, excluding only the southern section of Diyarbakır and the western section of Sivas);

C. The four sanjaks of Cilicia (Maraş, Sis, Djebel-Bereket and Adana with Alexandretta).

A vast state was being organized and demanded — a great Armenia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to the Arabian Desert. Where did that imperial, amazing demand emanate from? Neither the government of Armenia nor the Dashnagtzoutiun had envisaged such a childish and foolish plan. On the contrary, our Delegation had carried with it from Yerevan very moderate demands, commensurate with our very modest ability.

How did it happen that our Delegation signed the “From Sea to Sea” demand? It was told that if they did not demand those fascinating frontiers, the Turkish-Armenians (through their National Delegation) would sever their Cause from that of the “Republic of Ararat” and will apply to the Powers accordingly. Our Delegation was also told that America would not accept a mandate over a small Armenia but would accept one over a "From Sea to Sea" Armenia. Because it would have been dangerous to proceed with the defense of our Cause with two separate bodies, each with a contradictory demand, and because the American mandate was what we wanted, our delegates signed the Memorandum and presented it to the Powers.

I wish [therefore] to prove once more that our Party has not managed national affairs, has not had a strong will, has not followed our own program, but it has been led by others and has allowed the others to lead our Party.

The Paris Memorandum of course thrilled us. A kind of mentality was created according to which the drawing of frontiers on paper actually gave us those territories. To doubt it was a treachery. Of course there followed the rude awakening — the Treaty of Sèvres;[45] the refusal of the Senate of the United States to accept the mandate; even the frontiers drawn by President Wilson did not satisfy us. We thought he could have demanded a larger territory . . . There were the usual complaints that the powers were unfair, did not appreciate us and did not compensate us according to what we deserved.

However, these narrow borders were an inaccessible and alluring “blue bird” for us. Turks accepted neither the Wilson solution, nor our objections, nor the Sèvres Treaty. Instead of vacating Armenian lands, they were heavily arming and consolidating their positions. The allies on the other hand, showed no intention of forcing the rebel Ankara to submit. It was the reverse; they had started to flirt with them. It was as if they did not see that we were unsatisfied and they were busy straightening their own affairs.

(I often use the words “we” and “our” and do not clarify these pronouns. In many cases, I do not put any distinction between the party and the masses of people. Here is another instance of the same psychology, the same narrow scope, the same political short-sightedness)

The agony of the Armenian Cause began in 1922. At the London Conference [46] was heard for the first time the word “Home”. The Treaty of Sèvres was entirely forgotten. There was no question of an independent Armenian State. Only a doubtful “Home” in someone else’s home. This was the blow dealt us in March. Things got worse at Lausanne toward the end of the year. No “Home” was demanded for us. The Turks politely refused everything. The Great Allies, in a desperate gesture, confessed and bewailed that they had done everything possible to help the Armenians but could not do anything.

Then, here came comrade Tchicherin and offered in the name of Soviet Russia to locate the Armenians of Turkey in Crimea, on the shores of Volga, in Siberia. Thus, the “State” was reduced to a “Home”, and the “Home” was converted into colonies in Siberia. The mountain did not even give birth to a mouse. . . This was the past.

If we are to evaluate the work we did and the results we obtained, we must confess that we have nothing to boast about from the time we declared the independence of our Republic. We must admit that our burden to organize a State and lead it was far beyond our strength.

We have always miscalculated and have always encountered with unpredictable situations because we have been unable to foresee them. And it is evident, to me at least, that it was on account of our ineptness, individually, that prevented us from conducting affairs of state properly. We had been unable to distinguish the State from the Party and have introduced party mentality into matters of state. We have not been statesmen.

Let no one take offense from these words which are not spoken with any malice but are a mere self-estimation. Is it not true that I myself have been among the incompetents on the front line, your collaborator, equally responsible in our defeat?

I mentioned “responsibility”...I have had no courage so far to add that we were, most of the time,not aware of the responsibility we had taken upon us; and also we were not always sufficiently honest in connection with our duties. I do not have the courage, because I have worries about whether I can be sufficiently just. Yet, some people know about it and some day, perhaps some person who is more just than I am will come up talk about it more justly.

What is the present?

We have a small Republic today between the River Aras(Araxes) and Lake Sevan, nominally free, but in reality one of the fringe countries of the re-established sovereign Russian Empire. There is no Turkish-Armenia, neither State nor Home, not even an international political Question any more, killed and buried at Lausanne. Generally speaking, the Armenians in the Dispersion are not a political element for Armenia today.

I can say more: There are no longer any Armenians in the Turkish Armenia and it is out of the question that one day they will come back. Turks have firmly closed the doors and a force which will make them open the doors is nowhere to be seen.

Nearly one million Armenians are living outside the borders of the Republic; in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Northern Caucasia, Iran, Syria, Constantinopolis, Balkans and even in all the countries of the world.

Only a very small number of Armenians in the Dispersion were able to find themselves a sanctuary in Armenia. Leaving out the temporary difficulties, the too-narrow borders of the Republic do not permit massive migration (the issue here is the possibility of migration of the peasants in Armenian vilayets to Armenia). On the other hand, the social identity of the Armenians living outside Southern Caucasia (the petty bourgeoisie who have not had the chance to make a living in their plundered agricultural country which is dependent on commercial centers) is no less a problem.

^45. Under Article 88-93, Section VI of this treaty signed between the Allies and Turkey on August 10, 1920 Armenia was formally recognized by Turkey and the Allies as a “free and independent” state—a state more of the mind than of fact—which was promptly deserted by the Allies, rescinded by the Turks, abused and misgoverned by the Dashnage, and finally put to rout by the waiting Soviets.

^46. As a result, Italy entered the war on the Allied side, May 23, 1915.